So , Marci, you would allow this church to picket same sex weddings? And you
would bar pickets from a funeral at which cheney spoke about the importance of
the iraq war?
Marc
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From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Sent: Wed Mar 10 1
Steve has said much more eloquently what I was trying to say to Eugene. I
agree with Steve that the categories drawn by Eugene are not as hard and
fast as he has depicted them.
This case is teed up to be one of those cases where law professors are
"shocked" by the reasoning, but only
I share Eugene's hope that the Court does not deform current doctrine.
Although I am not at all confident that it will do so, the Court
could reverse the fourth circuit on narrow grounds. The Epic included
what were alleged to be provably false statements of fact ("Albert and
Julie . . .
Under international law, freedom of speech can be limited when it impinges
the rights of others provided the limitations are part of the law of the
country. Surely that is sound principle that is in fact at least at part at
work in many 1st Amendment speech cases that would otherwise be even more
Well, the premise of the constitutionality of libel law -- whether
under an actual malice standard, a negligence standard, or a (possibly
permissible) strict liability standard -- is that false statements of fact lack
constitutional value; the mens rea standard is there chiefly to make s
I think Eugene has oversimplified defamation law here. We hold some
tortfeasors to an actual malice standard while others are held to more lax
standard. So while false statements of fact are a constant minimum element of
proof (because they lack value AND are very likely to cause harm to reput
I should think that I'd be extremely distressed to see an article in a
magazine -- even a clearly non-factual article -- that talked about my supposed
sexual encounter with my mother, however fictional the encounter would clearly
be. The jury found that Falwell was indeed seriously dist
Eric Rassbach writes:
> Eugene is right -- I was asking about the sound aspect, i.e. could the
> protest be
> heard during the funeral ceremony, were they using megaphones, etc.
>
> Eugene -- if the shouting could be heard during the funeral ceremony, do you
> think
> IIED liability would be co
I had a bit role at the margins of the Skokie litigation. Teh Holocaust
survivors in Skokie surely took the march in Skokie as being aimed at them
personally and sought to ban it for just that reason. As a result, though lots
of other towns simply ignored the Nazi request to march, Skokie felt
Eugene is right -- I was asking about the sound aspect, i.e. could the protest
be heard during the funeral ceremony, were they using megaphones, etc.
Eugene -- if the shouting could be heard during the funeral ceremony, do you
think IIED liability would be constitutional, in addition to TMP regu
I think the argument for liability in Hustler was considerably weaker. What
actual harm did Falwell experience? Nobody reading Hustler could have
expected the piece was factual. Different set of parameters
I also think that the doctrine of defamation is not solely about the speech but
also
As always, Eugene raises good points and asks good questions. He is
correct that I would not consider speech expressed on a web site to be covered
by my analysis.
As to the question of whether it is possible that some attendees might
be open to the protestor's message, a court i
I sympathize with the sentiment in favor of liability here (as I did in
Hustler v. Falwell), though I ultimately disagree with it.
But I would hope that arguments for liability could be made without too
much deforming of existing doctrine. The Rock Against Racism cases are
expr
The more I think about twos the less I am inclined to agree with Eugene on this
one
I don't think Skokie is an apt analogy because the speech there was not
directed at any one person or persons. Nor was it intended to disrupt or
impact one of life's most sacred and solemn events. The speakers
I take it that the analogy would have been disruption by sound: The
government is certainly entitled to restrict speech that interferes with
others' speech (or other matters) because of the noise that it creates, and
many such restrictions are content-neutral. The disruption there is u
I'm scratching my head at Eric's analogy; perhaps he could elaborate? On
the one hand, we have constituents of an institution disrupting (however
inappropriately) an institutional ceremony to protest an institutional
policy. On the other hand, we have outsiders directing a crude and
emotionally d
I know of nothing in the case that suggests this. The protest was 1000
feet away from the funeral, so that makes it unlikely that it could be heard
inside. And the concurrence states that "Snyder admits he could not see the
protest"; I take it that if Snyder heard the protest, the opin
I am sorry if this fact has already been circulated on the list, but was the
protest at issue loud enough to be heard at the location of, and during, the
funeral ceremony? If so, would this fact pattern be analogous to disruption of
a public university graduation ceremony by students protestin
I appreciate Alan's points (though I probably disagree with him on the
bottom line), and they might have been relevant to picketing in front of the
funeral. But here, as Alan's first sentence acknowledges, liability was based
partly on the Web site and partly on speech a thousand feet f
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