Re: [tor-talk] General question regarding tor, ssl and .onion.

2015-08-08 Thread Jeremy Rand
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 08/07/2015 10:16 PM, Seth David Schoen wrote: > MaQ writes: > >> Hello, >> >> I'm curious, I'm developing an app whereas sharing/collaboration >> can be done by localhost through tor and .onion address between >> pairs or multiples. When I use

[tor-talk] Tor Weekly News — August 8th, 2015

2015-08-08 Thread Harmony
Tor Weekly News August 8th, 2015 Welcome to the thirtieth issue in 2015 of Tor Weekly News, the weekly newslette

Re: [tor-talk] General question regarding tor, ssl and .onion.

2015-08-08 Thread MaQ
Seth and et al, Thank you very much for the answers. It basically confirmed what I thought. Was also experimenting with a self-signed cert anyway as people connecting would already have a direct association. My thoughts after answers, while not knowing how everything works behind scenes, are the

Re: [tor-talk] General question regarding tor, ssl and .onion.

2015-08-08 Thread Seth David Schoen
MaQ writes: > Also, while it was said that .onion encryption was of lower standard, > wouldn't a high degree of privacy and randomness still be assured, > except for maybe alphabet agencies and more nefarious types out there > specifically targeting a subject or .onion addresses in general, and >

Re: [tor-talk] General question regarding tor, ssl and .onion.

2015-08-08 Thread Seth David Schoen
Jeremy Rand writes: > It's theoretically possible to use naming systems like Namecoin to > specify TLS fingerprints for connections to Tor hidden services, which > would eliminate the need for a CA. I'm hoping to have a proof of > concept of such functionality soon. Is there a way to prevent an

Re: [tor-talk] General question regarding tor, ssl and .onion.

2015-08-08 Thread Jeremy Rand
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 08/09/2015 01:04 AM, Seth David Schoen wrote: > Jeremy Rand writes: > >> It's theoretically possible to use naming systems like Namecoin >> to specify TLS fingerprints for connections to Tor hidden >> services, which would eliminate the need for