oun...@lists.ucla.edu] ON BEHALF OF Levinson,
Sanford V
SENT: Sunday, July 06, 2014 7:45 PM
TO: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
SUBJECT: Re: Hobby Lobby Question
Mark may well be right, but why would a clearly constitutional single
payer system elicit such disobedience (and arguments about
p; Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Hobby Lobby Question
Mark may well be right, but why would a clearly constitutional single payer
system elicit such disobedience (and arguments about complicity) but the
funding of deeply immoral wars and complicity with a number of terrible regimes
w Academics
Subject: Re: Hobby Lobby Question
Mark may well be right, but why would a clearly constitutional single payer
system elicit such disobedience (and arguments about complicity) but the
funding of deeply immoral wars and complicity with a number of terrible regimes
do not? This is
"peasants" with pitchforks.
Mark
Mark S. Scarberry
Pepperdine University School of Law
Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE Smartphone
Original message
From: "Levinson, Sanford V"
Date:07/06/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-08:00)
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academ
n Wireless 4G LTE Smartphone
Original message
From: "Levinson, Sanford V"
Date:07/06/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-08:00)
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Hobby Lobby Question
I suppose that Jon's is the 64 billion dollar question. I think th
I suppose that Jon's is the 64 billion dollar question. I think the answer
would depend on the degree to which the single payer system was exclusive. If
one could still purchase supplemental coverage (for heart transplants, say),
then I assume the US could treat abortion as special. But if singl
Why wouldn't the Congress ban coverage of abortions under a
single-payer system?
Jon
On 2014-07-01 22:22, Levinson, Sanford V wrote:
I do not understand why the complicity with evil rationale doesn't
apply to taxpayers ( like Thoreau). The argument against is either
that it would
ehalf Of Levinson, Sanford V
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2014 7:20 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Hobby Lobby Question
Art raises an interesting point. For better and worse, Brown in 1954 did
absolutely nothing, and Brown II settled for the (in)famous “all deliberate
On Wed, Jul 2, 2014 at 1:42 PM, Scarberry, Mark <
mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu> wrote:
> a conclusion that a person's religious beliefs are not sincere could
> itself raise constitutional issues
Seriously? I don't see how that can be right--if a jury can't decide on
fundamental issues of credib
Yes, it is a statutory issue, and perhaps this is best seen as analogous.
Congress did import to some degree constitutional analysis, which could
strengthen the analogy. Also, a conclusion that a person's religious beliefs
are not sincere could itself raise constitutional issues (though I don't
: Monday, June 30, 2014 7:20 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Hobby Lobby Question
Art raises an interesting point. For better and worse, Brown in 1954 did
absolutely nothing, and Brown II settled for the (in)famous “all deliberate
speed.” It was the Civil Rights Move
rom:* "Scarberry, Mark"
>
> *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
>
> *Sent:* Monday, June 30, 2014 8:03 PM
>
> *Subject:* RE: Hobby Lobby Question
>
> With regard to Sandy’s comment that there isn’t a chance in hell of
> getting funding from Congr
I assume that the use of quotes around "constitutional fact" is meant to
highlight that the phrase is used as an analogy in this situation, which is
governed by a statute and not the Constitution. But partly for that reason,
I think the danger of a jury's refusal to follow a proper instruction on
t
s.
Alan
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
on behalf of Volokh, Eugene [vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2014 8:09 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Hobby Lobby Question
The Court also said
?
Eugene
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Rick Duncan
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2014 5:04 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Hobby Lobby Question
The Court assumed that there is a compelling interes
I do not understand why the complicity with evil rationale doesn't apply to
taxpayers ( like Thoreau). The argument against is either that it would unduly
burden the state to set up a c.o. system for tax protesters or that it would
invite strategic misrepresentation. Are these sufficiently "comp
ve corrupted it that I want to reform" --Dick Gaughan (from the song,
Thomas Muir of Huntershill)
From: Arthur Spitzer
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Sent: Tuesday, July 1, 2014 1:04 AM
Subject: Re: Hobby Lobby Question
I app
the scoundrels
who've corrupted it that I want to reform" --Dick Gaughan (from the song,
Thomas Muir of Huntershill)
From: "Scarberry, Mark"
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2014 8:03 PM
Subject: RE:
That is, of course, a deep problem. People can sincerely believe absolutely
crazy things.
Sandy
Sent from my iPhone
On Jul 1, 2014, at 12:29 PM, "Scarberry, Mark"
mailto:mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu>> wrote:
Maybe this is a "constitutional fact," like NY Times actual malice. We need to
be c
iel J. Greenwood"
mailto:daniel.greenw...@hofstra.edu>>
Reply-To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
mailto:religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>>
Date: Tuesday, July 1, 2014 at 1:40 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
mailto:religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>>
S
law,
consumer protection, environmental and safety law, human rights law, etc.
DG
From: Alan Brownstein [mailto:aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu]
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2014 5:08 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Hobby Lobby Question
I think the least restrictive m
Maybe this is a "constitutional fact," like NY Times actual malice. We need to
be careful that a trier of fact does not conclude that a party isn't sincere
just because the trier of fact thinks the belief is so obviously wrong that a
reasonable person couldn't believe it.
