On 04 Mar 2010, at 06:44, Rex Allen wrote:
On Wed, Mar 3, 2010 at 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
I may be absent for a period, for reason of sciatica.
Best,
Bruno
No worries! I will be a bit delayed on my response anyway. All is
well!
I am back home ...because they have not enough r
On 03 Mar 2010, at 19:30, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/3/2010 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Mar 2010, at 20:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/2/2010 10:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Mar 2010, at 20:29, Rex Allen wrote:
I don't have a problem with anti-realism about causal laws,
since
On Wed, Mar 3, 2010 at 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> I may be absent for a period, for reason of sciatica.
> Best,
> Bruno
No worries! I will be a bit delayed on my response anyway. All is well!
Rex
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I'm sorry to hear that, Bruno. Hope you get well soon!
Charles
On Mar 4, 3:26 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I may be absent for a period, for reason of sciatica.
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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On 3/3/2010 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Mar 2010, at 20:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/2/2010 10:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Mar 2010, at 20:29, Rex Allen wrote:
I don't have a problem with anti-realism about causal laws, since as
you say, my position boils down to "consciousne
I may be absent for a period, for reason of sciatica.
Best,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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On 02 Mar 2010, at 20:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/2/2010 10:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Mar 2010, at 20:29, Rex Allen wrote:
I don't have a problem with anti-realism about causal laws, since as
you say, my position boils down to "consciousness is fundamental and
uncaused."
What doe
On 3/2/2010 10:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Mar 2010, at 20:29, Rex Allen wrote:
I don't have a problem with anti-realism about causal laws, since as
you say, my position boils down to "consciousness is fundamental and
uncaused."
What does that explain? I cannot even derive from that if
On 01 Mar 2010, at 20:29, Rex Allen wrote:
On Mon, Mar 1, 2010 at 4:07 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 01 Mar 2010, at 05:40, Rex Allen wrote:
At most (!) one of those levels is
what really exists - the other levels are just ways that we think
about what really exists or ways that things *seem*
On Mon, Mar 1, 2010 at 4:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Mar 2010, at 05:40, Rex Allen wrote:
>> At most (!) one of those levels is
>> what really exists - the other levels are just ways that we think
>> about what really exists or ways that things *seem* to us.
>
> The point is that such a s
On 01 Mar 2010, at 05:40, Rex Allen wrote:
On Sun, Feb 28, 2010 at 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 28 Feb 2010, at 07:33, Rex Allen wrote:
What would the causal mechanism for natural selection be? A
"selection field"? "Selection particles"? Spooky "selection at a
distance"???
No
On Sun, Feb 28, 2010 at 2:15 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I think you have to narrow a concept of "explanation"; you seem to confine
> it to "causal physical chain at the most fundamental level." If someone
> asked you whether you expected a newly discovered animal species to be one
> that ate it's
On Sun, Feb 28, 2010 at 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 28 Feb 2010, at 07:33, Rex Allen wrote:
>
>> What would the causal mechanism for natural selection be? A
>> "selection field"? "Selection particles"? Spooky "selection at a
>> distance"???
>
>
>
>
> No, it is (mainly) Sex.
>
> Select
Okay, I think maybe we're getting somewhere!
On Sun, Feb 28, 2010 at 3:37 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 28 February 2010 17:38, Rex Allen wrote:
>
>>> People believe and do all sorts of crazy things, as I'm sure you know.
>>> The psychological capacity for just about any possible behaviour
On 2/27/2010 10:38 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 10:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:
On 28 February 2010 05:33, Rex Allen wrote:
I'm not sure what you're saying here. Is it that peoples' beliefs
could not be other than what they actually are given initial
condition
On 2/27/2010 10:33 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 4:27 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Rex Allen wrote:
Note that I am not arguing that this particular belief is an
impossible belief. What I'm arguing is that evolution doesn't help
you one way or the other in deciding...because evol
On 28 Feb 2010, at 07:33, Rex Allen wrote:
What would the causal mechanism for natural selection be? A
"selection field"? "Selection particles"? Spooky "selection at a
distance"???
No, it is (mainly) Sex.
Selection by individual seduction. On some level.
