Of course it's not odd. As a policy matter, I'm happy to let a
good deal of discrimination be permitted. As a constitutional matter, I
agree that some discrimination must be "left alone."
What this doesn't answer, I think, is the question that was
originally posed: When the gove
With respect, I am not sure that characterizing the relation as akin to
that of employer and employee tells us how to decide the question. I
cannot imagine that there is a strong governmental interest in the
gender of clergypersons. Any expression or statement of such an
interest clearly results
My point is that there are some relationships that have a kind of
intimacy that the government ought to leave alone. I think that the
Religion Clauses compel the government to leave the intimate relation
between clergy and religious institutions alone.
The broader, and obvious, point is that no
Well, I'd think that you too would think this -- presumably even
if we didn't have a First Amendment, we would agree that revoking tax
exemptions based on such factors would be a bad policy. My view is that
the benefits of maintaining and encouraging religious and ideological
diversity, an
1) My definition of "discrimination" here is simply the one the
Court applied in Manhart and various other cases: The principle that
"discrimination" means that an entity "treats a person in a manner which
but for that person's sex would be different." City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water
I'm not denying the special nature of the clergy-laity relationship, in
fact or in law. I'm simply trying to answer your question: Why might a
government properly deny benefits in some instances of
religiously-motivated discrimination (e.g. withholding funding from
churches that discriminate again
I am not sure that the employment paradigm fully captures the meaning of
the clergy-laity relation.
-Original Message-
From: Andrew Wyatt [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, March 08, 2006 4:06 PM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE:
StateRFRAandnonreligiousgr
I suspect that the difference is that church-clergyperson is an
employer-employee relationship, while spouse-spouse is not.
Andrew Wyatt
Information contained in this communication is CONFIDENTIAL and intended
for the use of the addressee only. If you have received this
communication in error, p
I'm afraid that I don't understand your non-discrimination principle.
You have not indicated whether you think that it is appropriate to deny
a government benefit to individuals who refuse to marry people with
green hair. If it is inappropriate to do so then I am lost. Marriage
is an intimate rel
I am coming to this discussion a little late in the day, but I wonder whether Larson v. Valente (a decision I have been thinking about a lot lately) is relevant? Suppose the government funds a college scholarship program and provides that the funds can be used to attend any college "except a colleg
I'm afraid I still don't quite get it. The core of the
argument, it seems to me, is that "There has been an on-going debate
among Christian groups regarding the matter of women clergy. For the
state to choose one side in that debate is to make precisely what I said
-- an unavoidable theol
The question is really not about discrimination at all. It is about
discrimination in the selection of clergy, and not about some "vast
range" of government decisions. Context matters. I have not taken a
position on the balance to be struck between discrimination and other
kinds of decision-maki
Eugene,
I believe that the idea of revoking the Catholic Church's tax-exemption
because of their all-male priesthood is fraught with constitutional
problems (for some of the reasons already stated by others). But I am
more interested in your statement, which I agree with, concerning such
revocati
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