thwhile to see what it takes to mount an attack and what
> works against a low resource adversary. That was also part of our
> motivation to show what could be done with a single bad node. But, an
> adversary that has a few tens of thousands of dollars can simply run
> many reliable high bandwidth nodes and thus mount the attack
> invulnerable to any countermeasure against lying. Michael Gersten
> noted the threat of this attack in a separate context in a post to
> this list yesterday (March 6). And it has long been recognized as a
> potential threat to Tor in general. I have begun to look at
> countermeasures that should work unless the adversary owns major hunks
> of the network, e.g., social network based, but will not get into that
> further here.
>
>
> More than you wanted to read. Hope it was useful anyway.
>
> aloha,
> Paul
--
Eugene Y. Vasserman
http://www.cs.umn.edu/~eyv/
>> get the
>> circuit complete.
>>
>> i save the cached-routers file and rename it, when tor empty the original
>> file i replace it with the one i have and it work again.
>>
>>
>>
>> ==
>> The Best Security Is Knowle
many rulings
> from the FCC and SEC require it. (For instance the ATT merger stated
> they had to uphold net neutrality)
> Comrade Ringo Kamens
>
> On 4/16/07, Eugene Y. Vasserman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Why exactly would blocking Tor be illegal (and in which country)?
w has a proxy
> bypasser, so I have to wonder...)
>
> EDIT: Weird. I opened a second gmail window, and the second one is
> logging everything through privoxy. But the first one doesn't.
--
Eugene Y. Vasserman
http://www.cs.umn.edu/~eyv/
Linux/Abusing_chroot
Thanks,
Eugene
- --
Eugene Y. Vasserman
Ph.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota
http://www.cs.umn.edu/~eyv/
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> I don't think much of the aforementioned physical "destruction" methods;
> I also agree in that full disk encryption is the best way to go, if at
> all possible.
(snip)
While I don't think much of physical destruction either, the "encrypted
stora
>
> References
>
>1. mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>2.
> http://www.theinquirer.net/gb/inquirer/news/2007/12/20/nsa-0wnz-popular-firewalls
>3. http://cs.niu.edu/
--
Eugene Y. Vasserman
Ph.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota
http://www.cs.umn.edu/~eyv/
]
> <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jan 02, 2008 at 02:47:11PM -0600, Eugene Y. Vasserman wrote:
> > Thus spake Ringo Kamens on Sun, 23 Dec 2007:
> >
> > (snip)
> > >Also, we know the NSA and DoJ have engaged
just trying to see things from both
sides. They're not NECESSARILY adding a back door. The algorithm is
included in a standards document - Microsoft added it because some
customers will ask for it. SP1 also adds AES-GMAC.
Eugene
> Comade Ringo Kamens
>
> On Jan 2, 2008 9:42 PM, Eugene
(much snippage)
> So, what happens when you set "HidServDirectoryV2 1"? Your relay will
> become part of a DHT-like directory for hidden service descriptors.
(yet even more further snippage)
Hi Karsten,
Is there a design document on this DHT-like thing?
Thanks,
Eugene
--
Eug
: Steven J. Murdoch. "Hot or Not: Revealing Hidden Services by
their Clock Skew"; Nicholas Hopper, Eugene Y. Vasserman, and Eric
Chan-Tin. "How much anonymity does network latency leak?".
(Full disclosure: I'm one of the authors of the second paper).
"Furthermore, we show
ds to have access
to the Tor network in the first place to notify the bridge authority
that a bridge is blocked. This is perhaps a lesser problem than the
first one.
I'm not sure this item CAN have a workable solution...
Thoughts?
Thanks,
Eugene
--
Eugene Y. Vasserman
http://www.cs.umn.edu/~eyv/
ose problems with a "liveCD" distro that dosen't
> touch the hard disk. There are many such "internet privacy appliances",
> my personal favorite being the one based on OpenBSD (Anonym.OS).
>
> Other general recommendations :
>
> Firefox (dump cookies
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