Chatting universal chromosomes
On 28 February 2010 17:38, Rex Allen wrote:
>> People believe and do all sorts of crazy things, as I'm sure you know.
>> The psychological capacity for just about any possible behaviour is
>> there, but the very maladaptive behaviours are rare. It's not that
>> it's difficult to make an animal th
On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 10:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:
> On 28 February 2010 05:33, Rex Allen wrote:
>
>>> I'm not sure what you're saying here. Is it that peoples' beliefs
>>> could not be other than what they actually are given initial
>>> conditions and physical laws? I suppose that is
On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 4:27 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Rex Allen wrote:
>>
>> Note that I am not arguing that this particular belief is an
>> impossible belief. What I'm arguing is that evolution doesn't help
>> you one way or the other in deciding...because evolution is just a
>> mental tool, a
On 28 February 2010 05:33, Rex Allen wrote:
>> I'm not sure what you're saying here. Is it that peoples' beliefs
>> could not be other than what they actually are given initial
>> conditions and physical laws? I suppose that is true, but even in a
>> deterministic single universe we generally us
Rex Allen wrote:
On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 5:27 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 February 2010 14:59, Rex Allen wrote:
People can only have beliefs that supervene onto one of the physical
configurations that it is possible for a human brain to take. What
determines the set of possi
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 February 2010 14:59, Rex Allen wrote:
On Fri, Feb 26, 2010 at 5:55 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 February 2010 16:41, Rex Allen wrote:
Could our universe *actually* produce such a being by applying our
presumably deterministic laws to a
On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 5:27 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 27 February 2010 14:59, Rex Allen wrote:
>> People can only have beliefs that supervene onto one of the physical
>> configurations that it is possible for a human brain to take. What
>> determines the set of possible physical brain
On 27 February 2010 14:59, Rex Allen wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 26, 2010 at 5:55 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>> On 26 February 2010 16:41, Rex Allen wrote:
>>> Could our universe *actually* produce such a being by applying our
>>> presumably deterministic laws to any set of initial conditions ov
On Fri, Feb 26, 2010 at 5:55 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 26 February 2010 16:41, Rex Allen wrote:
>> Could our universe *actually* produce such a being by applying our
>> presumably deterministic laws to any set of initial conditions over
>> any amount of time?
>
> Of course it could. Peo
On 26 February 2010 16:41, Rex Allen wrote:
>> We could, for example, have the belief that we only survive for a day,
>> and the entity who wakes up in our bed tomorrow is a different person.
>> We would then use up our resources and plan for the future as if we
>> only had hours to live. But peo
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 11:02 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:
> On 25 February 2010 14:46, Charles wrote:
>
>> However, I agree that the statement "evolution has programmed us to
>> think of ourselves as a single individual", etc is rather contentious
>> as an explanation of why we think this way.
On 25 February 2010 14:46, Charles wrote:
> However, I agree that the statement "evolution has programmed us to
> think of ourselves as a single individual", etc is rather contentious
> as an explanation of why we think this way. It seems to imply that
> there are many other ways we *could* think
On Jan 15, 5:15 pm, Rex Allen wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 10:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
>
> wrote:
>
> > There is no real distinction between the different possibilities you
> > mention, but evolution has programmed me to think that I am a single
> > individual travelling in the forward dire
On 23 January 2010 07:08, Nick Prince wrote:
> Hi Stahis
>
> You brought up the point of personal identity.
>
> When someone goes to sleep they lose consciousness (I am assuming so
> anyway - perhaps during deep sleep rather than REM). OK, so some
> people say that because they wake up again there
Hi Stahis
You brought up the point of personal identity.
When someone goes to sleep they lose consciousness (I am assuming so
anyway - perhaps during deep sleep rather than REM). OK, so some
people say that because they wake up again there is always a branch
where they wake up. But suppose someb
On Jan 16, 1:06 am, Rex Allen wrote:
> Evolution doesn't count as an answer since it has to be cashed
> out in terms of some more fundamental theory, right?
> To answer "evolution" is dodging the question.
