On Sat, Jun 28, 2014 at 09:38:05PM +, williamwin...@openmailbox.org wrote:
I don't understand what Schneier means by this:
After identifying an individual Tor user on the internet, the NSA
uses its network of secret internet servers to redirect those users
to another set of secret
It is really pretty annoying to be surfing along and suddenly get a Unable to
connect
Firefox can't establish a connection to the server message. Right now I am
stuck on 188.226.249.138 as I have been many times before. In ten minutes I
will be re-assigned a new exit node and can get back to
Zenaan,
I work with big data analytics, implementing traffic analysis and pinpointing
the location of servers is a trivial task given a global view. The obvious
solution is to make one of those ends invisible ensuring a comparison cannot be
made.
Given the scale of this obviousness, I can
On Sun, Jun 29, 2014 at 12:19:56PM +0100, Mark McCarron wrote:
Given the scale of this obviousness, I can only assume that you're a
sock puppet for an intelligence agency who has started to panic about
the network going truly dark.
Deal with it.
Hi Mark,
I've tried to tolerate the conspiracy
Roger,
I see that you were quite quiet whilst ad hominem attacks were being made
against me. But I will put that to one side for the moment.
As you mentioned, there are legitimate worries, mainly that Tor and people like
yourself have a conflict of interest. The main funding appears to come
On 6/29/2014 2:56 AM, C B wrote:
It is really pretty annoying to be surfing along and suddenly get a Unable to
connect
Firefox can't establish a connection to the server message. Right now I am stuck on 188.226.249.138 as I have been many times before.
In ten minutes I will be re-assigned a
On 6/29/2014 1:22 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Sat, Jun 28, 2014 at 09:38:05PM +, williamwin...@openmailbox.org wrote:
I don't understand what Schneier means by this:
After identifying an individual Tor user on the internet, the NSA
uses its network of secret internet servers to
On Sun, 29 Jun 2014 08:31:20 -0400
Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu allegedly wrote:
On Sun, Jun 29, 2014 at 12:19:56PM +0100, Mark McCarron wrote:
Given the scale of this obviousness, I can only assume that you're a
sock puppet for an intelligence agency who has started to panic about
the
On Sun, 29 Jun 2014 14:11:18 +0100
Mark McCarron mark.mccar...@live.co.uk allegedly wrote:
Roger,
I see that you were quite quiet whilst ad hominem attacks were being
made against me. But I will put that to one side for the moment.
As you mentioned, there are legitimate worries, mainly
++ 29/06/14 00:56 -0700 - C B:
Firefox can't establish a connection to the server message. Right now
I am stuck on 188.226.249.138 as I have been many times before. In ten
minutes I will be re-assigned a new exit node and can get back to what
I had been doing. With the old Vidalia, though, all
Mick,
Congratulations, so you found someone with a similar name what are the odds of
that. When you are reduced to digging up dirt, it stems from the fact that you
are trying to change the nature of the discussion.
FYI, I am a security specialist. I've previously worked with the Australian
On Sun, Jun 29, 2014 at 07:30:35PM +0100, Mark McCarron wrote:
I see Roger has remained quiet, so I am assuming he either does not
want to address the issue or is subject to a National Security letter.
Wtf dude?
I'm working on the dev meeting that starts tomorrow. I'll get to answering
your
Eleven tabs open now. When it affects me the most is when I am filling out a
posting - I have no backup of what I was typing, and if I wait ten minutes
Firefox will repost it for me, if I get a new browser session, I have to try to
remember what I was going to send. Since it tends to catch me
Roger,
Fair enough. I skipped through that talk and wow, you do look like you work at
MIT. It still seems to me that the marketing focus is given to a myriad of
exposure techniques, but this global view is buried as a footnote. Even
though, it is the most important element.
I also noticed
On 6/29/2014 9:11 AM, Mark McCarron wrote:
As you mentioned, there are legitimate worries, mainly that Tor and people
like yourself have a conflict of interest. The main funding appears to come
from the US military. It appears to many of us, that the software has been
deliberately kept
Mike,
Thanks for the input, but this end-to-end traffic analysis is a well documented
problem by the Tor devs themselves. Although, what is missing from the devs
statements is more revealing, namely that it can be fixed by removing
visibility of one of the ends.
One must ask why that
On 6/29/2014 4:20 PM, Mark McCarron wrote:
Mike,
Thanks for the input, but this end-to-end traffic analysis is a well
documented problem by the Tor devs themselves. Although, what is missing
from the devs statements is more revealing, namely that it can be fixed by
removing visibility
On Sun, 29 Jun 2014 08:31:20 -0400
Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote:
On Sun, Jun 29, 2014 at 12:19:56PM +0100, Mark McCarron wrote:
Given the scale of this obviousness, I can only assume that you're a
sock puppet for an intelligence agency who has started to panic about
the network going
On Sun, Jun 29, 2014 at 4:14 PM, coderman coder...@gmail.com wrote:
...
1) compute the cost of global traffic analysis. we have big data mark
to put a ball park on it, but the point is: the cost is non zero and
non trivial.
specifically UPSTREAM model collection at backbone peering points.
On Sun, Jun 29, 2014 at 2:24 PM, Juan juan@gmail.com wrote:
...
You´ve been officially threatened by one of the ´leaders´ of the
´tor family´ for (unlike me) politely point out tor´s obvious
flaws.
pointing out obvious flaws - as in, it's so easy to protect
Well, let's see this:
1) compute the cost of global traffic analysis. we have big data mark
to put a ball park on it, but the point is: the cost is non zero and
non trivial.
We already know from the Snowden releases that the physical infrastructure for
this is in place. That it spans at
Andreas Krey writes:
On Thu, 26 Jun 2014 00:50:29 +, Tor Talker wrote:
...
enough to do it securely enough. Also, hidden services are far more
vulnerable than Tor users, simply because they serve stuff.
...
What sort of vulnerabilities would you expect to see?
Problem: Your
On Sun, Jun 29, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Seth David Schoen sch...@eff.org wrote:
I wonder if there's a way to retrofit high-latency hidden services
onto Tor -- much as Pond does, but for applications other than Pond's
messaging application.
[...]
Then a question is whether users would want to use a
It's not clear to me why torbirdy by default sets the port for socks
forwarding to 9150 while on the other hand the default port for tor is
9050. And Torbirdy explicitely underlines it presumes the installation
of tor.
Thanks in advance for your patience.
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