On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 10:54:13AM -0700, Isaac J. Manjarres wrote:
> Currently, when checking to see if accessing n bytes starting at
> address "ptr" will cause a wraparound in the memory addresses,
> the check in check_bogus_address() adds an extra byte, which is
> incorrect, as the range of addr
Currently, when checking to see if accessing n bytes starting at
address "ptr" will cause a wraparound in the memory addresses,
the check in check_bogus_address() adds an extra byte, which is
incorrect, as the range of addresses that will be accessed is
[ptr, ptr + (n - 1)].
This can lead to incor
On Tue, Nov 13, 2018 at 6:51 PM, Isaac J. Manjarres
wrote:
> Currently, when checking to see if accessing n bytes starting at
> address "ptr" will cause a wraparound in the memory addresses,
> the check in check_bogus_address() adds an extra byte, which is
> incorrect, as the range of addresses th
On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 4:35 AM, William Kucharski
wrote:
>
>
>> On Nov 13, 2018, at 5:51 PM, Isaac J. Manjarres
>> wrote:
>>
>> diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
>> index 852eb4e..0293645 100644
>> --- a/mm/usercopy.c
>> +++ b/mm/usercopy.c
>> @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static inline void che
> On Nov 14, 2018, at 10:32 AM, isa...@codeaurora.org wrote:
>
> Thank you and David for your feedback. The check_bogus_address() routine is
> only invoked from one place in the kernel, which is __check_object_size().
> Before invoking check_bogus_address, __check_object_size ensures that n i
On 2018-11-14 03:46, William Kucharski wrote:
On Nov 14, 2018, at 4:09 AM, David Laight
wrote:
From: William Kucharski
Sent: 14 November 2018 10:35
On Nov 13, 2018, at 5:51 PM, Isaac J. Manjarres
wrote:
diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
index 852eb4e..0293645 100644
--- a/mm/use
> On Nov 14, 2018, at 4:09 AM, David Laight wrote:
>
> From: William Kucharski
>> Sent: 14 November 2018 10:35
>>
>>> On Nov 13, 2018, at 5:51 PM, Isaac J. Manjarres
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
>>> index 852eb4e..0293645 100644
>>> --- a/mm/usercopy.c
>>>
From: William Kucharski
> Sent: 14 November 2018 10:35
>
> > On Nov 13, 2018, at 5:51 PM, Isaac J. Manjarres
> > wrote:
> >
> > diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
> > index 852eb4e..0293645 100644
> > --- a/mm/usercopy.c
> > +++ b/mm/usercopy.c
> > @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static inline void
> On Nov 13, 2018, at 5:51 PM, Isaac J. Manjarres wrote:
>
> diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
> index 852eb4e..0293645 100644
> --- a/mm/usercopy.c
> +++ b/mm/usercopy.c
> @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static inline void check_bogus_address(const unsigned
> long ptr, unsigned long n,
>
Currently, when checking to see if accessing n bytes starting at
address "ptr" will cause a wraparound in the memory addresses,
the check in check_bogus_address() adds an extra byte, which is
incorrect, as the range of addresses that will be accessed is
[ptr, ptr + (n - 1)].
This can lead to incor
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