Sorry, should have clarified; a mixture of spam and SSH bruteforcing
attempts.
On Fri, 10 May 2019, 21:43 Luis E. Muñoz via mailop,
wrote:
> On 10 May 2019, at 11:49, James Cloos via mailop wrote:
>
> >> "CW" == Chris Woods via mailop writes:
> >
> > CW> Like others I've reached the end of
On 10 May 2019, at 11:49, James Cloos via mailop wrote:
>> "CW" == Chris Woods via mailop writes:
>
> CW> Like others I've reached the end of my tether with DO. In my case, I've
> CW> seen increasing volumes of malicious / junk traffic via their IPv6
> CW> prefixes, with reports to abuse doin
> "CW" == Chris Woods via mailop writes:
CW> Like others I've reached the end of my tether with DO. In my case, I've
CW> seen increasing volumes of malicious / junk traffic via their IPv6
CW> prefixes, with reports to abuse doing virtually nothing, so now I just
CW> define ip/ip6tables drop r
On May 9, 2019, at 5:43 PM, Andrew C Aitchison via mailop mailto:mailop@mailop.org>> wrote:
>
> Is this deliberate enemy action or collateral damage ?
> I'm finding it difficult to see why a general spam bot
> would sign spam traps up to a mailing list,
> so guess that I am missing something ?
Va
> On 10 May 2019, at 14:11, Leo Gaspard via mailop wrote:
>
> Steve Atkins via mailop writes:
>>> On May 10, 2019, at 10:50 AM, Leo Gaspard via mailop
>>> wrote:
>>> Laura Atkins via mailop writes:
For victims of listbombing, COI isn’t an answer. In fact, much of the
problem with
Steve Atkins via mailop writes:
>> On May 10, 2019, at 10:50 AM, Leo Gaspard via mailop
>> wrote:
>> Laura Atkins via mailop writes:
>>> For victims of listbombing, COI isn’t an answer. In fact, much of the
>>> problem with listbombing is COI mail.
>>>
>>> How do you propose to address that i
> On 10 May 2019, at 11:40, Michael Wise via mailop wrote:
>
>
> The solution ... is to stop thinking that all decisions on the legitimacy of
> an email can be resolved at the instant the machine is focusing on that one
> email.
>
> We need to move beyond "Spam" filtering as a one-off, per me
The solution ... is to stop thinking that all decisions on the legitimacy of an
email can be resolved at the instant the machine is focusing on that one email.
We need to move beyond "Spam" filtering as a one-off, per message task and
start working more actively on techniques of campaign detect
> On May 10, 2019, at 10:50 AM, Leo Gaspard via mailop
> wrote:
>
> Laura Atkins via mailop writes:
>> For victims of listbombing, COI isn’t an answer. In fact, much of the
>> problem with listbombing is COI mail.
>>
>> How do you propose to address that issue?
>
> Captchas are a way to fo
On Thu, 9 May 2019 22:43:30 +0100 (BST)
Andrew C Aitchison via mailop wrote:
> On Thu, 9 May 2019, Rob McEwen via mailop wrote:
> > That has been happening OFTEN in recent years - and those who
> > don't do COI and don't captcha-protect their forms (or some
> > equivalent only-a-human-could-hav
Laura Atkins via mailop writes:
> For victims of listbombing, COI isn’t an answer. In fact, much of the problem
> with listbombing is COI mail.
>
> How do you propose to address that issue?
Captchas are a way to force the malicious subscriber to spend human or
computer time breaking it (if captc
Captchas aren’t a FUSSUP. They’re meant to address a specific problem -
listbombing. COI contributes to the problem of listbombing. SMS challenge is
going to make that worse. 1000 SMS messages in an hour is a problem.
There are people who’ve been working on this issue for years and I’m sure
th
> On 9 May 2019, at 22:53, Rich Kulawiec via mailop wrote:
>
> On Thu, May 09, 2019 at 09:26:50AM -0400, Rob McEwen via mailop wrote:
>> you should strongly encourage your customers to
>> captcha-protect their signup forms to prevent bots from signing up spamtrap
>> addresses.
>
> No, you shoul
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