On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 4:32 PM, John Case wrote:
> Hello Julie,
> On Mon, 14 Feb 2011, Julie C wrote:
>
>> I suppose the anarchist genes in me are not strong enough. I have to agree
>> with Mike Perry's arguments, given his credibility, and his clearer
>> perspective than most of the rest of us.
On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 9:34 PM, Andrew Lewman wrote:
> I've talked to a few services that do one of the following:
>
> - Run a Tor exit enclave, which would only allow exit through Tor to
> your webservers. There are a few services that run a tor client and
> simply block every IP in the conse
On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 2:09 PM, wrote:
[snip]
> I'm getting to the point where I'm tempted to offer my two
> exit node lists (yesterday plus today, and previous six days
> plus today) to the public. If I had more confidence in the
> lists currently available to the public, I wouldn't be
> tempte
On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 11:39 AM, Tomasz Moskal
wrote:
[snip]
> Would you recommend using not Tor connection when one is forced to use
> unencrypted protocols? I think I'm safer using Tor even with unencrypted
> traffic that using "regular" connection but again I can be gravely wrong
> here. What
On Sat, Feb 12, 2011 at 5:35 PM, John Case wrote:
> That's fair.
>
> Instead of stressing the boundless set of "pros", I will discuss a single,
> specific "pro", and that is the idea that open, arbitrary systems provide a
> foundation upon which to build surprising and unexpected combinations.
>
>
On Fri, Feb 11, 2011 at 12:58 AM, John Case wrote:
>
> I think these reasons should be worked around or ignored.
>
> I think you, and others on that side of this argument have a very, very
> myopic view of the constraints and non-technical decisions that go into
> running a particular node - exit
On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 8:08 PM, mi nt wrote:
>> These people should not be Tor nodes.
>
> Mike, I respectfully disagree. Anyone willing to allow traffic should be
> node. The tor project homepage makes no 'rules' when it
> comes to running a node. If you're willing to allow any traffic you're a
>
On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 11:30 AM, Andrew Lewman wrote:
[snip]
> If we're going to start censoring Tor exits based on impressions, we
> might as well start blocking Tor relays that are rumoured to be run by
> national intelligence agencies, criminal organizations, martians, and
> other people we mi
On Sat, Jan 29, 2011 at 9:56 PM, grarpamp wrote:
>> I dont see how to recognize if the traffic is recorded?
>
> I know people who record exit traffic, lots of it. And they
> do all sorts of things with it too. Does that news trouble
> you? If so, you need to readjust your thinking.
It's not real
On Tue, Jan 4, 2011 at 12:11 PM, Steve Crook wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 04, 2011 at 10:13:00AM -0500, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
>
>> swap /dev/sda9 /dev/urandom swap,cipher=aes-lrw-plain,size=256
>
> Same solution as I use but with slightly different options. Mine are:
> cipher=aes-
OT, I know, but this is information that all tor node operators should have.
On Tue, Jan 4, 2011 at 8:25 AM, wrote:
> I sure would LOVE to know an easy way to encrypt my swap. My plan had
> been to do a fresh reinstallation of Ubuntu 10.04 on my dual-boot
> machine but I got to the "encrypt the
On Fri, Dec 31, 2010 at 10:17 PM, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> But to answer your questions, the main reason Tor doesn't use ECC now
> (and that its RSA keys are 1024 bits except for authority keys) is
> that back when we designed the relevant parts of the current Tor
[snip]
So— if someone had asked
On Tue, Dec 28, 2010 at 11:29 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
[snip]
> What I'm really looking forward to is learning what modifications to Tor
> might slow down the attack. For example, what happens if we move to a 1024
> byte cell by default, or if we randomly add some extra cells periodically,
> or
On Sat, Dec 18, 2010 at 4:55 AM, xhdhx wrote:
> I figured the lgical thing to add to torchat would be voip .Is there any
> move to that end , can anyone give me pointers as to probable protocols ,
> packages that can be ported to torchat .Or how abt getting ekiga to do the
> same along with z
On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 10:11 AM, Mitar wrote:
> Hi!