I think evolution is the primary driver of everything, as evolution
could be applied to n
2010/1/21 Brent Meeker :
> Not necessarily psychological. A materialist theory also includes the idea
> of information preservation in material form. In the thought experiment
> about copies, it is assumed that the information content of the those
> "terminated" is lost. But it's not clear to m
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/20 Brent Meeker :
What do you think could happen if there were 100 copies of you running
in parallel and 90 were terminated? If you think you would definitely
continue living as one of the 10 remaining copies then to be
consistent you have to accept QTI. If
On 20 Jan 2010, at 11:25, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/20 Nick Prince :
If the no clone theorem were a problem then you could not survive
more
than a moment, since your brain is constantly undergoing classical
level changes.
How interesting!! I had forgotten that most people believe
2010/1/20 Nick Prince :
>> If the no clone theorem were a problem then you could not survive more
>> than a moment, since your brain is constantly undergoing classical
>> level changes.
>>
> How interesting!! I had forgotten that most people believe that
> consciousness is a classical rather than
2010/1/20 Brent Meeker :
>> What do you think could happen if there were 100 copies of you running
>> in parallel and 90 were terminated? If you think you would definitely
>> continue living as one of the 10 remaining copies then to be
>> consistent you have to accept QTI. If you think there is a
>
> > Are you saying that you do not subscribe to differentiation?
>
> > Nick Prince
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by "differentiation", but I don't subscribe
> to one theory or another - I just consider them. Above I was only
> pointing out that there are theories (in fact the most common theor
Nick Prince wrote:
On Jan 19, 6:43 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/19 Nick Prince :
Perhaps you misunderstood my reference to the use of copies. What I
meant was why they are considered as an indication of measure at the
beginning of thought experimen
Something vs Nothing?
I played with this so a decade+ ago and found that by simply realizing the
term *"NOTHING*" we achieved *'something*' so the *nothing* is gone. While,
however, going from *'something'* to the (elusive?) 'nothing', we have to
cut out *EVERYTHING* that may interfere with 'nothi
On Jan 19, 6:43 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > 2010/1/19 Nick Prince :
>
> >> Perhaps you misunderstood my reference to the use of copies. What I
> >> meant was why they are considered as an indication of measure at the
> >> beginning of thought experiments such as the
> If the no clone theorem were a problem then you could not survive more
> than a moment, since your brain is constantly undergoing classical
> level changes.
>
How interesting!! I had forgotten that most people believe that
consciousness is a classical rather than quantum process (Penrose
exc
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/19 Nick Prince :
Perhaps you misunderstood my reference to the use of copies. What I
meant was why they are considered as an indication of measure at the
beginning of thought experiments such as the one you discussed (tea/
coffe). Jaques Mallah uses them t
On 18 Jan 2010, at 19:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Jan 2010, at 09:11, Brent Meeker wrote:
Brent
"The reason that there is Something rather than Nothing is that
Nothing is unstable."
-- Frank Wilczek, Nobel Laureate, phyiscs 2004
So, why is Nothing unstable?
Bec
2010/1/19 Nick Prince :
> Perhaps you misunderstood my reference to the use of copies. What I
> meant was why they are considered as an indication of measure at the
> beginning of thought experiments such as the one you discussed (tea/
> coffe). Jaques Mallah uses them too (I’d like to discuss o
On Jan 18, 2:11 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2010/1/18 Nick Prince :
>
>
>
>
>
> >> If you had to guess you would say that your present OM is a common
> >> rather than a rare one, because you are more likely to be right.
> >> However, knowledge trumps probability. If you know that your prese
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Jan 2010, at 00:37, Rex Allen wrote:
The patterns I've observed don't explain my conscious experience.
There's nothing in my concept of "patterns" which would explain how it
might give rise to conscious experience.
So I fully buy the idea that patterns (physical or
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Jan 2010, at 09:11, Brent Meeker wrote:
Brent
"The reason that there is Something rather than Nothing is that
Nothing is unstable."
-- Frank Wilczek, Nobel Laureate, phyiscs 2004
So, why is Nothing unstable?
Because there are so many ways to be something
2010/1/18 Nick Prince :
>> If you had to guess you would say that your present OM is a common
>> rather than a rare one, because you are more likely to be right.
