Hardware, Software, Humans: Truth, Fiction, and Abstraction

*Hardware, Software, Humans: Truth, Fiction, and Abstraction* Graham White [ http://www.eecs.qmul.ac.uk/profiles/whitegraham.html ] pdf: https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/11717/White%20Hardware,%20Software,%20Humans%3A%20Truth,%20Fiction%20and%20Abstraction%202015

Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

gt;> >>>>> According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the >>>>> proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language >>>>> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and

Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

;>>> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and >>>> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also >>>> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, >>>> then, is a matter of th

Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

nse is the >>> proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language >>> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and >>> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also >>

Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

at all. The meaningfulness of names and predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the

Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

e they occupy in the sentence, and also >> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, >> then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the >> whole sentence. >> >> @philipthrift >> > > This leads me to a

Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

the smallest unit of language > which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and > predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also > whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, > then, is a matter of the co

Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

e. Whether or not a name refers to an object, > then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the > whole sentence. > > > Is that true? Doesn't the sentence have different truth values depending > on what object a name refers to? not just whether it refers or no

Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

. The meaningfulness of names and predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the whole sentence. Is that true?  Doesn't the sentence have

Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the whole sentence. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups

Re: Indefinite truth

He might have been listening to The Rolling Stones, "I can't get no satisfaction." Hamkins is pretty reliable though. LC On Tuesday, April 10, 2018 at 1:39:54 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > I wonder if Bruno is familiar with this paper? > > https://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.0670.pdf > > Brent > --

Re: Indefinite truth

ing. That is part of why I insist Mechanism is a theology, a risky invitation of an unknown at the table, which looks strangely like yourself. The Model of Set Theory have too much imagination. I am already happy that ZF and ZFC captured the same arithmetical truth. The paper does not illustrate that

Indefinite truth

I wonder if Bruno is familiar with this paper? https://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.0670.pdf Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to

Proof and truth are not the same thing (was: substitution level)

On Sun, Jun 4, 2017 at 1:15 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​>> ​ >> Anything that can be done a Turing Machine can do, if it can't be done >> then a Turing Machine can't do it, and neither can anything else.​ > > ​> ​ > If "can be done" means "can compute or emulate", I am OK. That

Re: Truth and Existence

n ontology, and as such are more >> tractable in terms of an adequate theory of knowledge. >> >> If the foregoing is valid (and obviously I think it may well be) then a >> more illuminating criterion to be applied in matters within the observable >> or perceptual spectrum is no

Re: Truth and Existence

is valid (and obviously I think it may well be) then a > more illuminating criterion to be applied in matters within the observable > or perceptual spectrum is not whether they exist in an ontological sense > but rather whether they are true in an epistemological one. By true I don't > mean

Re: The search of truth

"Platonic hyperspace"? But if computationalism is right, you need no more than the sigma_1 truth, for what will be said to exist, and the usual second-order arithmetic, analysis, for studying the statistics of the relative state of the sigma_1 observers, which usually will have muc

Re: The search of truth

Physical is good, that means, in principle, we can interact with it. -Original Message- From: John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com> Sent: Fri, Jul 1, 2016 2:57 pm Subject: Re: The search of truth On Fri, Jul 1, 2016

Re: The search of truth

On Friday, July 1, 2016 at 8:57:31 PM UTC+2, John Clark wrote: > > > On Fri, Jul 1, 2016 at 11:32 AM, spudboy100 via Everything List < > everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote: > > ​> ​ >> To my ignorant brain, the very definition of matter needs, somehow, to be >> precisely, described, >> > >

Re: The search of truth

On Fri, Jul 1, 2016 at 11:32 AM, spudboy100 via Everything List < everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: ​> ​ > To my ignorant brain, the very definition of matter needs, somehow, to be > precisely, described, > ​Matter is everything that is not nothing. Nothing is infinite unbounded

Re: The search of truth

On Thu, Jun 30, 2016 at 10:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​>> ​ >> Forget the "primary" crap. Matter is needed for the existence of >> computations period. > > > ​> ​ > No, matter is needed locally to make a calculation relative to you in the > physical reality. > ​OK fine, but

Re: The search of truth

memorizing computer networking, let, alone, join discussions of the Cosmos, yet, here I write. -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com> Sent: Thu, Jun 30, 2016 10:54 am Subject: Re: The search of truth On

Re: The search of truth

On 26 Jun 2016, at 00:04, John Clark wrote: Forget the "primary" crap. Matter is needed for the existence of computations period. No, matter is needed locally to make a calculation relative to you in the physical reality. But the relative computations exist, provably so in any sigma_1

Re: The search of truth

saying something of vital importance about the nature of our world and it might be wise to listen to what it's saying. ​> ​ > "primary matter is needed for having the existence of computations in > general". > Forget the "primary" crap. Matter is needed

The search of truth

eady provable by RA, we explain the appearances of matter by the necessity of restricting/enlarging the measure by invoking truth or consistency, (or both), and, surprise, it works, in the sense of providing a type of quantum logic on which we can hope some future "Gleason theorem".