>
>> Relaxing the realtime constraint, adding random delays, more
>> hops and also chaff trafic in a Tor derivate would arguably
>> make such attacks more difficult.
>
> I am asking just about more hops. Why would more hops be necessary? It
> is
On Mon, Oct 18, 2010 at 2:37 PM, wrote:
> Maybe this subject has already been discussed here.
>
> Given, an attacker succeeds to break into a large number of tornodes and gets
> a copy of the secret keys from all those nodes. This would increase the
> chance to decrypt parts of the traffic that
On Fri, Sep 17, 2010 at 10:41 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> If your hidden service really needs to be annoying to find, run it:
>
> * using only well-written, secure software,
> * in a VM with no access to physical network hardware,
> * on a (physical) computer with no non-hidden services of any kind
On Mon, Sep 13, 2010 at 12:11 AM, Robert Ransom wrote:
>> There we go—
>> Perhaps the signature could be shipped only to the directory
>> authorities but left out of the published descriptors, no?
> No, the client needs to see it in the relay/bridge descriptor.
>> they'd need to be left outside of
On Sun, Sep 12, 2010 at 9:40 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> That's the wrong approach. The config file should contain a random
> secret key shared among all relays in a family, and the relays should
> publish in their descriptors a public key derived from that secret key
> along with a signature of t
On Sun, Sep 12, 2010 at 6:53 PM, wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 12, 2010 at 02:38:18PM +0200, tor...@ymail.com wrote 1.1K bytes
> in 31 lines about:
>> If it is technically not necessary, because tor would never use certain
>> nodes in one circuit. I would understand people running >20 nodes that
>> do no
Tcpcrypt (http://tcpcrypt.org/) proposes a new extension to TCP to
enable opportunistic encryption with optional authentication. From a
features and performance perspective, it's probably exactly what we
need to get away from the almost-everything-in-the-clear Internet that
we have today.
Unfortun
On Sun, Aug 29, 2010 at 3:54 AM, Mike Perry wrote:
[snip]
> Any classifier needs enough bits to differentiate between two
> potentially coincident events. This is also why Tor's fixed packet
> size performs better against known fingerprinting attacks. Because
> we've truncated the lower 8 bits off
On Wed, Aug 25, 2010 at 11:31 AM, Matthew wrote:
>> People are running automated datamining queries _via tor_ in order to
>> gain control of more IPs and avoid being blocked.
>>
> What is a datamining query exactly? Is this what I would call "typing some
> text into the search box and pressing en
On Wed, Aug 25, 2010 at 6:28 AM, Matthew wrote:
> On numerous occasions when using Google with Tor (yes, I know there are
> other options like Scroogle) it claims I might be sending automated queries
> and gives me a CAPTCHA. Sometimes this allows me to search; other times I
> am caught in a loop
On Tue, Aug 24, 2010 at 3:31 PM, David Carlson wrote:
> If I understand that correctly, it means that my ISP can tell that I am
> having a secure communication with, say, Paypal, even if the contents of my
> communication is encrypted. Is that correct? Wouldn't I be lost in the
> crowd of others
Greetings, I've searched my copy of the lists and can't find any
discussion of this. If there has been, please direct me to it.
I think it's obvious that the best way of using tor is running your
torrified apps in a VM which can only access the outside world via
TOR. This provides the highest prot
On Tue, Aug 17, 2010 at 2:08 AM, Seth David Schoen wrote:
[snip]
> I'm tempted to reply pointing out that _all_ uses of TLS represent
> at least potential support for a threat model in which a network
> operator is the adversary whom users are trying to defend against.
> So there's not much concep
On Mon, Aug 16, 2010 at 11:32 PM, Julie C wrote:
> The larger threat that I see is the Tor Project is absolutely ... dare I say
> it? ... PATHETIC AT MARKETING ITSELF.
