On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 04:09:59PM -0500, Nico Williams wrote: > [Adding Roland and Viktor to the cc list. I'm not quoting anything, > but it's roughly this: there's interest in implementing RFC2712, which > is Kerberos in TLS. Hank is inviting me to state my opinion; see > below.] > > RFC2712 is to be burned. Please do not implement. We should either > add a different extension to TLS to use Kerberos (or GSS), or simply > not try this.
My take is that there is no future for Kerberos ciphersuites in TLS. Instead, Kerberos-based authentication in TLS should be based on channel-binding. Negotiate a TLS session with (ignored if present) or without certificates, extract a channel-binding, and use GSSAPI with channel binding to perform mutual authentication. I strongly agree with Nico, DO NOT implement the TLS Kerberos cipher suites. I'd like to see these removed from OpenSSL at some point. -- Viktor.