Aloha,

I'd like to remind everyone to define terms like "DMZ" when having
discussions such as this one. Remember that many routers, especially
lower-end SOHO routers, offer a "DMZ host" feature that configures Network
Address Translation (NAT) in the router so that a particular IP address on
the internal LAN is the default for all inbound traffic. Such a router with
a DMZ host offers zero security for the LAN if the DMZ host is
penetrated/owned from the outside.

The DMZ you seem to be discussing here is a separate network or subnet that
is able to receive unsolicited packets from the outside world, connected to
another network or subnet protected by a firewall configured to deny all
inbound traffic except for TCP packets that pertain to stateful sessions
initiated by hosts inside the protected LAN.

Sincerely,

Jason Coombs
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

-----Original Message-----
From: Volker Kindermann [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2002 10:02 PM
To: Tiago N. Sampaio
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: DMZ Arguments....


Hello Tiago,


> I like to place one dmz in my net but my boss like an arguments for
> this...
> I find in the net why dmz is better than a simple firewall?
> but not found nothing concrete to display to my boss

building a DMZ because you want to have one is a loss of money and other
ressources. A DMZ makes sense in the following scenarios:

- You offer some service (web, dns, email, ftp, etc) to the outside
world
In this case a DMZ is essential because you have to allow access to the
servers. If these servers are in your internal net and have some
security flaws an attacker is immediately on your internal fileserver,
databaseserver, etc and can do a lot of damage.
If you have a DMZ with proper configured firewalls the damage is
restricted to the failing server or, in a worser case to all machines in
the dmz. An article about the benefits of a proper configured DMZ
infrastructure can be found here:
http://www.linuxsecurity.com/feature_stories/ftp-analysis-part1.html


- You need a separated area to do intrusion detection
In this case you build an area between two firewalls to monitor traffic
in a relavitely sane environment. You may want to place devices here
that can cancel malicious connections before they can reach your
servers.


- You don't trust one firewall-reseller
If you don't trust one firewall-reseller (firewall-technique, etc) you
can build a "DMZ" while putting two different firewalls in a seriell
line. If one device fails, the other might stand the attack. Therefore
it is important in any form of DMZ to use two different firewalls on two
different Operating Systems.


- You won't allow direct connections from your internal LAN to the
internet
Here you can place proxy machines in the DMZ that does application level
firewalling to avoid the incubation of your internal LAN by Viruses,
Trojans, etc.

Of course, any combination of the above scenarios is possible.

hth
Volker



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