On 11/2/2018 4:14 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
Has anyone else observed how so many scientific "studies" actually
relate to semiotics?
Peirce did. And so did the Scholastics. All science is second
intentional, since it is language about first intentional reports
of observations.
On a related
On 11/1/2018 12:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Just curious, why do you prefer Predicate and Proposition to the
more general Rheme and Dicisign?
There are two important audiences:
1. Peirce scholars who are doing the detailed textual analysis to
determine as exactly as possible what
On 10/31/2018 3:34 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
to get to me. I will ask again--could you (or John himself)
please post an image of Figure 6.14,
See the attached signs.jpg.
This is the version from http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf
But fig 6.14 in the KR book (2000), the term in the lower
On 9/27/2018 10:54 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
Pure mathematics has infinitely many theories.
If you only want a restricted version, it has that also.
Fine. If you wish to hypothesize that pure mathematics can
generate large categories of theories, I will grant you that
that is readily
On 9/27/2018 6:05 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
it is not possible to fully respond to your beliefs about the
relationships between Peircian realism, modern mathematics and
science. Our disagreements are sharp and well defined.
My beliefs are based on Peirce and the overwhelming majority
of
On 9/22/2018 10:59 AM, marty.rob...@neuf.fr wrote:
/It is evident that a possible can determine nothing but a Possible,
it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but
a Necessitant./
Thank you for that reminder (EP 2.481). In an earlier note on
another topic, I
On 9/21/2018 3:05 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
so mathematics perhaps is the only example, for which Platon´s
idea of "idea" is correct. All phenomena can be explained with
mathematics. Though only afterwards, subsequently?
As Peirce said, diagrammatic reasoning is the foundation for
all
On 9/20/2018 5:33 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
I ask that you clearly state the meaning of your notion of “pure
mathematics”. I have taken it to mean the usual undergraduate
level of mathematical philosophy...
The scope of pure mathematics, as Peirce defined it, is infinitely
larger than
On 9/19/2018 4:28 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
A chemical atomic number, as a unique form of matter, is composed of
polar opposite electrical charges that generate a special (polar)
logical operation called valence that operates only on one of the pair
of polar opposites.
That is an
Jerry LRC,
As Kirsti said, the subject line about categories and modes was
a long thread about Peirce's 1903 classification of the sciences.
I plan to post a copy that text, my diagram about it, and related
quotations by Peirce on my web site.
But I changed the subject line for the topic of
Edwina and Jeff BD,
ET
I think it's the unstated assumption that IF ONLY one can classify
a research action within a specific analytic framework, THEN, this
will result in truthful results.
Peirce never assumed that. I never assumed that. But Peirce
considered that outline a useful map
Jon AS, Auke, Gary F, and Kirsti,
This thread started with what I thought was an uncontroversial
diagram that summarized Peirce's classification of the sciences.
Your questions, objections, and citations have been very helpful
in forcing me to fill in the gaps, to correct some points, and
to
Jerry R, Helmut, and Jon AS,
This note is rather long, but each of your questions requires
a lot of explanation supported by quotations.
JR
But my reservation about not treating bacteria as quasi-mind remains.
How is this even possible?
I'll answer that question with another question: A
Edwina, Jerry R, Jon AS, and Jerry LRC,
Peirce answered your questions. I like his 1903 *outline* because
it's a clean and simple summary of everything he wrote about the
sciences and their interrelationships. But as an outline, it omits
nearly all the details.
ET
I wonder if this list will
On 9/13/2018 11:27 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
How do you classify biosemiotic using your scheme?
Very simply. Every living thing, from a bacterium on up, has
a quasi-mind with a phaneron that contains the kinds of signs
it recognizes and responds to.
When Peirce said "present to the mind in any
Edwina and Jon AS,
ET
My concern is that this list seems to focus almost exclusively
on debates about terminology and classification of research areas,
and doesn't venture outside the seminar room into the mud and dirt
of the real matter-as-mind world.