Re: Proof, Truth and Physics

On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 2:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote: ​>> ​ >> In this case even mathematicians, even mathematicians who specialize in >> number theory, would give physics the last word in determining what is true >> and what is not, >> > > ​> ​ > It would not be physics that

Re: Proof, Truth and Physics

On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 12:34 PM, John Clark wrote: > Fermat proved 350 years ago that no three integers exist that satisfy the > equation X^4 + Y^4 =Z^4 and since that time few have bothered to look for > such numbers because they knew it was a fool's errand; but suppose >

Proof, Truth and Physics

Fermat proved 350 years ago that no three integers exist that satisfy the equation X^4 + Y^4 =Z^4 and since that time few have bothered to look for such numbers because they knew it was a fool's errand; but suppose Professor Bozo, a eccentric computer scientist, decided to look anyway and suppose

Re: Google to Decide Truth

An interesting approach to knowledge as coherence. Still has problems to be resolved as noted in the paper http://arxiv.org/pdf/1502.03519v1.pdf. Brent On 3/1/2015 11:36 AM, : Google has created an automated system for collecting facts:

Google to Decide Truth

Google has created an automated system for collecting facts: http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22329832.700-googles-factchecking-bots-build-vast-knowledge-bank.html#.VPNoW3zMSSo as interesting as this is towards the creation of an AI (as something that learns more and gets smarter when

Re: truth of experience

in arithmetic. First order theories have a nice metamathematical property, discovered by Gödel (in his PhD thesis), and know as completeness, which (here) means that provability is equivalent with truth in all models, where models are mathematical structure which can verify

Re: truth of experience

if there is a reality beta verifying t. Now, Kripke semantics extends classical propositional logic, and t is verified in all worlds. So, if alpha verifies t (if t is true in alpha), then t means simply that there is some world beta accessible (given that t is true in all world). t = truth

Re: truth of experience

be translated in arithmetic. First order theories have a nice metamathematical property, discovered by Gödel (in his PhD thesis), and know as completeness, which (here) means that provability is equivalent with truth in all models, where models are mathematical structure which can verify

Re: truth of experience

is always t? And then is f also a formula in every world? Brent So, if alpha verifies t (if t is true in alpha), then t means simply that there is some world beta accessible (given that t is true in all world). t = truth is possible = I am consistent = there is a reality out there = I am

Re: truth of experience

with truth in all models, where models are mathematical structure which can verify or not, but in a well defined mathematical sense, a formula of classical first order logical theories. For example PA proves some sentences A, if and only if, A is true in all models of PA

Re: truth of experience

propositional logic). Then the arbitrary formula get their value by the truth table, and the modal formula get their value by the Kripke semantics, that is, the truth values of the boxed an diamonded propositions depends on the locally accessible worlds. Are we to assume that t is a formula

Re: truth of experience

A include f when A=p-p? No, the valuations are defined only on the atomic p, q, r, (in modal propositional logic). Then the arbitrary formula get their value by the truth table, and the modal formula get their value by the Kripke semantics, that is, the truth values of the boxed

Re: truth of experience

(Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊ ?) Yes I do! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to

Re: truth of experience

On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10:45AM +1300, LizR wrote: (Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊ ?) Yes I do! Not me (alas). Although it is visible when typing my response. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish

Re: truth of experience

of a formula A include f when A=p-p? No, the valuations are defined only on the atomic p, q, r, (in modal propositional logic). Then the arbitrary formula get their value by the truth table, and the modal formula get their value by the Kripke semantics, that is, the truth values

Re: truth of experience

On 13 Mar 2014, at 22:10, LizR wrote: (Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊ ?) Yes I do! Nice, I hope everyone see it. Does someone not see a lozenge? Here: ◊ Do someone not see Gödel's second theorem here: ◊t - ~[]◊t ? Bruno -- You received this message because you are

Re: truth of experience

On 14 Mar 2014, at 01:49, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10:45AM +1300, LizR wrote: (Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊ ?) Yes I do! Not me (alas). Damned. I will need to use the more ugly instead of the cute ◊ ! No problem. Bruno Although it is visible when

