I know that the capacity throughout the network I was working on
at the time was designed to handle peak loads with a comfortable
margin, and I would surmise that that is the case on many, if not
most networks. It seems obvious that the scope of the analysis of
this issue must include
William said they changed a lot of the way they do things at the
company
that hosts CNN.com since 9/11. I don't believe they were the only ones.
Which was my point to start with...
- kurtis -
On måndag, sep 16, 2002, at 18:02 Europe/Stockholm, JC Dill wrote:
When I got back to the office, I learned that the big screen TV that
had previously been located in the exercise room had been moved to the
center of the office so that everyone could more easily see it, and
everyone
On Fri, 13 Sep 2002, Stephen J. Wilcox wrote:
At what point does one build redundancy into the network.
No, it doesnt necessarily use IX's, in the event of there being no peered path
across an IX traffic will flow from the originator to their upstream
tier1 over a private transit link,
Yet, it is reasonable that people expect x % of their traffic to
use IX's. If those IXs are gone then they will need to find another
path, and may need to upgrade alternate paths.
I guess the question is.
At what point does one build redundancy into the network.
I suspect its a balancing
On Thu, 12 Sep 2002, John M. Brown wrote:
I guess the question is.
At what point does one build redundancy into the network.
I suspect its a balancing act between reducancy, survival (network)
and costs vs revenues.
In 1982 ATT was still a monopoly, could spend whatever it took and the
On fredag, sep 6, 2002, at 21:57 Europe/Stockholm, Tim Thorne wrote:
OK, what if 60 Hudson, 25 Broadway, LinX and AmsIX were all put out of
commission?
To some extent - nothing for the above...if design right. The major
networks should have designed their networks to route around this. If
At 09:47 PM 9/7/2002 -0400, Sean Donelan wrote:
Unlike phone calls, TCP traffic doesn't occur in fixed bandwidth
increments. TCP traffic, 90% of Internet traffic, is elastic. By design,
TCP adjusts the traffic rate to keep the bottleneck congested. As the
bottleneck moves, traffic reacts by
Thank Goodness for well-behaved applications, right?
( Misbehaving TCP
stacks and UDP-based apps don't obey these back off
rules. )
You can see lot of intiatives to make things more
TCP friendly to avoid hogging of bandwidth by some
selected applications( mostly multimedia based.) More
On Fri, 6 Sep 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You also have the problem of cascading failures. Just because there
are redundant paths and alternate peering locations does not mean
those facilites have the bandwidth to handle all the redirected
traffic. If A gets swamped you go to B if the
Subject: Re: Vulnerbilities of Interconnection
At 02:45 PM 9/5/2002 -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This obviously would be a thesis of Equinix and other collo space
providers,since this is exactly the service that they provide. It
won't, hower, be a
thesis of any major network that either
Is there a general consensus that cyber/internal attacks are more
effective/dangerous than physical attacks. Anecdotally it seems the
largest Internet downages have been from physical cuts or failures.
It depends on what you consider and internet outage. Or how you define
that. IMHO.
On Fri, 2002-09-06 at 10:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What kind of implact on the global internet would we see should we observe
nearly simultaneous detonation of 500 kilogramms of high explosives at N of the
major known interconnect facilities?
Keep in mind that traffic in the global
Hi Alex,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Is there a general consensus that cyber/internal attacks are more
effective/dangerous than physical attacks. Anecdotally it seems the
largest Internet downages have been from physical cuts or failures.
It depends on what you consider and
Lets bring this discussion to a some common ground -
What kind of implact on the global internet would we see should we observe
nearly simultaneous detonation of 500 kilogramms of high explosives at N of the
major known interconnect facilities?
N? Well, if you define N as the
What kind of implact on the global internet would we see
should we observe
nearly simultaneous detonation of 500 kilogramms of high
explosives at N of the
major known interconnect facilities?
Not knowing how much damage would result from 500kg of explosives..
What is the typical size
On Fri, 6 Sep 2002, Pawlukiewicz Jane wrote:
:would be difficult to reach. I'd have to run a model to be sure, but
:every one of the major seven have rerouting methodologies that would
:recover from the loss. And I don't think they exclusively peer at
Even if we were to model it, the best data
impact than that incident.
sean
- Original Message -
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Friday, September 6, 2002 10:29 am
Subject: Re: Vulnerbilities of Interconnection
Lets bring this discussion to a some common ground -
What kind of implact on the global internet would we see
Hi,
batz wrote:
On Fri, 6 Sep 2002, Pawlukiewicz Jane wrote:
:would be difficult to reach. I'd have to run a model to be sure, but
:every one of the major seven have rerouting methodologies that would
:recover from the loss. And I don't think they exclusively peer at
Even if we were
Hi Alex,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Lets bring this discussion to a some common ground -
What kind of implact on the global internet would we see should we observe
nearly simultaneous detonation of 500 kilogramms of high explosives at N of the
major known interconnect
[EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
Taking out an a collo would more than just increase time to download porn
for a few days.