Peirce had a long career in science
On 9/13/2018 11:10 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
What's the point of these seminar-room analyses of terminology, of
classification of areas of study? Surely it can't mean that one is
barred from studying X within the area of Y because X is strictly
classified in another area of re
It shows how
Jon AS, Auke, and Jeff BD,
Both subject lines are closely related. For modes of being,
I'll quote Bertrand Russell, whom I rarely cite:
Mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know
what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true.
That is a dramatic way
On 9/12/2018 2:28 PM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
In any case, I am not ultimately seeking to explicate Peirce's
1904-1906 efforts at classifying Signs; I am trying to develop a
viable framework for understanding Signs and their relations based
on Peirce's /entire /corpus, especially his late
Jon AS and Gary R,
JAS
Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection
with phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a
Normative Science?
To show the relationships more clearly, I attached another copy
of CSPsemiotic.jpg. Note that Peirce placed formal logic under
Auke, Francesco, Frances, Gary F, and Jon AS,
I agree with your points, but none of them explain one important
issue: Peirce's categories of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are central to
semiotic, and they are usually called *phenomenological* categories.
But in that classification of 1903, he did not
On 9/9/2018 9:48 PM, frances.ke...@sympatico.ca wrote:
In his later classification of the sciences Peirce seemingly located
*formal* *logics* under the mathematical sciences, but he also located
*critical logics* and *normal* *logics* as separate normative sciences
under the philosophical
In his 1903 classification of the sciences (CP 1.180-202)
Peirce classified formal logic under mathematics, but he also
classified logic as a normative science.
Question: Where is semeiotic?
As a formal theory, it would be classified with formal logic
under mathematics. But semeiotic is also
On 9/7/2018 10:51 AM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
But what does "map his terminologies to FOL" mean, really?
I apologize. The word 'map' in that sentence was a careless
mistake. I've been working on AI and computational linguistics
for years, and I fully realize the enormous range of
Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
FB
"Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions" (EP
2:494)
Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
confirm the point I was trying to make: From
On 9/6/2018 11:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I agree with your linking Peirce's semiotic with his logic, but
my concern is that one can lose the vital nature of Peirce; namely,
that his logic-as-formal semiotic is a pragmatic system.
I agree with your concerns. I know many logicians who get
On 9/5/2018 2:57 AM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general"
in at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices,
which have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves
(as types that occur in replicas),
Francesco,
Thanks for the very helpful comments. I'd just like to make
one point about terminology:
Peirce defines a rheme as that which remains of a proposition after
something replaceable by a proper name has been removed from it,
where "replaceable" means that when the replacement has
Janos and Kirsti,
I have been tied up with some deadlines, which prevented me from
responding to the many issues in these threads. I hope to catch up
later this week. But your recent notes raise two important issues.
Kirsti
I wonder why science(s) seems to be left out of the context
in the
On 8/23/2018 4:06 AM, A. Mani wrote:
1. Obviously \exists x is \exists x.
Why should it refer to models?
When the subject matter is mathematics, existence is not obvious.
This issue has been debated for over two millennia: If mathematical
objects exist, where are they? In a Platonic heaven?
Edwina, Gary R, and Jon AS,
I agree with your points and with the quotations by Peirce.
The challenge is to find a systematic terminology that is
consistent with Peirce, with modern conventions in logic,
and with the following constraints:
1. Logic allows a variable x in ∃x to refer to refer
On 8/22/2018 2:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
"I defined actuality as anything that ever was, is, or will be
anywhere in the universe. Most of us know more about the past
and present than we do about the future, but our knowledge is
irrelevant to its existence. "
What's the difference, then,
On 8/22/2018 10:55 AM, Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote:
Reality is anything, all, totality, the sum of semiotic existence.
Thus if I say Mello Rolls (something from my long ago childhood) in
the year 2099, it is real, Reality does not depend on the faculties
of the body or mind.
That is one
David and James,
DP
What about "the first cake that I bake in 2020". Is it an actual
entity? It is not (currently) observable. It might not even exist
(because I might not bake a cake in 2020). I would claim that it
is of the same type as "the first cake I baked in 2018" (which did
exist
Azamat,
When we use the words 'possible' and 'actual', we must distinguish
pure mathematics and applied mathematics:
1. Pure mathematics is pure possibility. It can never make any
claims about what is or is not actual.
