The adoption call has ended.
The consensus is clearly, strongly, that the working group thinks this is an
important area that the working group needs to address.
A significant fraction of the responses indicated that discussing the problem
should be the initial focus of the wg, before the
I'm not yet convinced that the operational costs justify the potential
weakening of security. So I do not support adoption of the document as
is. I would like to see it split into 2 drafts -- one describing the
problem(s) (perhaps including the aspects Rob has mentioned) with an
analysis of
I think that Rob makes an excellent point.
I have no problem with making this draft the focal point of discussions
about changing RPKI path validation. Indeed, I greatly appreciate the
effort that Geoff and George have put into articulating the operational
concern with RFCs 3779 and 6487. There
On Fri, Apr 25, 2014 at 12:05:14PM -0400, Sandra Murphy wrote:
The authors of draft-huston-rpki-validation-01.txt, RPKI Validation
Reconsidered, have requested wg adoption.
See http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-huston-rpki-validation-01.
Please do respond to the list as to whether you
I do support this draft, I am willing to review.
Thanks,
Byron
On 26/04/2014 2:05 am, Sandra Murphy sa...@tislabs.com wrote:
The authors of draft-huston-rpki-validation-01.txt, RPKI Validation
Reconsidered, have requested wg adoption.
See
+1
Mark
From: George Michaelson g...@algebras.orgmailto:g...@algebras.org
Date: Monday, April 28, 2014 at 8:11 PM
To: sidr@ietf.orgmailto:sidr@ietf.org sidr@ietf.orgmailto:sidr@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [sidr] WG adoption poll for draft-huston-rpki-validation-01
I would like to see the WG discuss
Hi,
I read the draft and I support adoption.
I think this addresses a real problem both in the transfer case described in
the document, and in fragility wrt unintended changes in the hierarchical RPKI.
This could be considered bad CA ops, but even then I think the impact on the
children
I support the adoption of this draft.
Kind regards,
Ing. Sofía Silva Berenguer
Senior SSR Engineer
PGP Key ID: 0xAAD4EB5F
LACNIC - www.lacnic.net
Latin American and Caribbean Internet Address Registry
Rambla República de México 6125
Montevideo - Uruguay
+598 2604 ext 4408
El 25/04/14
[mailto:sidr-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Sandra Murphy
Sent: Friday, April 25, 2014 12:05 PM
To: sidr@ietf.org
Cc: Sandra Murphy
Subject: [sidr] WG adoption poll for draft-huston-rpki-validation-01
The authors of draft-huston-rpki-validation-01.txt, RPKI Validation
Reconsidered, have requested wg adoption
I support adoption of this draft and I second all of Andy's comments.
I do believe that we need to be tolerant in the operation of the CA's as
we move forward in adoption of origin validation in routers.
Cheers!
~Carlos
On 4/28/14, 5:14 PM, Andy Newton wrote:
I support the adoption of this
Unfortunately, the binary adopt-or-not question is insufficiently
nuanced for a case like this.
I think the WG needs a work item to explore the issue of decoupling
RFC-3779-style[*] path validation from certificate validation. It may
be that at the end of that process we will decide not to
I think there is a discussion here that needs to occur. I'm not convinced
that this document is the complete embodiment of that which should be
adopted or it's the sole answer to the problem space.
However I do share the concerns that in the growing complexity of RPKI
certificate structures any
I support the adoption of this draft, as it makes the operations of a CA less
problematic.
I also 100% disagree with Randy’s view that it adds complexity. To the
contrary, it lessens complexity, aids flexibility and decreases fragility.
-andy
On Apr 25, 2014, at 3:06 PM, Randy Bush
I would like to see the WG discuss validation. I think there are inherent
risks in the current model, which could be avoided if we had a more nuanced
understanding of the validity of any given resource under consideration.
So as a co-author of this draft its hardly surprising I support adoption,
Obviously, I also support this call for adoption, for the reasons George has
outlined here.
Geoff
On 29 Apr 2014, at 10:11 am, George Michaelson g...@algebras.org wrote:
I would like to see the WG discuss validation. I think there are inherent
risks in the current model, which could be
The authors of draft-huston-rpki-validation-01.txt, RPKI Validation
Reconsidered, have requested wg adoption.
See http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-huston-rpki-validation-01.
Please do respond to the list as to whether you support the wg adopting this as
a work item. You do not need to comment
i really hate to side with dr kent :)
i am unsure of this is a useful work item. please explain how it is
other than a complex (i.e. dangerous) patch to accommodate sloppy
operational praactices by a CA.
make the protocol complex and you are vulnerable forever. sloppy CA
ops practices can
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