>> However, knowledge trumps probability. If you know that your present
>> OM is common and your successor OM a minute from now rare - b
On 18 Jan 2010, at 00:37, Rex Allen wrote:
The patterns I've observed don't explain my conscious experience.
There's nothing in my concept of "patterns" which would explain how it
might give rise to conscious experience.
So I fully buy the idea that patterns (physical or platonic) can be
used
On 17 Jan 2010, at 09:11, Brent Meeker wrote:
Brent
"The reason that there is Something rather than Nothing is that
Nothing is unstable."
-- Frank Wilczek, Nobel Laureate, phyiscs 2004
So, why is Nothing unstable?
Because there are so many ways to be something and only one way to
be n
On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 at 1:05 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Rex Allen wrote:
>>
>> So I'm just trying to understand my situation here. To me, my
>> existence seems quite perplexing. An explanation is in order.
>>
>
> But you never say what would count as an explanation - which makes me think
> you do
Rex Allen wrote:
On Sun, Jan 17, 2010 at 7:22 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Rex Allen wrote:
So ultimately, there is no reason you value the things you do...that's
just the way things are.
Suppose there was a reason - what would it be like? And why would it make
any difference whet
On Sun, Jan 17, 2010 at 7:22 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Rex Allen wrote:
>> So ultimately, there is no reason you value the things you do...that's
>> just the way things are.
>>
>
> Suppose there was a reason - what would it be like? And why would it make
> any difference whether there was a reaso
On Sun, Jan 17, 2010 at 6:31 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 17, 2010 at 12:50 AM, Jason Resch
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 4:51 PM, Rex Allen
> wrote:
> >>
> >> On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 1:59 PM, Brent Meeker
> >> wrote:
> >> > Rex Allen wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> What caused it
On Sun, Jan 17, 2010 at 12:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 4:51 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 1:59 PM, Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>> > Rex Allen wrote:
>> >>
>> >> What caused it to exist?
>> >>
>> >
>> > Who said it needs a cause?
>>
>> Why this reality
Rex Allen wrote:
On Sun, Jan 17, 2010 at 3:11 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Rex Allen wrote:
Okay, an underlying objective reality causes the order in what we
experience - but then what causes the order in this underlying
objective reality?
You haven't answered any questions...you've just r
On Sun, Jan 17, 2010 at 3:11 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Rex Allen wrote:
>> Okay, an underlying objective reality causes the order in what we
>> experience - but then what causes the order in this underlying
>> objective reality?
>>
>> You haven't answered any questions...you've just rephrased them
On Jan 17, 11:51 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2010/1/17 Nick Prince :
>
> > You can see I am struggling with these self sampling assumptions. I
> > just cannot get a handle on how to think about them.
>
> The SSA is difficult to get one's head around, and sometimes leads to
> counterintuiti
2010/1/17 Nick Prince :
> You can see I am struggling with these self sampling assumptions. I
> just cannot get a handle on how to think about them.
The SSA is difficult to get one's head around, and sometimes leads to
counterintuitive conclusions. Have you looked up Nick Bostrom's
writings in r
Rex Allen wrote:
On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 6:26 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Rex Allen wrote:
It seems to me that you are starting with a strong bias towards matter
as fundamental, instead of starting with a clean slate and working
forward from first principles.
That's because taking
On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 4:51 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
> On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 1:59 PM, Brent Meeker
> wrote:
> > Rex Allen wrote:
> >>
> >> What caused it to exist?
> >>
> >
> > Who said it needs a cause?
>
> Why this reality as opposed to nothing? Given the principle of
> sufficient reason, woul
On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 6:26 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Rex Allen wrote:
>> It seems to me that you are starting with a strong bias towards matter
>> as fundamental, instead of starting with a clean slate and working
>> forward from first principles.
>>
>
> That's because taking material processes
Rex Allen wrote:
On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 10:09 AM, John Mikes wrote:
Dear Brent, just a tiny (but fundamental?) question. You wrote (never mind
'on' what):
"One can look at them that way, but ARE they that way?"
the BIG question: are we in any position to identify 'real existence'
(are)
Rex Allen wrote:
On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 1:59 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Rex Allen wrote:
What caused it to exist?
Who said it needs a cause?