2. But *applied* mathematics must determine which of the infinitely
Edwina, Jeff BD, and Jon AS,
I have been trying to send this message to Peirce-L, but for
some reason, it won't go through. In my previous versions, I
had copied some excerpts from your notes. To see if they had
caused some problems, I deleted those excerpts in this version.
In Peirce's
Edwina, Jeff BD, and Jon AS,
ET
I agree with your outline and suggestions to replace 'universal'
with 'mathematical'. That change also inserts a notion of Mind,
an active Mind, into the process - understanding 'mathematical'
as an act of reasoning, while 'universal' brings to my mind more
of
owing note, which I would
like to mention in discussing your notes.
John
Forwarded Message
Subject: [ontolog-forum] Re: Possibility and actuality
Date: Sat, 18 Aug 2018
From: John F Sowa
To: ontolog-fo...@googlegroups.com
...
Summary: The topmost level of an ontology shoul
On 8/18/2018 5:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I can see from the images that you refer to each of these Peircean
categories taking place in a different part of the brain.
That's not what I meant. The categories are correlated with the
interconnections of different areas.
For further
Jeff,
I went through some old files and found the attached pie chart,
CSP_MSS.jpg. This a rough estimate of the amount, location,
and state of the Peirce MSS.
Note that the previously published MSS are a small fraction
of the total, and they overlap the MSS at Harvard. But there
is a
On 8/18/2018 4:08 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
So I think it would be interesting to know, if in the Philippines stone
spearheads, or even stone arrowheads have been found, that can be dated
700,000 years ago. Or if so dated (rhino...) bones also have shown
impact marks of these weapons.
Fir a
Edwina and Gary R,
I agree with Gary that these issues go far beyond the scope of
Peirce-L. I was just about to send the following points to the
thread about the Luzon hominins. Then I'll get to the new issues.
On 8/18/2018 10:59 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I think a sailboat and navigation
On 8/17/2018 9:36 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Interesting. If the time analysis is scientifically correct.
I did a bit more Googling, and I found the original publication
in _Nature_:
Earliest known hominin activity in the Philippines by 709
thousand years ago
On 8/17/2018 11:54 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
I'd like to track down the MS that have not been scanned and
see if we might get them digitized and included in the
transcription efforts of the SPIN project.
That workshop was in 2014, and I summarized what I remembered.
One point they
Stone tools and rhino bones with cut marks were found on the
island of Luzon. What's amazing is that the bones were dated
to 700,000 years ago. See excerpt & URL below.
Getting across the South China Sea is far more difficult than
floating on a raft. And a lone fisherman who was accidentally
Jon AS, Mike B,
After the Peirce Centennial in 2014, I attended a one-day workshop
at Harvard about the critical issue of crumbling manuscripts.
JAS
[Digitization] has been done already, unless you are referring to
additional manuscripts that are not included in the Harvard microfilms.
...
Mike, Edwina, and Stephen
MB
I apologize for the length
Don't apologize, I agree with Edwina:
ET
Thank you so much for this scholarly, definitive analysis
of the term of 'action' within Peircean research.
It also shows the need for an easily searchable, chronological
ordering of
On 8/14/2018 5:30 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
I too agree with Gary f and JAS that choosing 'mark' rather
than 'tone' is a judgment call.
To end an overlong thread, I won't debate that point.
But I would like to emphasize several important goals:
1. Digitizing at high resolution thousands of
Gary F and Jon AS,
Thanks for the comments. They're consistent with what I said
in my previous note.
Gary
the earliest text I’ve found where Peirce uses the term “token”:
CSP, late 1904 (EP2:326)
including under the term “sign” every picture, diagram, natural cry,
pointing finger, wink,
On 8/11/2018 11:25 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
But aren´t EGs _the_ proper tool for ontology?
...
Somebody else please say something.