Mark
Mark S. Scarberr
.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steven Jamar
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2014 9:32 AM
To: Law Religion & Law List
Subject: Re: Hobby Lobby Question
No. I do not reject the legitimacy nor the religiousity of the plaintiff's
beliefs. Quite the contrary; I accept th
No. I do not reject the legitimacy nor the religiousity of the plaintiff’s
beliefs. Quite the contrary; I accept them and undertstand them. But I do not
accept that we should accept a complicity with evil claim when it becomes too
attenuated as it is here. The inquiry is attenuation, not sub
I have (perhaps incorrectly) assumed that when the Court says *it* should
not get involved in judging the sincerity of a religious belief, it is
expressing the proper division of labor between a court and the finder of
fact. It should be up to the jury (or the court wearing a fact-finder hat)
to de
I appreciate Steve's response, which I think demonstrates that he is
precisely rejecting the legitimacy (or perhaps the religiosity) of the
plaintiffs' beliefs. The plaintiffs say that their religious beliefs
prohibit complicity with evil, and that signing a contract that makes
available certain c
ation.
We need only remember what the US south looked like in 1950 to understand the
enormous changes Brown led to.
From: "Levinson, Sanford V"
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2014 10:20 PM
Subject: RE: Hobby Lob
,” as John P. Roche once put it, “and the prospect of losing power
> corrupts absolutely.” So I don’t know how much we disagree after all.
>
>
>
> sandy
>
>
>
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Beha
The court accepts without inquiry the assertion that the complicity with evil
theory is the problem that leads to the substantial burden. It merely accepts
the claim that the adherents cannot comply because of the complicity theory.
It then bootstraps that there would be costs of non-compliance
I'm puzzled by Steve Jamar's statement that yesterday's decision "arguably
requires all courts to simply accept the religious adherent’s claim that
the burden is substantial." The majority analyzed whether the burden was
substantial and found it was because the ACA would impose millions of
dollars
Brown eliminated the constitutional doctrine of separate but equal — in the
Brown decision just for education, but it was applied to all racial
classifications. The 1964 Civil Rights Act accomplished much more, of course,
but the Brown decision matters a lot.
So it is with numerous decisions.
: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Arthur Spitzer
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2014 8:51 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Hobby Lobby Question
With respect, I think Sandy's response ("I think that it'
;
>
> Mark S. Scarberry
>
> Professor of Law
>
> Pepperdine Univ. School of Law
>
>
>
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [
> mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> ] *On Behalf Of *Levinson, Sanford V
> *Sent:* Monday, June 30, 2014 12:28 PM
> *T
ol of Law
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Levinson, Sanford V
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2014 12:28 PM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Hobby Lobby
...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Levinson, Sanford V
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2014 12:28 PM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Hobby Lobby Question
This is a good question. AS I read the opinion it tends to rely on the fact
that the insurance providers will
t;
> Alan
>
>
>
> Alan Brownstein
>
> Professor of Law
>
> UC Davis School of Law
>
>
>
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Douglas Laycock
> *Sent:* Monday, June 30, 2014 12:29 PM
>
> *To:
Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Hobby Lobby Question
The entire solution for the non-profits was done by regulation. So I assume
that extending it to for-profits could also be done by regulation. Of course
there could be some hidden obstacle that I don’t know about.
The C
as.edu]
> *Sent:* Monday, June 30, 2014 4:12 PM
>
> *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> *Subject:* RE: Hobby Lobby Question
>
> The majority opinion gives ammunition to the plaintiffs in the
> nonprofit cases by reemphasizing that when the plaintiffs determine that
gt; *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Richard Friedman
> *Sent:* Monday, June 30, 2014 4:36 PM
> *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> *Subject:* Re: Hobby Lobby Question
>
>
>
> Hi, Doug. Co
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Friedman
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2014 4:36 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Hobby Lobby Question
Hi, Doug. Congrats on the result! I haven't focused eno
Hi, Doug. Congrats on the result! I haven't focused enough on it to have
any clear sense of the merits, but the outcome does seem sensible to me,
and it sure seems that some of the rhetoric I'm seeing on the other side --
much of it in support of fund-raising appeals -- is way overblown.
I hope
-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
on behalf of Berg, Thomas C. [tcb...@stthomas.edu]
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2014 4:12 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Hobby Lobby Question
The majority opinion gives ammunition to the plaintiffs in the nonprofit cases
by reemphasizing that when
7;Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Hobby Lobby Question
The entire solution for the non-profits was done by regulation. So I assume
that extending it to for-profits could also be done by regulation. Of course
there could be some hidden obstacle that I don’t know ab
Hobby Lobby interpretation — quick take:
1. It seems to have lowered the threshold for substantial burden to something
lower than most lower courts had been using and adopts both the complicity with
evil theory and says it cannot second guess a complicity with evil claim of
burden or substanti
The entire solution for the non-profits was done by regulation. So I assume
that extending it to for-profits could also be done by regulation. Of course
there could be some hidden obstacle that I don’t know about.
The Court found the win-win solution; female employees can get free
contracept
That's not right. The accommodation that the Court recognizes as a less
restrictive alternative -- the one that the government offers to non-profit
objectors, described at pages 9-10 of the majority opinion -- is *not *that
the the gov't itself provide contraceptives (or reimbursement for
contrace
This is a good question. AS I read the opinion it tends to rely on the fact
that the insurance providers will be required to provide the coverage “for
free” (given that it will overall cost less to cover than would pregnancies),
so that the government must allocate not a single new penny. If,
47 matches
Mail list logo