and went on to say:
Is there a general consensus that cyber/internal attacks are more
effective/dangerous than physical attacks. Anecdotally it seems the
largest
Wow, nothing like jumping into the middle of a running discussion after
deleting all previous messages unread :)
On Fri, 6 Sep 2002, Pawlukiewicz Jane wrote:
Hi Alex,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Lets bring this discussion to a some common ground -
What kind of implact on
Jane == Pawlukiewicz Jane [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Even if we were to model it, the best data we could get for
the Internet would be BGP routing tables. These are also
subjectve views of the rest of the net. We could take a full
table, map all the ASN adjacencies, and then
Lets bring this discussion to a some common ground -
What kind of implact on the global internet would we see should we observe
nearly simultaneous detonation of 500 kilogramms of high explosives at N of
the
major known interconnect facilities?
N? Well, if you
At 07:41 PM 05/09/2002 -0400, batz wrote:
On Thu, 5 Sep 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
:The question is what if someone was gunning for your fiber. To date
:cuts have been unintentional. Obviously the risk level is much higher
:doing a phyisical attack, but the bad guys in this scenario are
On Fri, 6 Sep 2002, Mike Tancsa wrote:
:How about network operators ? Would you be any more or less pissed and
:react differently at the motives as to why someone attacked your network
:?
To a network technician, it doesn't matter whether it's terrorists or cow
tipping teenagers causing
On Fri, Sep 06, 2002 at 01:55:40PM -0400, batz wrote:
On Fri, 6 Sep 2002, Pawlukiewicz Jane wrote:
:would be difficult to reach. I'd have to run a model to be sure, but
:every one of the major seven have rerouting methodologies that would
:recover from the loss. And I don't think they
On Fri, 06 Sep 2002 17:15:52 EDT, batz said:
To a network technician, it doesn't matter whether it's terrorists or cow
tipping teenagers causing outages, as the depth of analysis required to
fix the problem doesn't involve speculating about the identities and
motives of the perpetrators.
On Fri, 6 Sep 2002, batz wrote:
To a network technician, it doesn't matter whether it's terrorists or cow
tipping teenagers causing outages, as the depth of analysis required to
fix the problem doesn't involve speculating about the identities and
motives of the perpetrators.
It does
On Fri, 6 Sep 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Actually I do not know how to play chess maybe *Risk*, but your point
is well taken. The intent is not provide a public recipe for taking
down the Internet, that would be the opposite goal of the research to
begin with. Regardless it is difficult
- Original Message -
From: Jared Mauch [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Friday, September 6, 2002 2:20 pm
Subject: Re: Vulnerbilities of Interconnection
On Fri, Sep 06, 2002 at 01:55:40PM -0400, batz wrote:
On Fri, 6 Sep 2002, Pawlukiewicz Jane wrote:
:would be difficult to reach. I'd have
discussion is about, isn't it. ;)
Best regards,
_
Alan Rowland
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of
Tim Thorne
Sent: Friday, September 06, 2002 12:58 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Vulnerbilities of Interconnection
*** REPLY SEPARATOR ***
On 9/6/2002 at 1:42 PM Al Rowland wrote:
Okay,
If we're going to go off the deep end here, how about the effect of a
small yield air burst over $importantplace? Not designed to maximize
casualties/damage but rather EMP? A large number of senior
At 2:01 PM -0700 2002/09/06, Jeff Shultz wrote:
Said tube electronics were apparently more survivable against EMP
effects. Or was that the point you were making? I think the real
surprise was a toggle switch that Belenko said was supposed to be
flipped only when told over the radio by
*** REPLY SEPARATOR ***
On 9/6/2002 at 11:26 PM Brad Knowles wrote:
At 2:01 PM -0700 2002/09/06, Jeff Shultz wrote:
Said tube electronics were apparently more survivable against EMP
effects. Or was that the point you were making? I think the real
surprise was a toggle
On Fri, 06 Sep 2002 14:01:24 PDT, Jeff Shultz [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
Coonts has an inflated idea of what an outage there would do the the
internet... but there is a lot of other stuff fairly nearby, isn't
there?
*You* know that a hit on 60 Hudson would probably be worse (especially
On Fri, 6 Sep 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Fri, 06 Sep 2002 14:01:24 PDT, Jeff Shultz [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
Coonts has an inflated idea of what an outage there would do the the
internet... but there is a lot of other stuff fairly nearby, isn't
there?
*You* know that a hit on
Actually damage to the net could be done with relative ease.
If you wanted to do some planning and a little staging work you could
affect large amounts of traffic.