Peirce and I would agree.
But the people who are working on ontology know very little
about EGs. I've been writing and lecturing about EGs for years,
especially
I believe that the subject line blurs too many issues.
In various writings over the years, Peirce wrote about
real possibilities. He also wrote about laws as real.
In writing about modality, he distinguished three universes:
the possible, the actual, and the necessitated. Actual
existence is
On 8/8/2018 2:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I'd say this: the symbolic aspect and the agent/interaction aspect
is required.
Yes. And as Peirce would emphasize, there is a continuum.
That's the point of the vrmind slides:
http://jfsowa.com/talks/vrmind.pdf
I don't think that the
On 8/8/2018 8:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
if you see our species [homo sapiens] as a kind of 'black slate'
Both of the articles cited are contributions to the nature/nurture
debates that have been going on for centuries. Neither one said
that the infant's mind or brain is a "blank slate" at
For some reason, my response to Jerry's note that also
contained those additional comments didn't get through.
But when I sent those comments by themselves, they
did get through.
I believe that Peirce-L has a thin-skinned AI monitor
that is quick to take offense.
John
After I wrote the previous line in my response to Jerry,
I added the following:
We should also remember that Peirce list has an international
audience, including students and people from other professions
who would like to learn more about Peirce and his writings.
Many of them would be
My testing note got through in just one minute.
But I tried several ways of responding to the following
note by Jerry LRC:
In my opinion, John’s example are clear and meaningful.
I said "Thanks for the note of support".
And then I made some further comments. But those notes
never got
I have tried several times to get a message through to this
list. I'm just checking to see if it's working.
John
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
alidity of a context-free rule of netiquette, and trying to
explain why I think “Do not take offense” is a more practical rule.
Gary f.
-----Original Message-
From: John F Sowa
Sent: 2-Aug-18 15:19
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recommendation: In email notes, avoid the wor
Gary F,
The practice of avoiding the word 'you' may seem to be trivial,
but it is surprisingly effective in reducing the "heat" in
heated arguments.
GF
Shifting the focus from the statement by “taking it personally”
and reacting against some imagined slight in it is a habit that
can’t be cured
In another email list some years ago, a wise soul made a suggestion
for reducing heated arguments in a debate: Avoid the word 'you'.
Every occurrence of the word 'you' shifts the focus from the
statement to the person who made the statement. This immediately
puts that person on the defensive
On 8/1/2018 4:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
each interpreting Quasi-mind is always in a different state
of Experiential Information from any other--including the same
Quasi-mind at a different time.
Yes. And following is a related quotation by Peirce:
The vague might be defined as that
On 7/31/2018 12:37 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
I do think it’s become clear that there is more than one community
/within/ this community.
Peirce had such a broad range of interests that I don't believe
that anybody could correctly classify them.
I know that people who have tried to
Since my "testing" note got through, I assume that my earlier
note was too long. Here's a shorter version:
On 7/29/2018 3:54 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
4
I withdraw this assertion.
Comments on the other points:
1. To me, the critical word in CSP’s phrase was “represent”.
In my view,
Until yesterday, I would get a copy of every email I sent
to Peirce-L. That would confirm that it went through the
loop. But I never received a copy of the last two emails
I sent. The latest was at 11 AM (EST) today.
If people received that note, don't bother to tell me.
But if that note did
Helmut, Auke, and Jerry,
HR
what does "normative" mean?
Note what Auke said:
Don’t confuse mathematical logic with normative logic.
See the attached cspsci.gif, which shows Peirce's classification
of the sciences. Note that the word 'logic' appears in two places:
1. On the left, formal
I came across an old note by Christian Kloesel, in which
he listed the various manuscripts in which Peirce discussed
or mentioned EGs.
I put the except in the attached file MSS4EGs.txt.
John
From a note by Christian Kloesel:
If we are to understand Peirce's EG fully--not merely as an isolated,
On 7/13/2018 7:19 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
Thank you for your expressions of your well-held beliefs
about extension [in EGs]. But, I find no relationships to
the intensional logic of chemistry, biology or medicine.