> Something has been bugging me the last couple days about the bigger picture
> of the funding issue that came to light with the c
On Sun, Aug 15, 2010 at 2:46 PM, Ted Smith wrote:
> On Sun, 2010-08-15 at 17:40 +0200, Michael Scheinost wrote:
>> 2. Why is it offering HTTP
>> If duckduckgo.com really cares for the anonymity and privacy of its
>> users, why do they offer unencrypted HTTP?
>> Even if tor users are encouraged to
On Sat, Aug 14, 2010 at 12:19 PM, morphium wrote:
>> An "exit enclave" is when a service operates a Tor exit node with an
>> exit policy permitting exiting to that service. Tor will automagically
>> extend circuits built to that host from three hops to four, such that
>> your traffic will exit on
On Sat, Aug 14, 2010 at 11:09 AM, Geoff Down wrote:
> On Sat, 14 Aug 2010 09:20 -0400, "Ted Smith" wrote:
>> An "exit enclave" is when a service operates a Tor exit node with an
>> exit policy permitting exiting to that service. Tor will automagically
>> extend circuits built to that host from th
On Wed, Aug 11, 2010 at 11:52 AM, Mike Perry wrote:
[snip]
> Sometimes, you just need to pick your battles. If you believe the DMCA
> is bullshit and want a full exit policy, I think the practical answer
> is "Go outside the US for bandwidth". Or, be prepared to provider-hop
> for a good, long tim
On Sun, Aug 1, 2010 at 9:07 PM, Steven J. Murdoch
wrote:
[snip]
> To fix this attack, systems can add dummy traffic (padding), delay
> packets, and/or drop packets. Tor adds a bit of padding, but unlikely
> enough to make a difference. Tor doesn't (intentionally) drop or delay
> traffic.
>
> More
On Sun, Jul 25, 2010 at 9:31 PM, Kory Kirk wrote:
> Torbutton is just a firefox extension. I have no idea how it could be
> shipped including tor itself. In my experience with windows machines in
> computer labs, you are able to install firefox extensions without the
> permissions to install pr
On Sun, Jul 25, 2010 at 7:33 PM, Kory Kirk wrote:
> I think this can be achieved with a Java applet. So maybe when JTor is
> finished. A relay could host a web server, and have the Java applet on it.
> The applet would need to be signed, and could be further verified by a
> checksum, which could b
On Sun, Jul 25, 2010 at 5:58 PM, Moritz Bartl wrote:
> That being said, you should look into the bridge concept.
> http://www.torproject.org/bridges.html.en
Bridge-relays do no good for people who can't load the tor software.
That is specifically what I was responding to.
On Sun, Jul 25, 2010 at 5:44 PM, Praedor Atrebates wrote:
> At work I am unable to run or use tor even from a USB key - they are
> prevented from working. It might be nice to have a website(s) that act as
> entry points to tor and that use names that do not immediately scream TOR
> PROXY SERVER
On Wed, Jun 23, 2010 at 9:03 AM, Jon wrote:
> I don't know if this will help or not, but in the states, my ISP
> provider calls me when they get a complaint. They tell me what the
> complaint was about, I get the ports the issues came thru and what
> they were. All except the last one were Torren
On Fri, Mar 12, 2010 at 6:24 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 11, 2010 at 01:39:26PM -0500, Andrew Lewman wrote:
>> On Thu, 11 Mar 2010 17:38:25 +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>> :Any suggestions for making Tor filling up 2-3 /24 networks,
>> :so that it doesn't break anything for the users?
>>
>>
On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 at 1:08 PM, Paul Syverson
wrote:
> Two words: Hidden service
Okay. I'm now running a HTTP forwarder to LJ as a hidden service.
Email me for the hidden service address and port number.
...
