Danny, Thanks for the link. I read the doc.
I do not believe the work has been peer-reviewed and I detected a couple of bizarre statements (such as deleting an object = revocation or the idea of "overwriting" a ROA to replace an existing one). What I believe it adds to our work are a number of scenarios on how to implement grand-parenting (not all valid) if we ever decide to take that problem. What specific finding(s) concerns you? Roque On Mar 20, 2013, at 1:50 PM, Danny McPherson <[email protected]> wrote: > > Interesting presentation here: > > http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/Cooper_RPKI_BFOC.pdf > > "The RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) is a new infrastructure to > secure Internet routing > It’s been in deployment since ~2011 But, it also creates new risks > (misconfigurations and takedowns) > that could make IP prefixes unreachable" > > Given we've been concerned (and vocal) about this from an operational > perspective since RPKI's proposed "tight coupling" into BGPSEC discussions > many years ago... > > -danny > > _______________________________________________ > sidr mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
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