Sorry Ian,
Just trying to gauge whether the arguments I've made
for handling web pages "as is" without any extra markup
seem plausable or not. Specifically I've said that
required security for locally loaded pages could be
provided without relying on extra markup added to
those pages when they're s
Although Gerv's worked on me hard, it seems that the
essence of this "border crossing" model idea has
survived in this forum.
Calling for votes for or against from all lurkers,
which I'll take back to the relevant bug for
consideration there.
- Nigel.
___
With MOTW in place, Mozilla and Firefox trusts Word documents
more than it trusts web documents, passing them through the
file-save cycle without modification. That is silly.
Not exactly. The point of trust is on reload, not on save. The MOTW is
merely metadata about the file's origin. I might con
You are saying Microsoft will claim that Longhorn solves these problems.
It's a key plank of your hypothetical argument. So I'm asking "How do
you know that? What mechanism are they proposing?"
I never said that Microsoft would provide an alternate *concrete*
solution. I said that they're develo
But it's not just web pages, is it? Almost all Word or Excel files
basically have the "dirty bit" - when you fire them up, you are asked if
you trust the file and if you want to run the macros.
That's right, and the mechanism you describe for Word matches
the behaviour I proposed for the scripte
Mozilla can't save files to disk; only users can do that
using Mozilla as a tool.
That's splitting hairs. :-) Such files are not to be trusted /de facto/,
because we can assume the user has not audited them.
No it's not. To extend you Word analogy elsewhere, Mozilla users
can save .doc files to
What I didn't say was this: This is a really
hard problem.
That's why (in my view) some time and effort
should be spent on the problem rather than
just doing what "seems like" a good idea.
For those seeking a real solution, as opposed
to a "best efforts," which is the only practical
way forward,
Warning: subjective arguments abound in this article.
In a separate thread and elsewhere I've stated my aversion
to the "mark of the web" feature implemented by Microsoft.
I'm not particularly dogmatic about it, but people keep saying
"what's wrong with it?" so here's my case, which is marginally
o
Can you remind me of the use case here? Who wants to load HTML pages
from local disk and have JavaScript in that HTML have local disk access?
That specific case isn't a requirement. The use case I'm
defending is this one:
Developer creates a web page on local disk and is able to
load that file di
There are two worlds, the web and the disk. The
assumption is that the web is "untrusted" and the
disk is "trusted" **.
Rather, there are two security models with
different goals. Each model provides trust
of the kind its users need.
I said neither is necessarily less trusted than the
other, just
[long post]
I've been trying to progress bug 273419 (disclosure
of local files) and bug 230606 (same origin for local files).
Some notes.
Where I'm coming from:
Firefox's "smooth user experience" makes Fx a popular
product for end users. A similarly smooth experience will
help make moz/xulrunner/Fx
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