Re: truth of experience

On 3/13/2014 9:54 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: which was my objection to writing t. In such a formula, t can only be regarded as shorthand for some tautology. If you want. Any simple provable proposition would do. Then f also occurs in every world since (p ~p) can be formed in every world. But

Re: truth of experience

On 14 Mar 2014, at 06:08, meekerdb wrote: On 3/13/2014 9:54 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: which was my objection to writing t. In such a formula, t can only be regarded as shorthand for some tautology. If you want. Any simple provable proposition would do. Then f also occurs in every world

Re: truth of experience

), and know as completeness, which (here) means that provability is equivalent with truth in all models, where models are mathematical structure which can verify or not, but in a well defined mathematical sense, a formula of classical first order logical theories. For example PA proves some

Re: truth of experience

is equivalent with truth in all models, where models are mathematical structure which can verify or not, but in a well defined mathematical sense, a formula of classical first order logical theories. For example PA proves some sentences A, if and only if, A is true in all models of PA

Re: truth of experience

On 13 March 2014 04:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hello Terren, On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi Bruno, Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t? Unfortunately I haven't had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please forgive me but I don't

truth of experience

or incorrigible. Then we can approximate many sort of truth, by the very plausible, the probable, the relatively expectable, etc. If someone complains, is the pain real or fake? Eventually it is a question for a judge. The truth is what no machine can really grasp the whole truth, but all

Re: truth of experience

consciousness, we can decide to agree on some property of the notion. Then, consciousness-here-and-now might be a candidate for a possible true reference, if you agree consciousness-here-and-now is undoubtable or incorrigible. Then we can approximate many sort of truth, by the very plausible

Re: truth of experience

dissociative pathologies. OK. For me it all casts doubt on whether Bp p is an accurate formalization for experience, but I might be missing something. As I said above, it is a simplest meta definition which capture the main thing (the truth of the experience) without needing to define

Re: truth of experience

dissociative pathologies. OK. For me it all casts doubt on whether Bp p is an accurate formalization for experience, but I might be missing something. As I said above, it is a simplest meta definition which capture the main thing (the truth of the experience) without needing to define it. Also

Re: The Nature of Truth

On 08 Jan 2014, at 23:11, John Mikes wrote: Bruno and Brent: did you agree whether TRUE BELIEF means in your sentences 1. one's belief that is TRUE, (not likely), It is that one. Bp p means that p is believed (by some machine) and that it is the case that p. or 2. the TRUTH

Re: The Nature of Truth

(as a theorem of G*, not of G). Bruno Brent On 1/8/2014 2:11 PM, John Mikes wrote: Bruno and Brent: did you agree whether TRUE BELIEF means in your sentences 1. one's belief that is TRUE, (not likely), or 2. the TRUTH that one believes in it (a maybe)? (none of the two may be 'true'). JM On Wed

Re: The Nature of Truth

Bruno and Brent: did you agree whether *TRUE BELIEF* means in your sentences 1. one's belief that is TRUE, (not likely), or 2. the TRUTH that one believes in it (a maybe)? (none of the two may be 'true'). JM On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 5:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 Dec

Re: The Nature of Truth

. Brent On 1/8/2014 2:11 PM, John Mikes wrote: Bruno and Brent: did you agree whether *TRUE BELIEF* means in your sentences 1. one's belief that is TRUE, (not likely), or 2. the TRUTH that one believes in it (a maybe)? (none of the two may be 'true'). JM On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 5:50 AM, Bruno

Re: The Nature of Truth

On 31 Dec 2013, at 21:09, meekerdb wrote: On 12/31/2013 1:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: only rules to extract knowledge from assumed beliefs. ? I answered no to your question. Knowledge is not extracted in any way from belief (assumed or not). knowledge *is* belief, when or in the world

Re: The Nature of Truth

On 30 Dec 2013, at 20:02, Alberto G. Corona wrote: To summarize, there is no possible pure knowledge, Why? On the contrary, beliefs can intersect truth, sometimes, and provably so for simpler machine than us. What happens is that only God knows when your beliefs are genuine knowledge

Re: The Nature of Truth

of the infinite complexity so I would not mention truth. Again: compare your contemporary 'truth' concepts with a similar stance - say - of 3000 years ago. Did Ishtarians have the same 'truth'? #5 Right you are. What was 'true' for UGGH the caveman is different from what you described as 'true

Re: The Nature of Truth

On 12/31/2013 1:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: only rules to extract knowledge from assumed beliefs. ? I answered no to your question. Knowledge is not extracted in any way from belief (assumed or not). knowledge *is* belief, when or in the world those beliefs are true, but this you can never

The Nature of Truth

All, In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory I'm starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an important and separate issue from previous discussions. 1, it is impossible to directly know the external fundamental reality, we know external reality

