Re: Disposal of storage devices/med

2014-01-29 Thread Ron Hawkins
Radoslaw, One of the problems I see with Host based overwrite is that you can only overwrite the current location of the logical volume. If you are using IBM's Eazytier, or Hitachi's HDT you really do not know the past location of the chunks of the volume, only the last location. The same

Re: Disposal of storage devices/med

2014-01-29 Thread R.S.
Ron, Please, read carefully my first words: I did mean DISK overwrite. Eazytier or other vendors features, or SVA-like type of emulation make it hard to overwrite DISK (physical disk) from host level. However your point contains another assumption, untypical IMHO: logical volume overwrite.

Re: Disposal of storage devices/med

2014-01-22 Thread Roger W. Suhr
if an IT auditor would accept this method! Thank you for sharing. Roger -Original Message- From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU] On Behalf Of Pommier, Rex Sent: Tuesday, January 21, 2014 7:55 AM To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU Subject: Re: Disposal of storage devices

Re: Disposal of storage devices/med

2014-01-21 Thread R.S.
W dniu 2014-01-20 22:44, Paul Gilmartin pisze: On 2014-01-20, at 13:35, R.S. wrote: And what about n-times overwrite policies? What number is proper? Does one need to overwrite disk content once, twice, 3 times, 7 times or 21 times? What's the magic number? And what is the reason for the

Re: Disposal of storage devices/med

2014-01-21 Thread Pommier, Rex
Radoslaw, About 10 years ago I was given the task to migrate off an RVA onto a different disk subsystem. Not really knowing how to erase the disks without use of a sledgehammer, I initialized all the volumes to logically erase them, then uploaded a bunch of songs to the array. I then

Re: Disposal of storage devices/med

2014-01-21 Thread Phil Smith
R.S. wrote: 3. Regarding possibility rto read *valuable* information overwritten once: Such theoretical possibility assumes one use good microscope and watches single magnetic domain. There is no hidden HDD command like read deleted info. And now: what is easier: decrypt encrypted content of

Re: Disposal of storage devices/med

2014-01-21 Thread R.S.
W dniu 2014-01-21 17:03, Phil Smith pisze: R.S. wrote: 3. Regarding possibility rto read *valuable* information overwritten once: Such theoretical possibility assumes one use good microscope and watches single magnetic domain. There is no hidden HDD command like read deleted info. And now:

Re: Disposal of storage devices/med

2014-01-20 Thread Phil Smith
R.S. wrote: Well, two points: 1. Encryption means the data is still there, but you need a lot of time or ...just good luck to access it. So, when you dispose encrypted media then it's very unlikely someone could read it, but when you dispose erased media then you are sure. 2. LAS, BUT NOT

Re: Disposal of storage devices/med

2014-01-20 Thread R.S.
W dniu 2014-01-20 21:18, Phil Smith pisze: R.S. wrote: Well, two points: 1. Encryption means the data is still there, but you need a lot of time or ...just good luck to access it. So, when you dispose encrypted media then it's very unlikely someone could read it, but when you dispose erased

Re: Disposal of storage devices/med

2014-01-20 Thread Paul Gilmartin
On 2014-01-20, at 13:35, R.S. wrote: And what about n-times overwrite policies? What number is proper? Does one need to overwrite disk content once, twice, 3 times, 7 times or 21 times? What's the magic number? And what is the reason for the number? For example from:

Re: Disposal of storage devices/med

2014-01-20 Thread John Gilmore
Phil Smith wrote begin extract if I encrypt a ZIP file with DES (56 bit keystrength) and you believe it's a .doc file, you will cheerfully cruise right by the correct key, because you won't see the .doc signature you're expecting. /end extract and I have two comments. First. the professional

Re: Disposal of storage devices/med

2014-01-20 Thread John Gilmore
Phil thinks I misunderstood/misrepresented him. His statement begin extract But in the real world, such assumptions often don't apply, and so even relatively weak crypto can be de facto quite secure. /end extract immediately following the one about DES that I quoted earlier suggests otherwise

Re: Disposal of storage devices/med

2014-01-20 Thread John Gilmore
On 1/20/14, John Gilmore jwgli...@gmail.com wrote: Phil thinks I misunderstood/misrepresented him. His statement begin extract But in the real world, such assumptions often don't apply, and so even relatively weak crypto can be de facto quite secure. /end extract immediately following

Re: Disposal of storage devices/med

2014-01-20 Thread Phil Smith
John Gilmore wrote: Phil thinks I misunderstood/misrepresented him. His statement begin extract But in the real world, such assumptions often don't apply, and so even relatively weak crypto can be de facto quite secure. /end extract immediately following the one about DES that I quoted earlier

Re: Disposal of storage devices/med

2014-01-20 Thread John Gilmore
Thank you. It is my phrase. I provide quotation marks and, usually, an attribution when I quote, as I am said to do too much. John Gilmore, Ashland, MA 01721 - USA -- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access