Ian Paterson wrote:
> Are XMPP implementors
> experiencing interoperability issues with DIGEST-MD5? If so can't we fix
> them with a Best Practices XEP - as we did with SASL ANONYMOUS and SASL
> EXTERNAL? Which of the 7 problems with DIGEST-MD5 mentioned in [1] make
> DIGEST-MD5 less secure for XMP
On Wed, Sep 12, 2007 at 01:53:37PM +0100, Ian Paterson wrote:
> Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> >Ian Paterson wrote:
> >
> >>In real life servers will always be compromised (especially in cases
> >>where the attacker is the service provider). So SASL PLAIN still
> >>contains a serious vulnerability th
Mridul Muralidharan wrote:
> Ian Paterson wrote:
>> Greg Hudson wrote:
>>> On Tue, 2007-09-11 at 19:51 +0100, Dave Cridland wrote:
>>>
If I ruled the world, I'd mandate TLS+SCRAM, and have a SHOULD for
TLS+YAP (the latter being plaintext-equiv on the server, but only a
single rou
Ian Paterson wrote:
Greg Hudson wrote:
On Tue, 2007-09-11 at 19:51 +0100, Dave Cridland wrote:
If I ruled the world, I'd mandate TLS+SCRAM, and have a SHOULD for
TLS+YAP (the latter being plaintext-equiv on the server, but only a
single round-trip, so great for mobiles).
You may be
Greg Hudson wrote:
On Tue, 2007-09-11 at 19:51 +0100, Dave Cridland wrote:
If I ruled the world, I'd mandate TLS+SCRAM, and have a SHOULD for
TLS+YAP (the latter being plaintext-equiv on the server, but only a
single round-trip, so great for mobiles).
You may be missing the most pop
Michal 'vorner' Vaner wrote:
> Hello
>
> On Wed, Sep 12, 2007 at 08:37:34PM +0200, Jonathan Chayce Dickinson wrote:
>> Anyway, truth be told, if the client can't use Jabber unless they get a
>> certificate, chances are they will, which would not only benefit Jabber, but
>> the internet as a whole.
Hello
On Wed, Sep 12, 2007 at 08:37:34PM +0200, Jonathan Chayce Dickinson wrote:
> Anyway, truth be told, if the client can't use Jabber unless they get a
> certificate, chances are they will, which would not only benefit Jabber, but
> the internet as a whole. You could even use xmpp.org as the CA
scussion List
Subject: Re: [Standards] [Fwd: I-D
Action:draft-melnikov-digest-to-historic-00.txt]
Jonathan Chayce Dickinson wrote:
> Or, alternatively, what I said before, is that the SSL/TLS be two way,
that
> is both the client and the server present certificates (SASL EXTERNAL).
TLS + SAS
Greg Hudson wrote:
On Tue, 2007-09-11 at 19:51 +0100, Dave Cridland wrote:
If I ruled the world, I'd mandate TLS+SCRAM, and have a SHOULD for
TLS+YAP (the latter being plaintext-equiv on the server, but only a
single round-trip, so great for mobiles).
You may be missing the most popular rea
On Tue, 2007-09-11 at 19:51 +0100, Dave Cridland wrote:
> If I ruled the world, I'd mandate TLS+SCRAM, and have a SHOULD for
> TLS+YAP (the latter being plaintext-equiv on the server, but only a
> single round-trip, so great for mobiles).
You may be missing the most popular reason for sending
Jonathan Chayce Dickinson wrote:
> Or, alternatively, what I said before, is that the SSL/TLS be two way, that
> is both the client and the server present certificates (SASL EXTERNAL).
TLS + SASL EXTERNAL is also mandatory-to-implement. But how many people
have or use X.509 certificates? I seem to
Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
Ian Paterson wrote:
In real life servers will always be compromised (especially in cases
where the attacker is the service provider). So SASL PLAIN still
contains a serious vulnerability that is easily fixed in those cases
where DIGEST-MD5 is a practical option.
On Wed Sep 12 07:46:28 2007, Jonathan Chayce Dickinson wrote:
> Hmm, AFAIK such password protection is a designed feature of
DIGEST-MD5. > To take advantage of the feature, when registering a
new account a user > must provide their DIGEST-MD5 inner password
hash instead of their
password.
Or, alternatively, what I said before, is that the SSL/TLS be two way, that
is both the client and the server present certificates (SASL EXTERNAL).
Certificates are freely available from start.com, so that needn't be an
issue for the client. We just need the mainstream servers, like JAIM and J.O
to
Oh, and MD5 has been heavily criticized, is it not time somebody used SHA?