I'll be posting the mapping of the LJ accounts and passwords of
everyone who uses it
t
On Tue, Nov 24, 2009 at 8:05 PM, Ted Smith wrote:
> On Tue, 2009-11-24 at 19:49 -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote:
>> See especially point #1: "even if we didn't tell clients about the
>> list of
>> relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections
>> through
>> Tor to a test site and bu
On Mon, Nov 23, 2009 at 10:05 AM, Paul Syverson
wrote:
[snip]
> So, reducing the number of hops means that exit nodes have
> significantly more information about connection origins. Reducing hops
> to one means that they know everything about the origin of a
> connection (up to the IP address from
On Mon, Nov 23, 2009 at 12:29 AM, Lucky Green wrote:
[snip]
> seeking higher anonymity. The end state, if lower than three hop
> implementations are permitted to use the Tor network, is that Tor's
> network performance will acceptable only to users of lower hop clients.
I presume you can back thi
On Thu, Nov 19, 2009 at 12:10 PM, Marco Bonetti
wrote:
> DeepSec 2009 is on, this morning I gave the talk on new HTML5 features
> and how do they affect Tor browsing, if you're interested in the
> presentation with some sample code for the attacks go to
> http://sid77.slackware.it/.
> And keep bro
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 6:17 PM, moris blues wrote:
> hi,
> can someone tell me what it mean:
> letting Tor be used as a single hop proxy makes exit nodes a more attractive
> target for compromise?
> What is a songle hop Proxy, i know only my Onion Proxy.
> And how do this attack work?
This is a
On Tue, Nov 17, 2009 at 9:03 AM, Andrew Lewman wrote:
> People who don't want strong anonymity should use VPNS, single-hop proxy
> providers, or setup an ssh tunnel somewhere.
I thought there were plans to offer officially offer a length-two mode?
In particular the current routing is annoying fo
On Wed, Sep 30, 2009 at 12:34 AM, John Case wrote:
> No, no - I understand what the behavior in meatspace is like - I wonder what
> the behavior looks like on the network.
>
> Take carding ... presumably that all takes place on 443, as carders use
> online merchants to either test or use the cards
On Wed, Sep 16, 2009 at 5:01 PM, Rich Jones wrote:
> http://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/9kwph/i_am_a_guy_who_writes_covert_software_that_runs/
> Thoughts?
>
> also, I realized that two of the posts I've made this this list have now
> been reddit-related. Sorry about that. But I'd really like to
On Thu, Sep 10, 2009 at 10:51 AM, wrote:
> In general, these sorts of stories are the exception, not the norm. I
> ran an exit-node, and still do, for over 5 years. I've had my share of
> abuse complaints and dmca threat letters, but a simple response has
> taken care of all that. Posting the
On Wed, Sep 2, 2009 at 3:47 PM,
Arjan wrote:
> Maybe the FAQ should advise people with a static IP address to
> run a relay instead of a bridge? If the IP address of your bridge
> is static, an ISP or government that filters Tor will eventually
> find the address and block it.
Hm? but if it's dyna
On Sun, Aug 16, 2009 at 2:54 AM, James Brown wrote:
> When does the tor team intend to include supporting IPv6 in the Tor? And
> do they intend do it in principle?
Do you mean making IPv6 connections via Tor or using IPv6 as a
transport for TOR?
These things are serve distinct purposes, have diff
On Mon, Aug 10, 2009 at 2:39 PM, Scott Bennett wrote:
[snip]
> business-class service, but it seems unlikely to be any cheaper. Verizon's
> residential service does not currently have a cap, but I don't know whether
> they prohibit listening on ports accessable from the Internet.
VZN's residentia
On Sat, Jul 4, 2009 at 3:03 PM, Peter Hultqvist wrote:
> The forward DNS is problematic since they can be spoofed by pointing any
> domain to a server that does not belong to one. Second, I believe that
> ptr lookup is very limited but I'm not that knowledgeable in that area.
>
> One way could be t
There are many people who would like to run tor exits but whom don't
because of the inevitable flood of abuse complaints.