Re: The Nature of Truth

On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory I'm starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an important and separate issue from previous discussions. 1, it is impossible to directly know

Re: The Nature of Truth

2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory I'm starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an important and separate issue from previous discussions. 1

Re: The Nature of Truth

On 30 Dec 2013, at 15:25, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory I'm starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since

Re: The Nature of Truth

. Corona wrote: 2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory I'm starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an important and separate issue from previous

Re: The Nature of Truth

? i.e. sensible experience, Edgar is right here. The only truth Edgar is unearthing for me is: You can enlist entire mailing lists as free reviewers for any book project you may have, without paying them one cent for doing so. Vanity and altruism make good bedfellows. PGC 2013/12/30 Bruno

Re: The Nature of Truth

On 12/30/2013 3:39 AM, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory I'm starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an important and separate issue from previous discussions. 1, it is impossible to directly know the external

Re: The Nature of Truth

so. But i the realm of reality, And where may one find this realm of realms? i.e. sensible experience, Edgar is right here. The only truth Edgar is unearthing for me is: You can enlist entire mailing lists as free reviewers for any book project you may have, without paying them one

Re: The Nature of Truth

of reality, And where may one find this realm of realms? Is the realm where you pay taxes. i.e. sensible experience, Edgar is right here. The only truth Edgar is unearthing for me is: You can enlist entire mailing lists as free reviewers for any book project you may have, without

Re: The Nature of Truth

. sensible experience, Edgar is right here. The only truth Edgar is unearthing for me is: You can enlist entire mailing lists as free reviewers for any book project you may have, without paying them one cent for doing so. Vanity and altruism make good bedfellows. PGC 2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal

Re: The Nature of Truth

to extract knowledge from assumed beliefs. Thanks. But I already knew so. But i the realm of reality, And where may one find this realm of realms? i.e. sensible experience, Edgar is right here. The only truth Edgar is unearthing for me is: You can enlist entire mailing lists as free

Re: The Nature of Truth

complexity so I would not mention truth. Again: compare your contemporary 'truth' concepts with a similar stance - say - of 3000 years ago. Did Ishtarians have the same 'truth'? #5 Right you are. What was 'true' for UGGH the caveman is different from what you described as 'true' for today. Do you

Re: Belief vs Truth

On 23 Nov 2013, at 07:09, Chris de Morsella wrote: From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com ] On Behalf Of meekerdb Sent: Friday, November 22, 2013 9:11 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Belief vs Truth On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John

RE: Belief vs Truth

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Saturday, November 23, 2013 1:14 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Belief vs Truth On 23 Nov 2013, at 07:09, Chris de Morsella wrote: From

Re: Belief vs Truth

*To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: Belief vs Truth On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: Brent's dichotomy - as you pointed out - about exist and true may go deeper in my opinion: If we *THINK *of something: it DOES *exist* indeed *(in our mind)* but may not be true. I

Re: Belief vs Truth

the factual notions of truth and existence are linked by the notion that what is true kick back and what kick back can render you nonexistent at the moment `t +1` if you negate its truth at the moment `t`. Now natural selection can make the units of time really really long. So

Re: Belief vs Truth

:11 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Belief vs Truth On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: Brent's dichotomy - as you pointed out - about exist and true may go deeper in my opinion: If we THINK of something: it DOES exist indeed (in our mind) but may not be true. I

Re: Belief vs Truth

On 23 Nov 2013, at 16:47, Alberto G. Corona wrote: the factual notions of truth and existence are linked by the notion that what is true kick back and what kick back can render you nonexistent at the moment `t +1` if you negate its truth at the moment `t`. Now natural selection can

Re: Belief vs Truth

On 21 Nov 2013, at 19:28, meekerdb wrote: On 11/21/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Let´s go to a human level: in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief hardcoded by natural selection. This is self-defeating or circular. You need the truth of natural selection to make

Re: Belief vs Truth

IT IS TRUE is in our belief system. Now it is up to you to call the EXISTING thought as 'truly existing' We fabricate 'truth' in this respect but only in this respect. Otherwise I am just waiting for additional input disproving what I 'beleived-in' so far. John M PS I read this remark of mine to my

Re: Belief vs Truth

an assertative variant of real, and both reality and truth concerns the many form of existence. Atoms exists, temperature exists, countries exist, persons exist; all in different true senses, for example. Now it is up to you to call the EXISTING thought as 'truly existing' I reserve

