On 19/02/2008, John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Yes, you've shown either that, or that even some occasionally > intelligent and competent philosophers sometimes take seriously ideas > that really can be dismissed as obviously ridiculous -- ideas which > really are unworthy of careful thought were it not for the fact that > pinpointing exactly why such ridiculous ideas are wrong is so often > fruitful (as in the Chalmers article).
It doesn't sound so strange when you examine the distinction between the computation and the implementation of the computation. An analogy is the distinction between a circle and the implementation of a circle. It might be objected that it is ridiculous to argue that any irregular shape looked at with the right transformation matrix is an implementation of a circle. The objection is valid under a non-trivial definition of "implementation". A randomly drawn perimeter around a vicious dog on a tether does not help you avoid getting bitten unless you have the relevant transformation matrix and can do the calculations in your head, which would be no better than having no "implementation" at all but just instructions on how to draw the circle de novo. Thus, implementation is linked to utility. Circles exist in the abstract as platonic objects, but platonic objects don't interact with the real world until they are implemented, and implemented in a particular useful or non-trivial way. Similarly, computations exist as platonic objects, such as Turing machines, but don't play any part in the real world unless they are implemented. There is an abstract machine adding two numbers together, but this no use to you when you are doing your shopping unless it is implemented in a useful and non-trivial way, such as in an electronic calculator or in your brain. Now, consider the special case of a conscious computation. If this computation is to interact with the real world it must fulfil the criteria for non-trivial implementation as discussed. A human being would be an example of this. But what if the computation creates an inputless virtual world with conscious inhabitants? Unless you are prepared to argue that the consciousness of the inhabitants is contingent on interaction with the real world there seems no reason to insist that the implementation be non-trivial or useful in the above sense. Consciousness would then be a quality of the abstract platonic object, as circularity is a quality of the abstract circle. I might add that there is nothing in this which contradicts functionalism, or for that matter geometry. -- Stathis Papaioannou ------------------------------------------- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
