Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7261] Re: Natural Propositions Chapter 4

2014-11-04 Thread Frederik Stjernfelt
Dear Howard, lists - I stumbled over a text bite from mid-October which gave me the idea that there may be some terminological confusion at the root of some of our discussions. Den 20/10/2014 kl. 18.19 skrev Howard Pattee mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com>>: HP: Exactly. More generally, do the sym

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7261] Re: Natural Propositions Chapter 4

2014-11-04 Thread Sungchul Ji
Frederik, Thanks for your informative post. As I remember, Edwina wrote something similar a while back, although I do not remember any details. You wrote, "I think he is right that gene symbols code for functions (110414-1) both on a specific and a more general level - on several levels o

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5

2014-11-04 Thread Gary Fuhrman
Mara, Clark, lists, Clark quoted some very interesting passages in a post on Chapter 4, and following up on one of them led me to another that seems relevant to the idea of “adaptation to rationality”, so I’m addressing it here in connection with Chapter 5. Here again is the passage Clar

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5

2014-11-04 Thread Clark Goble
> On Nov 4, 2014, at 9:27 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: > > I place these here because I see a number of parallels between Damasio’s > psychobiological approach to cognitive development and Peirce’s > logical-semiotic approach. I’d noticed years ago when I’d first encountered Damasio how much his a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5

2014-11-04 Thread Edwina Taborsky
A few comments, Gary F; thanks for the long post and for Damasio's excellent selection: I think that experience has to consist of more than Secondness. Certainly, Secondness is basic, for it sets up and operates only within differentiation between the Self and Other. But this is a mechanical ac

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5

2014-11-04 Thread Benjamin Udell
Gary F., Mara, Clark, lists, In your quote from "Mr. Peterson's Proposed Discussion" (_The Monist_ v. XVI n. 1, January 1906, pages 147-151, http://books.google.com/books?id=3KoLIAAJ&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147), Peirce discusses not one but two conceptions that need names other than that of exper

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5

2014-11-04 Thread Gary Fuhrman
Edwina, a brief reply … ET: I think that experience has to consist of more than Secondness. GF: I agree. Secondness is one of three kinds of elements of experience. I just didn’t mention the other two in this particular post. ET: That's my question: what 'caused' consciousness and I do

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5

2014-11-04 Thread Edwina Taborsky
Gary F- thanks for your reply. With regard to the gradual vs punctuated views of evolution, I don't think it's just a matter of scale. First, I certainly don't refute the reality of continuity. To the contrary, my belief (for what it's worth) that semiosis is a basic component of the universe

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5

2014-11-04 Thread Gary Fuhrman
Ben, I considered including the whole Monist passage in my post, but decided against it. Anyway, I too see Peirce mentioning two conceptions for which he says that the term “experience” is not suitable; but they’re not the same two that you see. I see both of them at the very end of the pass

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5

2014-11-04 Thread Benjamin Udell
Gary, lists, Responses interleaved. On 11/4/2014 3:11 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: > [GF] Ben, I considered including the whole /Monist/ passage in my post, but decided against it. Anyway, I too see Peirce mentioning two conceptions for which he says that the term “experience” is not suitable;

Re: [biosemiotics:7361] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5

2014-11-04 Thread Howard Pattee
At 02:40 PM 11/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote: It seems to me that you're in danger here of falling into the trap that Howard sometimes falls into, of thinking that the existence of discontinuities or "punctuations" refutes the reality of continuity. HP: I have never said or implied anything lik

Re: [biosemiotics:7361] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5

2014-11-04 Thread Edwina Taborsky
I agree with Howard, when he says that: discreteness and continuity are irreducible complementary modes of thinking. But they are not only complementary (and I use his meaning) of thinking, but also of existence, in the nature of Secondness and Thirdness. Edwina - Original Message

[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7365] Re: Natural Propositions,

2014-11-04 Thread Gary Fuhrman
Howard, thanks for that clarification. But I had no idea that Peirce had ever tried to reduce either discreteness or continuity to the other, or derive one from the other. Can you tell us where and when he tried to do that, or said that he had? gary f. -Original Message- From: Howard Patt

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7367] Re: Natural Propositions,

2014-11-04 Thread Howard Pattee
At 07:30 PM 11/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote: Howard, thanks for that clarification. But I had no idea that Peirce had ever tried to reduce either discreteness or continuity to the other, or derive one from the other. Can you tell us where and when he tried to do that, or said that he had? See on