Given recent press about large carriers moving their interconnects to
a well known IX type company, all you would have to do
On Thu, 5 Sep 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
very much like to avoid doing the research in a vaccuum. I was hoping
a discussion on NANOG wold be a good first step. The project is quite
hot with the politicos and I very much want to make sure to best
recommendations are made. Formal
, 2002 12:48 pm
Subject: Re: Vulnerbilities of Interconnection
On Thu, 5 Sep 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
very much like to avoid doing the research in a vaccuum. I was
hoping a discussion on NANOG wold be a good first step. The
project is quite
hot with the politicos and I very much
: Vulnerbilities of Interconnection
On Thu, 5 Sep 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
:I completely agree with statement. It is not a matter of wanting
to
:know where the importants hubs are - we have a pretty good handle
on
:that, but what the impacts would be of a hub loss from an
operational
The crux of the issue are FOIA requests. The government won't make these
types of vulnerability reports immmune to FOIA requests - thus a foreign
terrorist or home-grown farmbelt fuhrer could simply order up a list of
the most vulnerable sites, and select some to attack.
Due to the distributed
At 12:44 PM 9/5/2002 -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
One part that
we are looking at are the vulnerbilites of interconnection facilites.
A quick point...Several folks have postulated that the internal
(non-physical) threat dwarfs that of the physical threat, due to the lack
of visibility,
is the headache.
- Original Message -
From: Daniel Golding [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thursday, September 5, 2002 1:27 pm
Subject: RE: Vulnerbilities of Interconnection
The crux of the issue are FOIA requests. The government won't make
thesetypes of vulnerability reports immmune to FOIA
That said, a few years back I wrote the Interconnection Strategies for
ISPs white paper, which speaks to the economics of peering using exchange
points vs. using pt-to-pt circuits. It documents a clear break even point
where large capacity circuits (or dark fiber loops) into an IX with
At 02:45 PM 9/5/2002 -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This obviously would be a thesis of Equinix and other collo space providers,
since this is exactly the service that they provide. It won't, hower, be a
thesis of any major network that either already has a lot of infrastructure
in place or has
]
Date: Thursday, September 5, 2002 3:50 pm
Subject: Re: Vulnerbilities of Interconnection
The thing is, the major cuts are not attacks; the backhoe operators
aren't gunning for our fiber (no matter how much it seems like they
are). If I wanted to disrupt traffic, intentionally
The thing is, the major cuts are not attacks; the backhoe operators
aren't gunning for our fiber (no matter how much it seems like they
are). If I wanted to disrupt traffic, intentionally and maliciously,
I would not derail a train into a fiber path. Doing so would be very
difficult,
On Thu, 5 Sep 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There is a good foundation of knowledge on the implications of cyber
attacks, but the what-if of an intentional physical attack is an
important question I believe. The context in this discussion has been
very valuable and many thanks to
On 9/5/2002 at 16:01:02 -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
The thing is, the major cuts are not attacks; the backhoe operators
aren't gunning for our fiber (no matter how much it seems like they
are). If I wanted to disrupt traffic, intentionally and maliciously,
I would not derail a
This fails to address how this affects someone who has no problem with legal
ramfications - i.e. a terrorist.
Even a terrorist will tend towards things that allow him to continue
to be a terrorist. If I can do X amount of damage, and get caught, or
do X amount of damage, and not get
On Thu, 5 Sep 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
:The question is what if someone was gunning for your fiber. To date
:cuts have been unintentional. Obviously the risk level is much higher
:doing a phyisical attack, but the bad guys in this scenario are not
:teenage hackers in the parents
: Thursday, September 05, 2002 1:29 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Dave Israel; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Vulnerbilities of Interconnection
On 9/5/2002 at 16:01:02 -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
The thing is, the major cuts are not attacks; the backhoe
operators aren't
-
From: batz [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thursday, September 5, 2002 7:41 pm
Subject: Re: Vulnerbilities of Interconnection
On Thu, 5 Sep 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
:The question is what if someone was gunning for your fiber. To
date
:cuts have been unintentional. Obviously the risk level
Daniel Golding [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The crux of the issue are FOIA requests. The government won't make these
types of vulnerability reports immmune to FOIA requests - thus a foreign
terrorist or home-grown farmbelt fuhrer could simply order up a list of
the most vulnerable sites, and
On Thu, 05 Sep 2002 12:04:16 -0700 William B. Norton [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Terrorists in cement trucks?
Again, it seems more likely and more technically effective to attack
internally than physically. Focus again here on the cost/benefit
analysis
from both the provider and disrupter
On Thu, 5 Sep 2002, Richard Welty wrote:
usually all i've ever needed to do at the door is sign in after proving
that i work for a company that has colo space. my boxes of equipment
have never been inspected.
How many banks know what their customers have put in the safe deposit
boxes stored
Unnamed Administration sources reported that Daniel Golding said:
The crux of the issue are FOIA requests. The government won't make these
types of vulnerability reports immmune to FOIA requests - thus a foreign
terrorist or home-grown farmbelt fuhrer could simply order up a list of
the
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