On 8 May 2024, at 10:20, Daniel Gultsch wrote:
>
> This message constitutes notice of a Last Call for comments on
> XEP-0421.
>
> Title: Anonymous unique occupant identifiers for MUCs
> Abstract:
> This specification defines a method that allows clients to identify a
> MUC participant across
Sorry, maybe I wasn't explicit enough. I didn't mean to not include it,
just that it does not belong into the "Security Considerations"
section, but instead belongs into the "Occupant ID generation" section.
It's meant to be a core part of the protocol, not just something
implementers should
I strongly disagree that this does not belong in the security
considerations. "anonymous" is not a formally provable security
property. You and I may know that that means "don't take a SHA-1 and
assume that it will be hard to guess", but as we see over and over and
over again many people won't
On Wed, 2024-05-08 at 10:19 -0400, Sam Whited wrote:
> I'd like to see the security considerations expanded on this.
>
> In particular, in the business rules it mentions the fact that if
> occupant-id isn't supported it could be spoofed. This should exist in
> the security considerations.
Fair.
Indeed, sorry to be unclear, I'm suggesting that we should discuss this
in the security considerations section (probably detailing exactly what
"The occupant identifier MUST be generated such that it is anonymous"
actually means in terms of security properties). In addition, I think we
should
Also, I suspect the naive way to implement this will be to hash the bare
JID. We probably want to mention that this is a bad idea and that these
identifiers should be random (or we should explicitly define the security
properties that are required if they're derived, which probably includes
I'd like to see the security considerations expanded on this.
In particular, in the business rules it mentions the fact that if
occupant-id isn't supported it could be spoofed. This should exist in
the security considerations.
Also, I suspect the naive way to implement this will be to hash