Why this reality as opposed to nothing? Given the principle of
sufficient reason, wouldn't "nothingness" be the expected state of
On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 10:09 AM, John Mikes wrote:
> Dear Brent, just a tiny (but fundamental?) question. You wrote (never mind
> 'on' what):
>
> "One can look at them that way, but ARE they that way?"
>
> the BIG question: are we in any position to identify 'real existence'
> (are) vs. our ass
On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 1:59 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Rex Allen wrote:
>>
>> What caused it to exist?
>>
>
> Who said it needs a cause?
Why this reality as opposed to nothing? Given the principle of
sufficient reason, wouldn't "nothingness" be the expected state of
things?
But, given that real
John Mikes wrote:
Dear Brent, just a tiny (but fundamental?) question. You wrote (never
mind 'on' what):
/"One can look at them that way, but ARE they that way?"/
It was Rex who wrote that.
//
/the BIG question: are we in any position to identify 'real
existence' *(are)* vs. our assumptio
Rex Allen wrote:
On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 2:57 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
There is some reality independent of us but which we invent
theories about which refer to some aspects of this reality.
Is this reality deterministic or random?
Random.
What caused it to exist?
Who said it
On Jan 15, 6:35 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2010/1/15 Nick Prince :
>
> > 1. Do you think dementia a cul de sac branch then (MWI or single
> > world?
>
> There are branches where your mind gradually fades away to nothing.
> However, there are other branches where you start dementing then
>
Dear Brent, just a tiny (but fundamental?) question. You wrote (never mind
'on' what):
*"One can look at them that way, but ARE they that way?"*
**
*the BIG question: are we in any position to identify 'real existence'
(are) vs. our assumptions - what we like to call here 'descriptions'? There
a
2010/1/15 Brent Meeker :
> I guess I should be more explicit. I found your post bemusingly
> inconsistent. You theorized that the continuity of your experience was an
> illusion produced by evolution and you "really" exist as a sequence of
> discrete OMs. But evolution is a process that acts on
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/15 Brent Meeker :
Or why not suppose you are your body (including your genes). Then evolution
would be able to have had the imputed effect on "you" that you suppose it
does.
The actual effect of any adaptive behaviour must be through the genes,
but e
2010/1/15 Brent Meeker :
> Or why not suppose you are your body (including your genes). Then evolution
> would be able to have had the imputed effect on "you" that you suppose it
> does.
The actual effect of any adaptive behaviour must be through the genes,
but evolution could not work directly
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/15 Brent Meeker :
There is no real distinction between the different possibilities you [Jason
Resch]
mention, but evolution has programmed me to think that I am a single
individual travelling in the forward direction through time. It's
possible to go throug
2010/1/15 Nick Prince :
> 1. Do you think dementia a cul de sac branch then (MWI or single
> world?
There are branches where your mind gradually fades away to nothing.
However, there are other branches where you start dementing then
recover, as well as branches where you don't dement at all. It's
2010/1/15 Rex Allen :
> On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 10:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>>
>> There is no real distinction between the different possibilities you
>> mention, but evolution has programmed me to think that I am a single
>> individual travelling in the forward direction through time.
2010/1/15 Brent Meeker :
>> There is no real distinction between the different possibilities you [Jason
>> Resch]
>> mention, but evolution has programmed me to think that I am a single
>> individual travelling in the forward direction through time. It's
>> possible to go through life not questio
Rex Allen wrote:
On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 10:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:
There is no real distinction between the different possibilities you
mention, but evolution has programmed me to think that I am a single
individual travelling in the forward direction through time.
How did
On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 10:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:
>
> There is no real distinction between the different possibilities you
> mention, but evolution has programmed me to think that I am a single
> individual travelling in the forward direction through time.
How did evolution do that? B
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/15 Jason Resch :
There's no clear answer. This is where the idea that we live only
transiently is helpful: there is no fact-of-the-matter about who is me
and who isn't since none of them are me, but we can talk about under
what circumstances the illusion of
2010/1/15 Jason Resch :
>> There's no clear answer. This is where the idea that we live only
>> transiently is helpful: there is no fact-of-the-matter about who is me
>> and who isn't since none of them are me, but we can talk about under
>> what circumstances the illusion of continuity of identit
(maybe appearing to sort of a over-person or god
or "I AM" that is even more stable?).
