Hi Brent, I have joined you last two posts,
Le 31-août-07, à 17:55, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>> Yes. I can accept that PA is a description of counting. But PA, per
>> se,
>> is not a description of PA. With your term: I can accept arithmetic is
>> a description of counting (and adding and mul
On Sep 1, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > The description itself is an algorithm written in symbols.
>
> Peano's axioms aren't an algorithm.
Er..you're right here of course. I'm getting myself a bit confused
again. Careful when thinking abou
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I said to Brent,
>
>
> Le 31-août-07, à 11:00, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
>
>> So, no, I don't see why you think my objection is a non-sequitur. It
>> seems to me you are confusing arithmetic and Arithmetic, or a theory
>> with his intended model.
>
>
> Brent, rereading yo
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 30-août-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>> ? I don't understand. Arithmetic is about number. Meta-arithmetic is
>>> about theories on numbers. That is very different.
>> Yes, I understand that. But ISTM the argument went sort of like
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> On Aug 31, 6:21 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>> I *don't* think that mathematical p
On Aug 31, 9:40 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Only a meta-theory *about* PA, can distinguish PA and arithmetical
> truth. But then Godel showed that sometimes a meta-theory can be
> translated in or by the theory/machine.
But is the meta-theory *about* PA, itself classified
On Aug 31, 9:40 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I said to Brent,
>
> Le 31-août-07, à 11:00, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
>
> > So, no, I don't see why you think my objection is a non-sequitur. It
> > seems to me you are confusing arithmetic and Arithmetic, or a theory
> > with his int
I said to Brent,
Le 31-août-07, à 11:00, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
> So, no, I don't see why you think my objection is a non-sequitur. It
> seems to me you are confusing arithmetic and Arithmetic, or a theory
> with his intended model.
Brent, rereading your post I think there is perhaps more th
Le 30-août-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> ? I don't understand. Arithmetic is about number. Meta-arithmetic is
>> about theories on numbers. That is very different.
>
> Yes, I understand that. But ISTM the argument went sort of like this:
> I say arithmeti
On Aug 31, 6:21 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>> Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
> I *don't* think that mathematical
> properties are propertie
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>>>
I *don't* think that mathematical
properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I
think they are properti
Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>>
>>> I *don't* think that mathematical
>>> properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I
>>> think they are properties *of the thing itself*.
>>
On Aug 30, 1:37 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 29-août-07, à 12:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
> > Any scientific theory (including Darwin's) *is* more accurate when
> > expressed in mathematical notation. You *can* draw a clear
> > distinction between the language used to
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
>> I *don't* think that mathematical
>> properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I
>> think they are properties *of the thing itself*.
>
>
> I agree with you. If you identify "mathematical the
Le 29-août-07, à 12:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> Any scientific theory (including Darwin's) *is* more accurate when
> expressed in mathematical notation. You *can* draw a clear
> distinction between the language used to express mathematical concepts
> and the concept itself.
OK.
> Pure
Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> I *don't* think that mathematical
> properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I
> think they are properties *of the thing itself*.
I agree with you. If you identify "mathematical theories" with
"descriptions", then th
On Aug 29, 1:10 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> So are mathematics human creations (c.f. William S. Cooper, "The Evolution of
> Logic"). There is no sharp distinction between what is expressed in words
> and what is expressed in mathematical symbols. Darwins theory of evolut
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> On Aug 29, 4:20 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Thanks for spelling it out.
>
>>> (1) Mathematical concepts are indispensible to our explanations of
>>> reality.
>> So are grammatical concepts.
>
> No they aren't. Grammatical concepts are human cr
On Aug 29, 4:03 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> There is this special quality of subjective experience: that which is
> >> left over after all the objective (third person knowable) information
> >> is accounted for. Nevertheless, the subjective experience can be
> >> perfectly
On Aug 29, 4:20 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Thanks for spelling it out.
>
> > (1) Mathematical concepts are indispensible to our explanations of
> > reality.
>
> So are grammatical concepts.
No they aren't. Grammatical concepts are human creations, which is
precisely shown b
Thanks for spelling it out.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> On Aug 28, 5:18 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> I don't find your arguments at all convincing. In fact I don't think you've
>> even given an argument - just assertions.
