Howard,
HP: To keep the discussion on the subject of Frederik's book let me explain
where I see modern physics differing from Peirce's views.
GF: What does that have to do with the subject of NP? Until you can explain
that, I'm changing the subject line of this thread.
HP: First, I
Ben, lists,
Just to go over it one more time,
In W2:180 (1868) Peirce distinguishes between a narrow sense of “individual”
which is synonymous with “singular”, and a far wider sense which you call
“general individual”. He doesn’t actually use the phrase “general individual”,
but says
Gary, Howard, List,
The critical question here is whether our conceptual framework (methods,
models, practices, theories, etc.) is adequate to a given domain of phenomena
and problems.
Naturalism being one of the few isms that I fess up to, I assume that
everything that happens is natural.
Peircers,
We've discussed Peirce's take on individuals — and its bearing on the myopia of
nominal thinkers — many times before. As often happens, his most peirceptive
and farsighted insights are stated most clearly in his virgin essays on the
subject, for example, here:
•
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
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Dear Gary F,
You wrote:
. . . this sign is not dicent, nor is it indexical, (101714-1)
nor is it a legisign, as Peirce defines these terms.
Are you sure ?
If the Hofstadter cubes are no dicent, nor indexical nor a legisign, which
of the ten classes of signs Peirce defined do you
At 07:37 AM 10/17/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Howard said: To keep the discussion on the subject of Frederik's
book let me explain where I see modern physics differing from Peirce's views.
GF: What does that have to do with the subject of NP? Until you can
explain that, I'm changing the subject