I think this can resolve the problem of personal identity, because "your
identity" is just an especially stable moment, that can relate many
sub-moments to itself and thus becomes especi
On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 3:22 PM, russell standish wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 10:21:34AM -0600, Jason Resch wrote:
> > If you don't believe they are you, that would imply when you put a pot of
> > coffee on the stove, you do so out of altruism. Since it only benefits
> > those future observe
On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 10:21:34AM -0600, Jason Resch wrote:
> If you don't believe they are you, that would imply when you put a pot of
> coffee on the stove, you do so out of altruism. Since it only benefits
> those future observers who have memory of being you but are not. It's not a
> useful
On Jan 14, 9:51 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2010/1/14 Nick Prince :
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>The ASSA proponents say that even though there are
> >>thousand year old versions of you in the multiverse they are of very
> >>low measure and you are therefore very unlikely to find yourself one
> >>of t
On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 8:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2010/1/15 Jason Resch :
>
> > I would think the business is operating a scam and possibly report them
> for
> > making deceptive claims in advertising. There is no difference between
> the
> > economy or first class tickets other than
2010/1/15 Jason Resch :
> I would think the business is operating a scam and possibly report them for
> making deceptive claims in advertising. There is no difference between the
> economy or first class tickets other than price and so I would go with the
> economy level ticket. I don't see how
On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 1:10 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2010/1/14 Jason Resch :
>
> > I agree, there is no subjective difference. But I think there is a
> logical
> > difference, if you are only your current OM why go to work when some
> other
> > OM will enjoy the fruits of that labor? Bu
2010/1/14 Nick Prince :
> Also if QTI is true then my birth OM could be just the consistence
> extension of the consciousness of someone who has died. QTI implies
> we always have a next observer moment. Somehow this begs the question
> as to whether consiousness is conserved somehow. Hence ther
2010/1/14 Nick Prince :
>
>>The ASSA proponents say that even though there are
>>thousand year old versions of you in the multiverse they are of very
>>low measure and you are therefore very unlikely to find yourself one
>>of them.
>
>
> How do they know this though? If the probability distributio
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/14 Jason Resch :
I agree, there is no subjective difference. But I think there is a logical
difference, if you are only your current OM why go to work when some other
OM will enjoy the fruits of that labor? But by attaching every OM to the
same observer th
2010/1/14 Brent Meeker :
> Is this different from your idea that "experiencing Friday" only comes after
> "experinicing Thursday" because "Friday" contains some memory of "Thursday"?
> You seem to be assuming an extrinsic order in the above.
I think it would be the same regardless of when the da
2010/1/14 Jason Resch :
> I agree, there is no subjective difference. But I think there is a logical
> difference, if you are only your current OM why go to work when some other
> OM will enjoy the fruits of that labor? But by attaching every OM to the
> same observer then there is a reason to m
Stathis,
I feel both ASSA and RSSA are variations WITHIN human thinking with a
minuscule difference of handling. When I TRY to think about 'everything' I
feel I have to step out from the restrictions of the human 'mind'(?)
capabilities and (at least) imagine to grasp totality (i.e. the wholeness)
On Jan 13, 6:21 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > ...
> > The ASSA/RSSA distinction on this list came, as I understand it, from
> > debate on the validity of the idea of "quantum immortality". This is
> > the theory that in a multiverse you can never die, because at every
>If I'm not already embedded in the multiverse then I could be anyone,
>and I am therefore more likely to be someone from a high probability
>group or era. So I am more likely to be a modern human than an early
>human, for example, because there are more modern humans. I think
>that's what Russell
>The ASSA proponents say that even though there are
>thousand year old versions of you in the multiverse they are of very
>low measure and you are therefore very unlikely to find yourself one
>of them.
How do they know this though? If the probability distribution was
uniform then versions of me
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
The ASSA/RSSA distinction on this list came, as I understand it, from
debate on the validity of the idea of "quantum immortality". This is
the theory that in a multiverse you can never die, because at every
juncture where you could die there is always a version of y
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