At the same time, there are a great many high traffic destinations on
the internet which have little to no complaint potential because they
are effectively read-only or are oth
On Tue, Jun 30, 2009 at 6:02 PM, Erilenz wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Firefox 3.5 was released today. Has anyone investigated the new video tag that
> it supports with regards to whether or not it can cause leaks with Tor?
and should have exactly the same attack surface as has.
Thats one of the benefits t
On Wed, Jun 3, 2009 at 10:26 AM, Camilo Viecco wrote:
> I would wait until it can ubiquitously work behind NATs.
> (Only FreeBSD has NAT SCTP support and it was committed on Feb 2009).
Everyone else thinking that way is why it never will.
On Wed, Jun 3, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Scott Bennett wrote:
> This may seem to some like beating a dead horse, but SCTP really is
> coming to the Internet. It just looks too useful to die like OSI did. The
> more I find out about it, the more it looks like a really good match for
> tor. In fact,
On Fri, Apr 3, 2009 at 12:34 PM, Paul Syverson
wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 03, 2009 at 12:03:53PM -0400, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
>
>> To solve this issue I believe that TOR needs a strong pseudo-anonymous
>> system built in and available to users. Something where Wikipedia can
On Fri, Apr 3, 2009 at 11:28 AM, 7v5w7go9ub0o <7v5w7go9u...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Thank you for bringing this up! How sad for us all!
>
> I sure hope that the Tor community can quickly effect some sort of short
> term solution. The precedent of destination sites restricting
> Tor access - eve
FYI—
-- Forwarded message --
From: Brion Vibber
Date: Fri, Apr 3, 2009 at 5:44 AM
Subject: [Wikitech-l] Planning to tighten TorBlock settings
To: Wikimedia developers
en.wikipedia.org and others have seen a rash of abuse coming via Tor in
the form of account creations with abus
On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 12:07 PM, wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 10:46:05AM +0100, morph...@morphium.info wrote 0.4K
> bytes in 13 lines about:
> : On the SAME day, a letter of the state attorney was sent to me
> : (arrived yesterday), stating I can pick my things they raided about 20
> : mont
People are unlikely to spend $$ to give their fake https sites real ca
signed certs. Its easy to test for, impossible to fake, and given how
the browser vendors handle self signed certs someone could claim they
are trying to defeat security risks by blocking self signed
webservers.
So I would gues
On Sat, Jan 10, 2009 at 11:28 PM, gabrix wrote:
> Hi list !
> I host a public postfix server . I wish to make it tor hidden , but i
> need some advices on how to make it as open as possible , i mean no
> authentication required and spam free (does spam torify its junk ?)
Spam free? Don't make it
On Fri, Jan 2, 2009 at 11:43 AM, Erik Heidt wrote:
[snip]
> - Permitting exit to key informational resources (e.g. wikipedia services)
> - Permitting exit to top 5 or 10 web mail services (e.g. google mail,
> hotmail, yahoo, etc.)
And manage to make yourself look like someone doing a targeted MIT
On Mon, Dec 8, 2008 at 4:07 PM, Scott Bennett <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[snip]
> That some people have found tor to be helpful in bypassing censorial
> regimes' efforts is one of the nicer unintended consequences of tor's design,
> but such use is fallout from, not motivation for, the design.
On Mon, Dec 8, 2008 at 8:05 AM, Benjamin S. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Am Samstag, den 06.12.2008, 19:49 -0500 schrieb Gregory Maxwell:
>> http://community.zdnet.co.uk/blog/0,100567,10009938o-2000331777b,00.htm?new_comment
>>
>> I've confirmed the reports of U
On Sun, Dec 7, 2008 at 8:09 PM, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> only few countries are on the list at opennet.
> An example is finland:
>
> http://lapsiporno.info/suodatuslista/?lang=en
>
> An interesting point is that finland censors some GB
> and many US sites, because of child porn.
It's
On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 8:39 PM, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 06, 2008 at 07:49:58PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote 0.2K bytes
> in 4 lines about:
> : I've confirmed the reports of UK ISPs censoring Wikipedia using some
> : UK tor exists.
