In addition to egress filtering, do try to configure your current
infrastructure to survive a direct attack as long as possible by:

- properly configuring Cisco QoS
- change default route cache algorithm to Cisco Express Forwarding (CES)
  as it is optimized for short duration, dynamic traffic
- where possible, implement reflexive filtering rules as opposed to
  vanilla ACLs
- Tune the command scheduler timing, so that when under direct attack, the
  device is not spending more time responding to interrupts than routing
- where possible, implement tcp-intercept rules

Not intended to be a complete list of things to do, but should set one on
the right path.

ttyl,

_________________________________________
John Daniele
Technical Security & Intelligence
Toronto, ON
Voice:  (416) 605-2041
E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Web:    http://www.tsintel.com

On Sat, 2 Feb 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

>
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> Glen,
>
> If it's DoS that you're specically worried about one thing that you could implement 
>to help mitigate the risk is egress filtering. I've included a couple of resouces 
>that may be of help.
>
> http://www.sans.org/dosstep/
> http://www.mitre.org/research/cyber/DDOS/
>
> cheers,
> gattaca
>
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