On Mon, Aug 14, 2023, at 11:08 AM, Dave Crocker wrote:
> MTAs that are doing MTA functions are not supposed to make changes to
> the content and typically they don't.
I'm not designing a typical MTA. I want to design one that doesn't allow DKIM
replay.
Jesse
Jesse Thompson wrote in
:
|Just a quick clarification:
|
|You mentioned below that you didn't understand what ESP meant. I honestly \
|have a hard time unraveling the nuanced differences of Email Sending \
|Provider and MTAs, MSAs, MDAs, MTAs, "intermediary" and "forwarder"; \
|all of
Alessandro Vesely wrote in
<1fcef96f-27ce-2cfa-30e6-e37237088...@tana.it>:
|On Sat 12/Aug/2023 21:52:13 +0200 Steffen Nurpmeso wrote:
|> Alessandro Vesely wrote in >:
|>> On Fri 11/Aug/2023 23:49:20 +0200 Steffen Nurpmeso wrote:
|>>> Alessandro Vesely wrote in
Hello Mr. Kucheraway.
Murray S. Kucherawy wrote in
:
|On Sat, Aug 12, 2023 at 12:31 PM Steffen Nurpmeso
|wrote:
...
[Bringing back some quotes]
||stef...@sdaoden.eu
|| |Isn't this discussion about Bcc: off-topic and solely RFC 5322?
|| |I have never seen a MUA implementation which
On 8/14/2023 10:53 AM, Jon Callas wrote:
The original statement from the Domain Keys folks from Yahoo was that
when your bank sends an email to you, your ISP can know that, even
though it's bounced through your alumni association.
I'm going to press this a bit. The alumni example involves
> On Aug 13, 2023, at 20:31, Jesse Thompson wrote:
>
> If I understand based on my limited view of history, DKIM was designed for
> authentication between two hops. Signature survival across intermediaries was
> only achievable by encouraging intermediaries to not make any changes to the
>
On 8/14/2023 8:20 AM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
DKIM was designed to attach, with cryptographic protection, the domain
name of a handling agent to the message. There's no expectation that
the agent doing so asserts anything about the content of the message
(i.e., "this is not spam"), nor is
On 8/13/2023 8:31 PM, Jesse Thompson wrote:
If I understand based on my limited view of history, DKIM was designed
for authentication between two hops.
No.
In email parlance, a hop is one SMTP transit, with relaying done by MTAs.
DKIM was designed to survive from posting to delivery (for an
On Sun, Aug 13, 2023 at 8:34 PM Jesse Thompson wrote:
> If I understand based on my limited view of history, DKIM was designed for
> authentication between two hops. Signature survival across intermediaries
> was only achievable by encouraging intermediaries to not make any changes
> to the
