There's an upcoming bar camp in Brussels (2012-09-14 - 2012-09-17) that
is relevant to our interests, but doesn't seem to be on the calendar yet:
http://www.freedomnotfear.org/
https://wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/Freedom_Not_Fear_2012
It's likely to be attended by a fair number of
- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch virtualad...@gmail.com -
From: Bryce Lynch virtualad...@gmail.com
Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2012 12:49:02 -0400
To: zs-...@googlegroups.com
Cc: doctrinez...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] End-to-end correlation for fun and profit
Reply-To:
- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch virtualad...@gmail.com -
From: Bryce Lynch virtualad...@gmail.com
Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2012 13:08:52 -0400
To: zs-...@googlegroups.com
Cc: doctrinez...@googlegroups.com
Subject: [ZS] Re: [tor-talk] End-to-end correlation for fun and profit
Reply-To:
On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 6:21 PM, The Doctor dr...@virtadpt.net wrote:
As I understand it, Tor nodes know IP addresses one up and one down in
a circuit. I haven't read through the Tor codebase in a while (two or
three years), so my question is this: Does Tor apply the same family
avoidance
Or they could get a blanket wiretapping order and catch them all at
once. I've often wondered if it's worth running Tor routers on the
EC2 for this reason.
Bridges make sense if EC2 has enough IP addresses and the censurer doesn't
ban the whole range.
Too many relays give too much power to
- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch virtualad...@gmail.com -
From: Bryce Lynch virtualad...@gmail.com
Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2012 13:08:52 -0400
To: zs-...@googlegroups.com
Cc: doctrinez...@googlegroups.com
Subject: [ZS] Re: [tor-talk] End-to-end correlation for fun and profit
Hey guys,
I succeeded to build a private tor network including some hidden services in it and every
tor-machine (ubuntu) is behind a different router (multiple networks) I have tried to
build my tor network as real as possible in our lab environment. Now I am monitoring the
network traffic
What is the plan if exit harassment is one day so strong that there are no
more exit server? Is that a realistic scenario?
As backup plan I suggest to keep the network and to concentrate on .onion.
Server with .onion obviously accept Tor traffic and don't harass Tor
servers.
Am I mistaken or
Hi,
Once there are no exit servers any more (for which there is absolutely
no indication), the network of relays will still exist and Hidden
Services will still work. So your backup plan is already in position.
On 21.08.2012 20:16, fakef...@tormail.org wrote:
What is the plan if exit harassment
On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 8:27 PM, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote:
10 11.50%
So, in other words, you'd hav to have 10 Tor routers on the same
network. That's like me having 10 Tor nodes on my home network and
not setting the NodeFamily directive in torrc. Somebody playing games
aside, I
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On 08/21/2012 01:30 PM, Runa A. Sandvik wrote:
From
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/path-spec.txt:
We do not choose more than one router in a given /16 subnet (unless
EnforceDistinctSubnets is 0).
So, seeing as how
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On 08/21/2012 02:57 PM, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
No, it means that if you intercept traffic from 10 top-bandwidth
Tor routers with some characteristics (Guard + Exit, basically) at
what's probably the nearest hardware switch (seems true for the
Original Message
From: Bryce Lynch virtualad...@gmail.com
This claim sounds a little fishy to me, in this light.
I'm not surprised. Last week, the same guy kept asserting that Tor was mainly
used for nefarious purposes like buying drugs or illegal pornography, in
addition
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I think karsten's graphs from #6443 fit also well to this thread:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6443
You might also be interested in this thread on tor-relays:
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On 08/21/2012 04:13 PM, With Weather Eye Open wrote:
I'm not surprised. Last week, the same guy kept asserting that Tor
was mainly used for nefarious purposes like buying drugs or
illegal pornography, in addition to claiming such would be not
On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 09:09:32PM +0300, juha...@wippies.fi wrote:
I succeeded to build a private tor network including some hidden
services in it and every tor-machine (ubuntu) is behind a different
router (multiple networks) I have tried to build my tor network as real
as possible in our lab
On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 11:13 PM, With Weather Eye Open
w...@safe-mail.net wrote:
I'm not surprised. Last week, the same guy kept asserting that Tor was mainly
used for nefarious purposes like buying drugs or illegal pornography, in
addition to claiming such would be not difficult to prove.
On Mon, Aug 20, 2012 at 10:33:29AM +0300, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
As you can see, sniffing just 25 Class-C networks (or 42 individual
nodes) lets an adversary correlate ~25% of (non-.onion) circuits.
I think your numbers may not be right (there are a lot of other subtleties
to the calculation),
With Weather Eye Open:
Original Message
From: Bryce Lynch virtualad...@gmail.com
This claim sounds a little fishy to me, in this light.
I'm not surprised. Last week, the same guy kept asserting that Tor was mainly
used for nefarious purposes like buying drugs or
On Mon, 2012-08-20 at 10:33 +0300, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
Hello gentlemen,
snip
[1] http://pastebin.com/hgtXMSyx
I ran this script on the current consensus. The full results (the
nodes-sniff-summary file) are below my signature. How did you compile
the country-codes to IPs list? That wasn't
Maxim Kammerer:
It's comforting that this approach yields quickly diminishing returns.
Going from 25 to 60 networks only gets you a 10% increase in networks
surveillance (if I'm reading the output correctly), and returns plateau
entirely at that point (I'm considering about two percent to be
On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 2:11 AM, Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote:
I think your numbers may not be right (there are a lot of other subtleties
to the calculation), but your point is still generally correct.
There are some subtleties, mainly the restriction on distinct families
in a circuit —
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