On Mar 21, 2012, at 3:37 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote: > On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 5:26 PM, Shane Amante <sh...@castlepoint.net> wrote: >> >> On Mar 21, 2012, at 3:21 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote: >>> On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 5:13 PM, Shane Amante <sh...@castlepoint.net> wrote: >>>> >>>> On Mar 21, 2012, at 3:00 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote: >>>>> On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 3:40 PM, Eric Osterweil <eosterw...@verisign.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> My input is that the current work that does not address the real route >>>>>> leak threat, and it is therefore insufficient. >>>>> >>>>> and many, many times ... 'how would you do this, really, show me the >>>>> math' has been asked. >>>> >>>> Answer: Evaluate policy. >>> >>> 'apply prefix lists' you mean? >> >> No. Evaluate _policy_. Policy is about whether an ASN /intended/ to >> announce a path to another ASN _or_ not. More succinctly: one needs input >> to verify output, (since you said "show me the math"). >> > > smarty... :) > > someone reminded me that I shouldn't be quite so flip 'show me the > math' is really, 'how can I tell from 2 as-hops away that: > > 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> me > > is a leak?' > > Randy posted on nanog (to you/shane, I think) a message with content like: > "to do this rigorously, i > would need to form the transitive closure of the business policies of > every inter-provider link on the internet." > > in this: <http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2012-February/045941.html> > message. This is what you mean as well, yes?
Yes. And, to answer Randy's question in that message ... I'm not asserting that this is a _simple_ problem to be solved, but we should not ignore the problem b/c it's "hard" ... otherwise, we wouldn't have the Internet, as it exists today, nor a lot of other things. -shane _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