>
> http://en.wikinews.org/wiki/UK_ISPs_erect_%
http://community.zdnet.co.uk/blog/0,100567,10009938o-2000331777b,00.htm?new_comment
I've confirmed the reports of UK ISPs censoring Wikipedia using some
UK tor exists.
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 6:46 AM, Erilenz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> * on the Mon, Nov 17, 2008 at 01:05:27PM -0800, Marc Erickson wrote:
>
>> I use Tor on my laptop to encrypt wireless packets when connecting to an
>> unsecured wireless network. Is there a way to limit the number of hops the
>>
On Wed, Oct 8, 2008 at 11:50 PM, M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> ok understood, so in actuality he would have to be observing 3 things:
>
> 1) The user' s computer (timing and size)
> 2) the first hop ((timing and size)
>
> 3) the last hop ((timing, size and anythign else)
>
> He would have to be ob
On Wed, Oct 8, 2008 at 11:34 PM, M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 9, 2008 at 6:31 AM, Gregory Maxwell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 8, 2008 at 11:23 PM, M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> > Thanx Gregory and F.Fox...un
On Wed, Oct 8, 2008 at 11:23 PM, M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Thanx Gregory and F.Fox...understood the concept. Just one note though:
>
> "Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity designs) fails when
> the attacker can see both ends of the communications channel. For example,
> supp
On Wed, Oct 8, 2008 at 4:50 PM, M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Is there any reason i get the same first hope for a number of days? Even
> when i form a "new identity" in vidalia, i still get the same first hops. i
> dont feel comfortable with that.
It increases your security.
https://wiki.torproj
On Tue, Sep 9, 2008 at 8:02 PM, Lucky Green <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[snip]
> Also interesting to me is the overall reduced amount of traffic over the
> last few months that I have been seeing with my middleman nodes. The
> most likely explanation is that the overall Tor network capacity is exit
On Fri, Sep 5, 2008 at 11:08 AM, Nick Mathewson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I dig what I've heard of the Chrome architecture, but it seems clear
> that, like every other consumer browser, it's not suitable for
> anonymous browsing out-of-the-box. The real question will be how easy
> it is to adap
On Thu, May 15, 2008 at 6:56 PM, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi everyone, I run an exit node (nickname: swopusa), and now I'm averaging 1
> DMCA request per day for TV shows, movies and the like, from paramount, NBC
> universal, etc.
>
> I do BW limiting @ 100k/sec -- 2GB/day. Otherwise it's t
On Sun, Apr 20, 2008 at 12:05 AM, Mike Perry <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Thus spake .FUF ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
> Incidentally, this was filed as Firefox Bug
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=405652. They have a fix
> in the 3.0 branch. I requested backport into FF2.0.
It looks like
On Sat, Apr 5, 2008 at 6:01 AM, .FUF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Mozilla Firefox sends your computer's uptime while establishing TLS
> (SSL) connection. This could be used to correlate anonymous traffic with
> non-anonymous (e.g. LAN traffic) by correlating intercepted uptime
> values (or to se
On Sun, Mar 2, 2008 at 6:34 PM, Michael_google gmail_Gersten
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[snip]
> Here's a simple idea. Just as search engines added a "robots.txt"
> file, how about a web server providing a "torexit.txt" file, which is
> simply the list of tor exit nodes that the server considers
On Jan 26, 2008 10:08 PM, Kraktus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 26/01/2008, 孙超 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > We in China use tor mainly for avoiding Great Fire Wall, which is a very
> > strong internet censorship software operated by the government. So, if
> You can add
> ExcludeNodes NodeName1,
On Jan 26, 2008 4:06 PM, maillist <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Some f:ing paedophile is responsible for loosing all my computers and
> scaring my better half. Thanks a lot.
Some f'ing paedophile is responsible for being a pervert, but the
invasion of your home, the home of an innocent person, is
On Jan 26, 2008 12:46 PM, Kraktus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Really, if I'd known my message was going to evoke this sort of response,
> I'd have entitled it 'Directory-distributed variables for exit lists'.