Re: Belief vs Truth

(partial) knowledge capability. WE THINK IT IS TRUE is in our belief system. Now it is up to you to call the EXISTING thought as 'truly existing' We fabricate 'truth' in this respect but only in this respect. Otherwise I am just waiting for additional input disproving what I 'beleived-in' so

RE: Belief vs Truth

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb Sent: Friday, November 22, 2013 9:11 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Belief vs Truth On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: Brent's dichotomy - as you

Re: Belief vs Truth

On 20 Nov 2013, at 21:57, Alberto G. Corona wrote: To say that F = m . a or e= m c2 as truth it is necessary to accept certain beliefs. Belief that at the next moment the laws will not change for example. e=mc^2 is an interesting theory (belief), or an interesting theorem

Re: Belief vs Truth

2013/11/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 20 Nov 2013, at 21:57, Alberto G. Corona wrote: To say that F = m . a or e= m c2 as truth it is necessary to accept certain beliefs. Belief that at the next moment the laws will not change for example. e=mc^2 is an interesting theory

Re: Belief vs Truth

On 21 Nov 2013, at 11:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2013/11/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 20 Nov 2013, at 21:57, Alberto G. Corona wrote: To say that F = m . a or e= m c2 as truth it is necessary to accept certain beliefs. Belief that at the next moment the laws

Re: Belief vs Truth

On 21 Nov 2013, at 12:17, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Nov 2013, at 11:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: The material phenomena are events in the mind. That is partially true in the comp theory. But mind and matter emerges from the existence of [READ OR] absence of solution(s) to

Re: Belief vs Truth

On 11/21/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Let´s go to a human level: in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief hardcoded by natural selection. This is self-defeating or circular. You need the truth of natural selection to make sense of it. That seems to confound truth

Re: Belief vs Truth

To say that F = m . a or e= m c2 as truth it is necessary to accept certain beliefs. Belief that at the next moment the laws will not change for example. Let´s go to a human level: in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief hardcoded by natural selection. Truth would say

The last truth that ever matters:

Him: God has shown me all truth, but your love is beauty beyond comprehension. Her: God has shown me all beauty, but your love is truth beyond imagination. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group

Re: Belief vs Truth

and the original images. Excellent point. Same difficulty as in judging proof. Formal, first order proof can be verified mechanically, but they still does not necessarily entail truth, as the premises might be inconsistent or incorrect. Scientific knowledge indeed is part of a belief system

Re: Belief vs Truth

. Excellent point. Same difficulty as in judging proof. Formal, first order proof can be verified mechanically, but they still does not necessarily entail truth, as the premises might be inconsistent or incorrect. Scientific knowledge indeed is part of a belief system. In conventional

Re: Belief vs Truth

On 03 Jun 2013, at 01:41, Stephen Paul King wrote: How do we integrate empirical data into Bpp? Technically, by restricting p to the leaves of the UD* (the true, and thus provable, sigma_1 sentences). Then to get the physics (the probability measure à-la-UDA), you can do the same with

Re: Belief vs Truth

order proof can be verified mechanically, but they still does not necessarily entail truth, as the premises might be inconsistent or incorrect. Scientific knowledge indeed is part of a belief system. In conventional sciences we THINK we know, Only the pseudo-religious or pseudo-scientist

Re: Belief vs Truth

How do we integrate empirical data into Bpp? On Saturday, June 1, 2013 3:41:56 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote: Russell wrote: *...When it comes to Bp p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as opposed to true conjectures,

Re: Belief vs Truth

On 31 May 2013, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote: On 5/31/2013 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 May 2013, at 01:19, meekerdb wrote: On 5/30/2013 3:43 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: You mean unprovable? I get confused because it seems

Re: Belief vs Truth

Brent, thanks for your clear ideas - not controversial to what I try to explain in my poor wordings. No proof is valid, or true. Applicable, maybe. In our 'makebilieve' world-model many facets SEEM true in our terms of explanation, i.e. using conventional science and wisdom. Mathematicians are

Re: Belief vs Truth

On 31 May 2013, at 01:19, meekerdb wrote: On 5/30/2013 3:43 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: You mean unprovable? I get confused because it seems that you sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p To a mathematician,

Re: Belief vs Truth

On 5/31/2013 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 May 2013, at 01:19, meekerdb wrote: On 5/30/2013 3:43 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: You mean unprovable? I get confused because it seems that you sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and

Re: Belief vs Truth

On 01/06/2013, at 3:35 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: All humans have many beliefs. A genuine scientist just know that those are beliefs, and not knowledge (even if they hope their belief to be true). So they will provides axioms/theories and derive from that, and compare with

Belief vs Truth

On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: You mean unprovable? I get confused because it seems that you sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in this theorem because I can prove it. If I

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