-Original Message-
*snip*
> Hmm, AFAIK such password protection is a designed feature of DIGEST-MD5.
> To take advantage of the feature, when registering a new account a user
> must provide their DIGEST-MD5 inner password hash instead of their
password.
Which brings you round to square
Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> Ian Paterson wrote:
>> Kevin Smith wrote:
>>> On 11 Sep 2007, at 17:20, Ian Paterson wrote:
Even where TLS is available, SASL PLAIN requires server operators to
keep copies of all users' passwords. This is a serious (and often
unnecessary) security weakness
Ian Paterson wrote:
> Kevin Smith wrote:
>> On 11 Sep 2007, at 17:20, Ian Paterson wrote:
>>> Even where TLS is available, SASL PLAIN requires server operators to
>>> keep copies of all users' passwords. This is a serious (and often
>>> unnecessary) security weakness.
>>
>> I'm not sure that's true
Kevin Smith wrote:
On 11 Sep 2007, at 17:20, Ian Paterson wrote:
Even where TLS is available, SASL PLAIN requires server operators to
keep copies of all users' passwords. This is a serious (and often
unnecessary) security weakness.
I'm not sure that's true; the server could hash the password
On Tue Sep 11 20:05:17 2007, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
Dave Cridland wrote:
> If I ruled the world, I'd mandate TLS+SCRAM, and have a SHOULD for
> TLS+YAP (the latter being plaintext-equiv on the server, but only
a
> single round-trip, so great for mobiles).
Well it seems to be early days for
Dave Cridland wrote:
> If I ruled the world, I'd mandate TLS+SCRAM, and have a SHOULD for
> TLS+YAP (the latter being plaintext-equiv on the server, but only a
> single round-trip, so great for mobiles).
Well it seems to be early days for SCRAM and YAP, so we'll have to wait
for one or both of th
On Tue Sep 11 17:20:24 2007, Ian Paterson wrote:
Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
Back in August I emailed about this issue [1] with the IETF area
directors for applications and security, relevant WG chairs, and
interested others. The conclusion was that in rfc3920bis we would
make
the following chan
Hello
On Tue, Sep 11, 2007 at 10:00:52PM +0530, Mridul Muralidharan wrote:
> Ian Paterson wrote:
>> TLS + DIGEST-MD5 is stronger than TLS + SASL PLAIN
>
> In what way ? On the wire there is no difference.
> If end to end there is tls (from the client to the server), then there is
> not much diffe
Ian Paterson wrote:
Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
Back in August I emailed about this issue [1] with the IETF area
directors for applications and security, relevant WG chairs, and
interested others. The conclusion was that in rfc3920bis we would make
the following changes to the mandatory-to-implemen
On 11 Sep 2007, at 17:20, Ian Paterson wrote:
Even where TLS is available, SASL PLAIN requires server operators
to keep copies of all users' passwords. This is a serious (and
often unnecessary) security weakness.
I'm not sure that's true; the server could hash the password still,
both in s
Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
Back in August I emailed about this issue [1] with the IETF area
directors for applications and security, relevant WG chairs, and
interested others. The conclusion was that in rfc3920bis we would make
the following changes to the mandatory-to-implement technologies:
1. R
Dave Cridland wrote:
On Tue Sep 11 11:55:35 2007, Jonathan Chayce Dickinson wrote:
Interesting because most clients used Digest-MD5, so what do we use now?
Cram-MD5? Or is there some other newfangled method out there?
DIGEST-MD5 is still more secure than CRAM-MD5, and this won't change
becaus
Dave Cridland wrote:
> On Tue Sep 11 11:55:35 2007, Jonathan Chayce Dickinson wrote:
>> Interesting because most clients used Digest-MD5, so what do we use now?
>> Cram-MD5? Or is there some other newfangled method out there?
>>
>>
> DIGEST-MD5 is still more secure than CRAM-MD5, and this won't cha
On Tue Sep 11 11:55:35 2007, Jonathan Chayce Dickinson wrote:
Interesting because most clients used Digest-MD5, so what do we use
now?
Cram-MD5? Or is there some other newfangled method out there?
DIGEST-MD5 is still more secure than CRAM-MD5, and this won't change
because of that draft. :-
@xmpp.org
Subject: [Standards] [Fwd: I-D
Action:draft-melnikov-digest-to-historic-00.txt]
FYI re rfc3920bis...
Original Message
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.
Title : Moving DIGEST-MD5 to Historic
Author(s
FYI re rfc3920bis...
Original Message
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.
Title : Moving DIGEST-MD5 to Historic
Author(s) : A. Melnikov
Filename: draft-melnikov-digest-to-historic-00.txt
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