Edwina, list,
I never meant to imply that language determines thought in toto. So far as
all thought is in signs, and a language represents a system of signs, and
signs determine other signs, then it must be admitted that language
determines signs and, since all thought is in signs, this means tha
Matt, list,
Can you give your source for this?
I cannot. I confess that my statement was not well-thought out. I did not
mean to imply anything about the possibility of developing scientific
terminology in any given human language. What I meant "about the
development of a language to the point w
Matt, list,
So, [the token of] smoke [in your mind], as understood as being a type,
e.g., relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment.
This is still a poor way of stating the matter. The token is not a type;
but your statement, as worded, suggests that it is. There is smoke as
John, list,
I agree about Peirce’s difference with Lewis wrt the a priori. I don’t see
> how that is related to the issue of the effability of percepts, though.
Because Lewis views percepts (the "given") as ineffable, he requires the
introduction of the pragmatic a priori in order to interpret t
Hi Gary R,
You wrote :
"As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do
not consider the 9 parameters (121915-1)
as signs at all, so that when I am discussing signs as possibly embodied
signs, I am *always* referring to
the 10 classes."
I have
Sung, list,
When I gave the example of the qualisign as a sign which " 'may not possess
all the essential characters of a more complete sign', and yet be a part of
that more complex sign," I was in fact referring to the rhematic iconic
qualisign following Peirce's (shorthand) usage, since "To des
Hi Jeff, Gary R, List,
I agree that "qualisigin" is not a complete sign because it is one of the 9
sigh types and not one of the 10 sign classes. It seems to me that in order
for "qualisign" to be a complete sign, it has to be a part of one of the 10
classes of signs, e.g., a "rhematic iconic qual
Jeff, Gary F. list,
I think one need look no further than to the qualisign for a good example
of a sign which "may not possess all the essential characters of a more
complete sign," and yet be a part of that more complex sign.
Best,
Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and
Hello Gary F., List,
In MS 7, Peirce says: "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a
sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a
more complete sign." How should we understand this distinction between a
sufficiently complete sign and those parts of