>
>
> Here the points of a clear-cut argumen
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> On Aug 28, 12:53 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> On 27/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
accept the concept of supervenience, but
On 28/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation
> > was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that
> > the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits,
> > but the circulat
On 28/08/07, David Nyman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation
> > was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that
> > the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits,
> > but the circulatory sy
On Aug 28, 6:31 pm, "Torgny Tholerus" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] skrev:
>
>
>
> > (7) From (3) mathematical concepts are objectively real. But there
> > exist mathematical concepts (inifinite sets) which cannot be explained
> > in terms of finite physical processes.
>
> How
[EMAIL PROTECTED] skrev:
>
> (7) From (3) mathematical concepts are objectively real. But there
> exist mathematical concepts (inifinite sets) which cannot be explained
> in terms of finite physical processes.
How can you prove that infinite sets exists?
--
Torgny Tholerus
--~--~-~
On Aug 28, 5:18 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I don't find your arguments at all convincing. In fact I don't think you've
> even given an argument - just assertions.
Here the points of a clear-cut argument. These are not 'just
assertions':
(1) Mathematical concepts are
On Aug 28, 12:53 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 27/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > > I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
> > > accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
> > > (stub
On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I'm prepared to remain agnostic. There is no 3rd person explanation of
> consciouness that is anywhere near as complete as the explanation of gravity
> or life. Maybe when I see one I'll consider it as complete as I do the
> biochemical
David Nyman wrote:
> On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> But my point is that you're insisting that explanation is something that you
>> find satisfying. It's not that explanation fails in general, it fails
>> subjectively for you. Every explanation can fail in that way
On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> But my point is that you're insisting that explanation is something that you
> find satisfying. It's not that explanation fails in general, it fails
> subjectively for you. Every explanation can fail in that way on any subject.
Well, it
David Nyman wrote:
> On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> I think you're setting up an impossible standard of "explaining".
>> You're asking that it produce a certain feeling in you, and then
>> you're speculating that after being given all the physics of
>> conscious process
On 27/08/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I think you're setting up an impossible standard of "explaining". You're
> asking that it produce a certain feeling in you, and then you're speculating
> that after being given all the physics of conscious processes and even the
> ability
David Nyman wrote:
> On 27/08/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation
>> was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that
>> the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> On Aug 27, 6:45 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> I don't know whether you're hair splitting or speaking loosely, but the
>> above is off the point in a couple of ways. In the first place empirical
>> science is inductive not deductive; so there
On 27/08/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation
> was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that
> the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits,
> but the circulatory sy
On 27/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
> > accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
> > (stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word "fundamental". The base
> > property seems to me
Le 27-août-07, à 07:08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
>
>
> On Aug 22, 10:14 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>>
>> Comp is a short expression made for "computationalism".
>> Computationalism, which I called also "digital mechanism" is Descartes
>> related doctrine that we are digi
On Aug 27, 6:45 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I don't know whether you're hair splitting or speaking loosely, but the above
> is off the point in a couple of ways. In the first place empirical science
> is inductive not deductive; so there is a trivial sense in which you ca
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> On Aug 22, 11:55 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>> I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
>> accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
>> (stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word "
On Aug 22, 11:55 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
> accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
> (stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word "fundamental". The base
> property seem
On Aug 22, 10:14 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Comp is a short expression made for "computationalism".
> Computationalism, which I called also "digital mechanism" is Descartes
> related doctrine that we are digitalisable machine. I make it often
> precise by defining comp to
Le 22-août-07, à 07:23, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
>
>
> On Aug 22, 4:41 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> That's a pity. I thought it might be something comprehensible, rather
>> than just plain mysterious.
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>
> The ida of property dualism is very simple:
> ht
On 21/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Here you are implicitly assuming that there is ONE fundamental level
> of reality only. Why do you keep making this assumption? Property
> Dualism says that there is more than one way to describe reality, and
> each way is no more or l
Le 21-août-07, à 07:24, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote
> I thought I made it clear I wasn't trying reduce everything to
> physics.
Yes. Nice. I did see that. I did just take the opportunity to criticize
both those who believe math IS reducible to physics and those (like you
up to now) who thinks th
Still sounds like emergence to me.
On Tue, Aug 21, 2007 at 10:23:18PM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
>
> On Aug 22, 4:41 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > That's a pity. I thought it might be something comprehensible, rather
> > than just plain mysterious.
> >
> > Cheers
On Aug 22, 4:41 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> That's a pity. I thought it might be something comprehensible, rather
> than just plain mysterious.
