Is that a competition in sarcasm? Because I can do better than that!
10 Jan. 2019 г., 2:41 :
> > Töma Gavrichenkov
> > Sent: Wednesday, January 9, 2019 7:08 PM
> >
> > On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 10:03 PM Saku Ytti wrote:
> > > Finding forwarding issues indeed is harder due to the limited access
> >
> Töma Gavrichenkov
> Sent: Wednesday, January 9, 2019 7:08 PM
>
> On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 10:03 PM Saku Ytti wrote:
> > Finding forwarding issues indeed is harder due to the limited access
> > to devices, so bit of security through obscurity I guess.
>
> Or, rather, security by complexity. Today
followup: they fixed it. Accidental fiber roll on their interface facing us
during maintenance.
James W. Breeden
Managing Partner
[logo_transparent_background]
Arenal Group: Arenal Consulting Group | Acilis Telecom | Pines Media
PO Box 1063 | Smithville, TX 78957
Email: ja...@arenalgroup
On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 10:33 PM Owen DeLong wrote:
> Fair enough, but the frequency of vulnerability announcements
> even in some of the best implementations is still more often than
> I think my customers will tolerated reboots.
Well, and when I think about it for the second time, I can't help
p
On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 10:33 PM Owen DeLong wrote:
> At the end of the day, this is really about risk analysis
> and it helps to put things into 1 of 4 risk quadrants
> based on two axes… Axis 1 is the likelihood of the
> vulnerability being exploited, while axis 2 is the
> severity of the cost/co
> On Jan 9, 2019, at 10:51 , Saku Ytti wrote:
>
> On Wed, 9 Jan 2019 at 20:45, Töma Gavrichenkov wrote:
>
>> Nope, this is a misunderstanding. One has to *check* for advisories at
>> least once or twice a week and only update (and reboot is necessary)
>> if there *is* a vulnerability.
>
> I
> On Jan 9, 2019, at 10:37 , Töma Gavrichenkov wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 9:31 PM Owen DeLong wrote:
>> So if I understand you correctly, your statement is that everyone
>> should be (potentially) rebooting every core, backbone, edge,
>> and other router at least once or twice a week…
On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 10:03 PM Saku Ytti wrote:
> Finding forwarding issues indeed is harder due to the limited access
> to devices, so bit of security through obscurity I guess.
Or, rather, security by complexity. Today's network infrastructure is
complex enough for people to dive into it, look
Hey,
> firmware which only runs on certain expensive devices. My point is
> that e.g. FRR is an open source software which is designed to run on
> the same Intel-based systems as the one which probably powers your
> laptop.
Most vendors have virtual image for your laptop, all of the modern
route
On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 9:51 PM Saku Ytti wrote:
> I think this contains some assumptions
>
> 1. discovering security issues in network devices is expensive (and
> thus only those you glean from vendor notices realistically exist)
> 2. downside of being affected by network device security issue is
On Wed, 9 Jan 2019 at 20:45, Töma Gavrichenkov wrote:
> Nope, this is a misunderstanding. One has to *check* for advisories at
> least once or twice a week and only update (and reboot is necessary)
> if there *is* a vulnerability.
I think this contains some assumptions
1. discovering security i
On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 9:32 PM Saku Ytti wrote:
> Those are scheduled, they have to meet some criteria to be pushed on
> scheduled lot. There are also out of cycle SIRTs. And yes, vendors are
> delaying them, because customers don't want to upgrade often, because
> customer's customers don't want
Anyone else having issues with Centurylink IP (Legacy Level3/3356) in/around
Houston, or WDM issues between Houston and San Antonio?
James W. Breeden
Managing Partner
[logo_transparent_background]
Arenal Group: Arenal Consulting Group | Acilis Telecom | Pines Media
PO Box 1063 | Smithvi
On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 9:31 PM Owen DeLong wrote:
> So if I understand you correctly, your statement is that everyone
> should be (potentially) rebooting every core, backbone, edge,
> and other router at least once or twice a week…
Nope, this is a misunderstanding. One has to *check* for advisori
On Wed, 9 Jan 2019 at 20:24, Töma Gavrichenkov wrote:
> So, network device vendors releasing security advisories twice a year
> isn't a big part of the explanation?
Those are scheduled, they have to meet some criteria to be pushed on
scheduled lot. There are also out of cycle SIRTs. And yes, ven
> On Jan 9, 2019, at 09:51 , Töma Gavrichenkov wrote:
>
> 9 Jan. 2019 г., 9:56 Randy Bush mailto:ra...@psg.com>>:
> > the question is how soon the frr
> > users out on the internet will upgrade.
> > there are a lot of studies on
> > this. it sure isn't on the order of a week
>
> Which is, as
FWIW Looks to be OpenDNS IP
https://support.opendns.com/hc/en-us/articles/227986927-What-are-the-Cisco-Umbrella-Block-Page-IP-Addresses-
It’s being abused… https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/146.112.61.106
From: NANOG On Behalf Of Blake Mckeeby
Sent: Tuesday, January 8, 2019 3:43 PM
To: nanog@
> We are seeing DNS requests for A and to 8.8.8.8 come back with erroneous
> replies resolving to 146.112.61.106 when sent via FiOS circuits in the
> northeast. Anyone else seeing issues with DNS on FiOS in Northeast? Issue
> started around 12:25 AM ET this morning and seems to be affecting
On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 9:07 PM Saku Ytti wrote:
> Not disputing bug or bog house as ideal location for said policy, just
> want to explain my perspective why it is so.
So, network device vendors releasing security advisories twice a year
isn't a big part of the explanation?
> Hitless upgrades ar
Hi all,
Thanks Christopher and co-authors for this document. The issues that you have
highlighted are critical to ensuring that SOV and other future applications of
the RPKI can be deployed in production without becoming serious latent risk to
the Internet community and RIR system.
As a case i
We are seeing DNS requests for A and to 8.8.8.8 come back with
erroneous replies resolving to 146.112.61.106 when sent via FiOS circuits
in the northeast. Anyone else seeing issues with DNS on FiOS in Northeast?
Issue started around 12:25 AM ET this morning and seems to be affecting
customers
In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
On Wed, 9 Jan 2019 at 19:54, Töma Gavrichenkov wrote:
> Which is, as usual, a pity, because, generally, synchronizing a piece of
> software with upstream security updates less frequently than once to twice in
> a week belongs in Jurassic Park today; and doing it hardly more frequently
> than o
9 Jan. 2019 г., 9:56 Randy Bush :
> the question is how soon the frr
> users out on the internet will upgrade.
> there are a lot of studies on
> this. it sure isn't on the order of a week
Which is, as usual, a pity, because, generally, synchronizing a piece of
software with upstream security upda
> On Jan 8, 2019, at 09:06 , valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
>
> On Tue, 08 Jan 2019 17:48:46 +0100, niels=na...@bakker.net said:
>
>> After seeing this initial result I'm wondering why the researchers
>> couldn't set up their own sandbox first before breaking code on the
>> internet. I beli
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