Hi Hosnieh,
On 8/13/13, Hosnieh Rafiee wrote:
> Hi Andrew,
>
> Thanks for your comments. See my response as follow:
>
>> "prudent" and "best" are things that will change overtime. I can see the
> value in
>> publishing some algorithm to generate IID, and maybe the more of these we
>> have - the b
Follow up:
Just a mistake... not 32 bits... 32 bytes! Everything in my last email is
bytes and not bits... :-) I just got confused...
>
> Hi Andrew,
>
> Thanks for your comments. See my response as follow:
>
> > "prudent" and "best" are things that will change overtime. I can see
> > the
> val
Hi Andrew,
Thanks for your comments. See my response as follow:
> "prudent" and "best" are things that will change overtime. I can see the
value in
> publishing some algorithm to generate IID, and maybe the more of these we
> have - the better.
>
That section is related to the use of word "might
"One of the
issues with this RFC concerns the wording that is used that allows
the implementation to make the choice as to what approach to use, and
in so doing, in some cases, the choice made is not the most prudent
or best approach, and this thus is not ideal and can lead to some
p
> For the record, this document doesn't address my feedback.
>
> Most of the I-D is about how to generate a random number.
>
> If you need a PRNG, just require implementations to implement one. Your
> workaround is to get into the same level of complexity to produce a PRNG
that
> wil be employed
On 08/12/2013 07:58 PM, Hosnieh Rafiee wrote:
> Hi,
> I applied Fernando's recent comments.
For the record, this document doesn't address my feedback.
Most of the I-D is about how to generate a random number.
If you need a PRNG, just require implementations to implement one. Your
workaround is
Hi,
I applied Fernando's recent comments. I also clarified the usage of the new
algorithm to make it clear that is not CGA (for those who interpreted it
incorrectly). Now this draft addresses all the deficiencies contained in RFC
4941 so as to prevent node tracking or location tracking attacks that