That is certainly true -- because, as Peirce pointed out,
formal logic is
On 7/13/2018 5:30 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
In your belief system, is the conceptualization of CSP’s "Beta graphs
(FOL)" identical in all logical respects with predicate logic?
As I said, by extensional criteria -- truth values and provable
theorems -- they are logically equivalent. That
I don't believe that there is any reason to distinguish Peirce's
Alpha graphs (propositional logic) from his Beta graphs (FOL).
In fact, Peirce himself (NEM 3:162-167) does not mention Alpha
or Beta. He uses exactly the same rules of inference for both.
I just reread it yesterday to see
On 7/11/2018 5:40 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
[JFS] Every Alpha and Beta EG can be mapped to a statement
in the first-order subset of his algebra of 1885.
Frankly, it is very risky to make such conceptual leaps,
especially with CSP wandering rhetoric!
I was not making a conceptual leap. I
Jerry,
Broken link? JLRC
For Church's own discussion of intensions and extensions, see the
first 3 pages of his 1941 book:
Sorry, I had another reference to church.htm
http://jfsowa.com/ontology/church.htm
So this one is
http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/alonzo.htm
Are you altering the meaning
On 7/10/2018 9:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Is there any conceptual difference between defining a Proposition
as a medad Rheme vs. defining a Rheme as an incomplete Proposition?
When I interpret Peirce's writings on any topic in science,
math, or logic, I look at his sources and his
Jon AS and Jerry LRC,
There is nothing contradictory about the following paragraph:
If parts of a proposition be erased so as to leave blanks in their
places, and if these blanks are of such a nature that if each of
them be filled by a proper name the result will be a proposition,
then the
On 6/19/2018 1:35 PM, Jack Ring wrote:
Our blessing is fragile. We have devolved from a nation of laws
to a nation of lawyers.
Believing in the teachings of Christ doth not a religion make.
I agree with both points. I wanted to generalize the issues without
getting into a debate with a
On 6/19/2018 9:15 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
Groupthink is the problem...
I believe that Christianity might provide some pointers.
All the religions of the world began at the village level,
usually as a social group with a guru or medicine-man as
the social-religious leader who shares power
On 6/19/2018 5:18 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
to prove that their government-heavy, groupthink-driven,
corruption-prone initiatives are more effective than the efficiencies to
which lean-and-hungry small-government systems are predisposed. Not to
mention the fake, corrupt science and problems
I came across a Ted talk by Dan E with the title
"How language began". At the halfway mark (9 minutes)
he mentions Peirce and relates his semiotic to the issues:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qFxg5vkaPgk
My only comment would be that there was probably some
kind of vocalization a few million
Helmut and Stephen,
Helmut
Anyways, do inquiry blocks follow a certain pattern, like, declaring
one aspect of philosophy for the main one, and others for epiphenomena
or even irrelevant ones?.
I would hesitate to make any blanket generalizations. But I think
that a major component of any
On 6/6/2018 1:06 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
The inferences of “synthesis" for CSP philosophy appears to broader
and deeper than metaphysics.
Peirce had a broad understanding of many fields, and he frequently
used insights from one to form abductions (by analogies and metaphors)
that enriched
On 6/5/2018 7:46 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
In the case of the ancient term, synthesis, it is commonly used in CSP’s
profession to mean the putting together of atoms to form molecules.
The word 'synthesis' means "putting together". A thesis and an
antithesis are both propositions. Both of
On 6/2/2018 11:45 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
The [dualities] that are complementary, not contradictory, can be
the basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there
is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind.
A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine,
and the
Helmut and Stephen,
To interpret Wittgenstein (or any philosopher), it's essential to
consider all the issues and put them in context. As I said in my
previous comment, Russell and Carnap misunderstood the Tractatus.
They assumed that LW agreed with them that metaphysics, especially
theology,
On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that)
you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought:
"No, you don´t tell me when to shut up".
That was from the his first book, the Tractatus. He wrote that
while
On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism,
semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn,
empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may
be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses,
Mary,
My previous post was intended for John alone. Please ignore it.
