On Apr 2, 2013, at 9:58 AM, Danny McPherson <[email protected]> wrote: > On 2013-04-02 09:30, John Curran wrote: > >> Indeed. Of course, that same outcome can effectively be had today (for any >> given IP address block) via one handful of court orders directed to the >> larger >> ISP backbones. > > Assuming those backbones operate within jurisdictional or MLAT reach, as > opposed to where an RIR falls jurisdictional. > > But yes, this was indeed part of my earlier point.
IMO, there is still one key difference. ISP's are _directly_ involved in receiving such orders, evaluating them for validity, applicability and then carrying them out. This can also include providing a heads-up to operations teams, in that SP, that a change in configuration to effect it was "purposeful", thus saving substantial time + OpEx not trying to track down a "general connectivity issue" that a customer calls in and reports to the SP. OTOH, with the RPKI ... the actions carried out by, for example, an RIR will have to be without consultation of the ISP(s) with the directly attached customer, in the case of sealed orders. How does the SP know that a certificate was revoked due: a) a bug; b) lack of payment to their RIR; or, c) a lawful order? And, more importantly, could/should/would ISP's act differently, in terms of routing on their networks in any of those cases? It's one thing for an operator to have direct influence/knowledge re: actions it takes on their own network, it's another matter entirely when third-parties have that control over your operations, particularly without any recourse. -shane _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