>
> Cheers
>
The ida of property dualism is very simple:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism
It just means that the sa
That's a pity. I thought it might be something comprehensible, rather
than just plain mysterious.
Cheers
On Tue, Aug 21, 2007 at 08:22:59PM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
>
> On Aug 22, 11:26 am, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> >
> > Marc, how does your property dualism
On Aug 22, 11:26 am, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Marc, how does your property dualism differ from the account of
> emergence I give in "On Complexity and Emergence"? (If indeed it does
> differ!).
>
> Cheers
>
I've only given your text a quick skim so far. As far as I can
On Tue, Aug 21, 2007 at 11:23:01AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Here you are implicitly assuming that there is ONE fundamental level
> of reality only. Why do you keep making this assumption? Property
> Dualism says that there is more than one way to describe reality, and
> each way is n
On Aug 21, 10:31 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Well, return to a concrete example. Yesterday, I thought red was the
> best colour for my new car, but today I think blue is better. My
> aesthetic values would seem to have changed. There must be some reason
> for this,
On 21/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Aug 20, 9:45 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > Now consider sentient agent motivations (and remember the analogy with
> >
On Aug 20, 10:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 19-août-07, à 08:07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
> But apparently, like Chalmers, you seem to dismiss even the possibility
> of comp. OK?
>
Sorry, I meant to say in previous post that my version property is NOT
quite the same
On Aug 20, 9:45 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Now consider sentient agent motivations (and remember the analogy with
> > the physics argument I gave above).
>
> > *Consider an agent with a set of mot
On Aug 20, 10:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > No, that's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to 'Abstract
> > Universals' - Platonic Ideals that all observers with complete
> > information would agree with.
>
> Even in the restricted arithmetical Platonia, no "observ
Le 19-août-07, à 08:07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
>
>
> On Aug 19, 12:26 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>>
>> This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a
>> particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we
>> can use empirical mean
On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Now consider sentient agent motivations (and remember the analogy with
> the physics argument I gave above).
>
> *Consider an agent with a set of motivations A
> *Consider the transition of that agent to a different set of
> motivations
On Aug 20, 9:26 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, "Giu1i0 Pri5c0" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months.
>
> > No. That's because after t
On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, "Giu1i0 Pri5c0" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months.
>
> No. That's because after the terrible insults levelled at me by some...
Surely not on this list!
--
St
>3PV observation and analysis _may_ eventually turn up with objective
>criteria that establish universally consistent and reliable
>correlation between certain brain processes and certain reported
>phenomenal experiences
Of course. It appears from all scientific evidence that phenomenal
experien
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, "Giu1i0 Pri5c0" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Question: why do you _want_
> to think that there are objective values?
> G.
Here's my answer:
I want to to think that there are objective values because I dislike
the idea that important aspects of our (human) existence are
inex
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, "Giu1i0 Pri5c0" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months.
No. That's because after the terrible insults levelled at me by some
I had to take a break to make absolutely certain that my arguments,
theories (and java code) are all
MG: 'It's really quite obvious in retrospect - physical
> properties involve energy, mathematical properties involve knowledge
> (meaningful patterns). Old David Chalmers was right about this one
> (see his 'property dualism'). The two properties just ain't the same
> and no amount of semantic t
On 19/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a
> > particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we
> > can use empirical means to determine what these values are. However,
> > if I like red and you li
Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months.
Concerning objective values, as we have discussed in the past, I don't
see any rational argument in support of their existence. For example
if one has chosen to consider the elimination of the human species as
a priority value (like some fu
On Aug 19, 9:25 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Marc, refers to "a commonality averaged across many events and agents" so
> apparently he has in mind a residue of consensus or near consensus.
Correct.
>Color preferences might average out to nil except in narrow circumstance
On Aug 19, 12:26 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a
> particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we
> can use empirical means to determine what these values are. However,
> if I like red an
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 18/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Objective values are NOT specifications of what agents SHOULD do.
>> They are simply explanatory principles. The analogy here is with the
>> laws of physics. The laws of physics *per se* are NOT description
On 18/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Objective values are NOT specifications of what agents SHOULD do.
> They are simply explanatory principles. The analogy here is with the
> laws of physics. The laws of physics *per se* are NOT descriptions of
> future states of matter
Objective values are NOT specifications of what agents SHOULD do.
They are simply explanatory principles. The analogy here is with the
laws of physics. The laws of physics *per se* are NOT descriptions of
future states of matter. The descriptions of the future states of
matter are *implied by*
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