I apologize for my mistake.
Please don't apologize. I'm glad to get the free advertising.
reading Joyce’s ouevre, reading Peirce (whom I think Joyce read in 1903-4
when he reviewed FCS Schiller’s book on pragmatism in a
Jerry,
I've been tied up with some critical deadlines, which require me
to curtail my email activities. I'll reply to your comments next
week. But I just wanted to mention an article in which I discuss
issues related to the following exchange:
Wittgenstein's language games represent the
On 5/22/2018 1:22 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
Of particular interest is Venn’s views on the role of “=“ sign.
Copula? Or predicate?
Or, in view of symbolization of the modern logic of set theory,
should the “=“ sign be banned altogether?
Wittgenstein's answer in the Tractatus is simple:
On 5/18/2018 12:54 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
I think of it as Inductive Logic 101, and Peirce's Illustrations
on the Logic of Science as Induction 201.
I assume that would be true.
In any case, Venn's books could be considered as background
knowledge that Peirce would expect his educated readers
On 5/17/2018 3:34 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
John Venn, in Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic. pg. 277-278:
Thanks for citing that passage. It reminded me of the value of checking
Peirce's sources and contemporaries in order to understand the context
of his writings. I found the book at
On 5/17/2018 9:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
My point is simply that reality has all sorts of permutations and that
to disclude things is to complexify.
I agree. And I recommend the anti-razor by Walter Chatton, who engaged
in years of debates with William of Ockham. Both Chatton and Ockham
On 5/16/2018 5:43 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
So, at very least, the jury is still out on this question.
I certainly agree. Ray K's predictions about AI have usually
been unreliable or just wrong.
The inverse square law implies that the energy of electromagnetic
radiation falls off very rapidly
On 5/13/2018 2:48 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
You forgot Persephone. :)
She was the one who was abducted (not retroducted) by the Turk.
The farmers of Eleusis want the statue of St. Dimitra back.
Every spring, they would honor her by heaping manure around
the statue to ensure the fertility of
On 5/13/2018 10:16 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Hey, John - you forgot: Happy Mother's Day.
[mutter, mutter, seethe, fume...if my kids ever did that..mutter, mutter].
Given the theme of this thread, I suspect that the ones who might
feel the most slighted would be Mary, Gaia, Hera, Demeter...
On 5/13/2018 8:50 AM, John Collier wrote:
I am afraid I do not find these arguments coherent with anything
I was taught to be God.
I recall a survey some years ago in which the interviewers asked
people two questions: (1) Do you believe in God? (2) How would
you describe God?
What they
On 5/3/2018 10:40 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
why did Peirce write that pastness is relative? Maybe "pastness"
is the feeling, not the past?
When Peirce said "pastness itself obviously is relative", the
qualifier 'obviously' is important. J think he meant the simple
point that the past is
On 4/30/2018 2:50 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I think, that a memory of the past is not the same as the past itself
But that is true of everything.
Our experience of anything and everything (past or present) is not
the same as the thing itself.
What Peirce added: " To any memory [of] the past,
If you google "Peirce" and any topic of any kind, it's likely
to lead to something interesting. I came across some articles
and an expensive book. This is just FYI. I don't want to
start another long thread.
The Semiotics of Music: From Peirce to AI
On 4/19/2018 11:01 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
According to [quantum mechanics] discrete points do form a continuum,
because they are blurred. Or something like that.
Maybe. But that would be a different ontology for time.
In any case, the distinction between Aristotle and Zeno
(or Peirce and
Jerry,
I promised that I would stop.
JLRC: The emotions that different compositions raise in me
are not expressed in first order logic.
JFS: I certainly agree with that point...
I'll quit on this point of agreement.
But this morning I woke up with the realization that music
notation is
On 4/18/2018 3:25 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
The emotions that different compositions raise in me are
not expressed in first order logic.
I certainly agree with that point. Why didn't you say that
in the first place?
I will leave the last word to you.
I'll quit on this point of
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