Andreas Krey wrote:
> On Sun, 17 Sep 2017 08:13:43 +, Scott Bennett wrote:
> ...
> > connections to other relays somewhere, those of us using packet filters
> > could
> > include the rest of the missing addresses in aid of the connectivity you
> > want.
>
> I really don't
On Sun, 17 Sep 2017 08:13:43 +, Scott Bennett wrote:
...
> connections to other relays somewhere, those of us using packet filters could
> include the rest of the missing addresses in aid of the connectivity you want.
I really don't see what the point is in this filtering. Any attacker
can
Martin Kepplinger:
> What if the relay operator knows about her connectivity issues / censorship
> and reflects that in her exit policy?
The exit policy is for exit traffic not for relay-to-relay traffic.
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Am 17.09.2017 01:56 schrieb Roger Dingledine:
On Sat, Sep 16, 2017 at 11:44:41PM +, dawuud wrote:
> Your only option would be to ask your ISP to uncensor the internet,
> unfortunately. Tor requires that all relays are able to contact all
> other relays, and those which cannot participate in
>
> On 17 Sep 2017, at 17:11, Iain R. Learmonth wrote:
>
> The most interesting thing I've discovered so far is that it's common
> for the connections to fail in one direction but then succeed when the
> two relays are reversed. I can't be sure if this is because I can't
>
> This is a great research area that it would be good to see some
> attention for.
Alrighty... I will try to find time to resume work on this soon. I'm
hoping Meejah or Jean-Paul will help me with this. I've always thought
this would be a fun project to do for Tor and now that you've
expressed
One must take care in the design of such Tor network scanning tools
to not make successive circuits through the same relays repeatedly.
Instead relay pairs should be shuffled.
Yes AND if circuit building A->B fails but B->A succeeds then a
subsequent A->B should also succeed.
On Sun, Sep 17,
Hi,
On 17/09/17 04:56, Iain R. Learmonth wrote:
> I'll have a think about this.
I had a little think about this. While the search strategy is something
to consider, I've hacked up a simple tool for building circuits and
detecting, at a very high level, when it fails. I don't yet have the
reason
Hi,
On 17/09/17 00:56, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> Actually, no, we want it to be the case that all relays can reach all
> relays. The less true that becomes -- that is, the less clique-like
> the network topology becomes -- the more complicated the anonymity
> measurements become, and that is
Thanks for the info, I will ask my ISP.
Graeme
On 17 September 2017 at 11:23, Sebastian Hahn
wrote:
> Hi there,
>
> > On 17. Sep 2017, at 01:19, Graeme Neilson wrote:
> >
> > I am running a relay but 4 out of 8 directory authorities appear to
> being
> Your only option would be to ask your ISP to uncensor the internet,
> unfortunately. Tor requires that all relays are able to contact all
> other relays, and those which cannot participate in the network.
I think you meant to say:
"Tor requires that all relays are able to contact all directory
Hi there,
> On 17. Sep 2017, at 01:19, Graeme Neilson wrote:
>
> I am running a relay but 4 out of 8 directory authorities appear to being
> blocked by my ISP.
> There is no route to the blocked authorities and the last responding tcp
> traceroute hop is an ISP machine.
Hi,
I am running a relay but 4 out of 8 directory authorities appear to being
blocked by my ISP.
There is no route to the blocked authorities and the last responding tcp
traceroute hop is an ISP machine. There are routes via IPv6 though.
Is there anything I can do to get my relay in the
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