Russ wrote > > * Is an Autonomous System (AS) authorized to originate an IP prefix > > * Is the AS-Path represented in the route the same as the path > > through which the route update traveled > > As we've been discussing on the list --I don't think this is a good > goal. The first goal should be to determine what it is we want to show > about the AS Path in relation to other things, and then work on filling > that goal. > > Starting with the assumption that proving an update travels a specific > path seems, to me, to be going about things the wrong way. oh! the second bullet seems like a perfect starting point! (and questioning the first would seem to consider rolling back the ROA work8-O)
I think the short name of the 2nd bullet is simply "authenticity of the AS path attribute". Having authentic AS path information seems to provide everybody with a sound base to do whatever they want to do as their policies - and certainly also general use rules. I have trouble to believe that less than "authentic AS path info" will serve us well enough, and doing less would mean that we dilute and messup the security mechanism by some implied policies. You are welcome to suggest relations and context that help defining useful policies to evaluate with authentic AS path info (whether as general rules or for private policy definitions). Starting to look into "context" assuming and targeting that less than authentic AS path should be sufficient would seem to me like heading for rat holes... > :-) > > Russ Ruediger _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