It would have been better if you had, but you would have still
received a negative respo
On Jan 24, 2008 10:11 PM, Kraktus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I just want to know if there is a technically feasible way of
> minimising one of the most harmful things Tor could potentially be
> used for.
Nope.
> And if it's not technically feasible? Fine, I like Tor anyway, I
> won't stop runn
On Jan 7, 2008 4:52 PM, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> that's clear; i'm using TOR as a mix with a transparent local http proxy
> which uses an ISP
> proxy as parent proxy, so that the exit traffic goes through two proxies and
> with several numbers
> in the X_FORWARDED_FOR header ;-)
> That's goo
On Dec 16, 2007 6:01 PM, F. Fox <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I think running *any* system in this modern age without some kind of
> firewall protection - even if it's just software on the end box itself -
> is an invitation to disaster; doing it with a server is suicide. =:oD
This is WindowsPC th
On Dec 4, 2007 3:35 PM, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> A strong magnetic field close to the hard drive will completely destroy
> the data making it impossible to recover. I will also probably fuckup
> the drive mechanism, rendering the drive useless.
If by strong you mean a super conducting magnet
On 11/24/07, anonym <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[snip]
> Now, with this background information in mind I can go on to my actual
> questions for those of you who have managed to read all this (sorry for
> being so verbose): Why does this happen? Is netstat operating on a too
> high level to detect th
It seems that when I use manual exit selection
(http://somesite.com.somenode.exit/) that my browser is sending the
node/exit name back in the HTTP request. This seems like a bad idea in
general and moreover it breaks some sites vhosting configuration.
Am I missing something?
On 10/15/07, Alexander W. Janssen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 10/15/07, Gregory Maxwell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > I don't intend to troll... but wouldn't be ..er better if playing the
> > videos didn't require using Flash?
>
> My mpl
On 10/13/07, Robert Hogan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> The defcon videos are up.
I don't intend to troll... but wouldn't be ..er better if playing the
videos didn't require using Flash? After all Tor users are advised not
to have the flash plugin installed in their browser if they want tor
to be a
On 10/8/07, Mike Cardwell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> You could set up a gmail account via tor. Then point a stunnel at
> smtp.gmail.com port 465 over Tor using tsocks or something. Making sure
> you have a copy of their public cert first and that the stunnel
> validates it. I set this up and poin
On 10/8/07, Florian Reitmeir <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Sure. thats a really good hidden service,
>
> As sender ..
> - i don't know where the server is, and who its operating..
You wouldn't really know that in any case. Or rather you'd know where
you found out about it, and the same would be tru
On 10/8/07, Michael_google gmail_Gersten <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 10/6/07, Chris Jacobs <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > When email is remailed via TOR is it possible to add a header with a
> > contact address for complaints,
> > like in cypherpunk remailers?
> Hmm. Technically, yes.
> To do
On 9/28/07, Scott Bennett <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> In order to keep such traffic distinguishable from my own local
> traffic, I intend to route it to tor on a second loopback interface
Instead why not consider running an exit node? You still may hear
something about the user's dodgy traffic,
On 10/1/07, Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 01, 2007 at 04:31:19PM +0200, Muelli wrote:
>
> > you are hosting by Hetzner, right? ;-) I get those automaticly generated
> > netscan-mails frequently. Some times they shut down the single Tor IP,
> > some time they shutdown the whol
What would be the implication of running multiple copies of tor with
identical configuration and duplicated private key data on a single
IP:PORT with a TCP connection based load-balancer in front of them?
To the outside world it would look like a single host/node.
Would it break the Tor network?
I'm working on setting up a number of nodes as exit enclaves. If I use
a normal socks4 client (resulting in local DNS resolution) it works
exactly as I would expect: All traffic to the exit host uses the exit
host local tor node.
If instead I use a client with privoxy and sock4a with DNS resolutio
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