On 17/02/2008, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > The first problem arises from Lanier's trick of claiming that there is a > computer, in the universe of all possible computers, that has a machine > architecture and a machine state that is isomorphic to BOTH the neural > state of a brain at a given moment, and also isomorphic to the state of > a particular rainstorm at a particular moment.
In the universe of all possible computers and programs, yes. > This is starting to be rather silly because the rainstorm and computer > then diverge in their behavior in the next tick of the clock. Lanier > then tries to persuade us, with some casually well chosen words, that he > can find a computer that will match up with the rainstorm AND the brain > for a few seconds, or a few minutes ... or ... how long? Well, if he > posits a large enough computer, maybe the whole lifetime of that brain....? > > The problem with this is that what his argument really tells us is that > he can imagine a quasi-infinitely large, hypothetical computer that just > happens to be structured to look like (a) the functional equivalent of a > particular human brain for an indefinitely long period of time (at least > the normal lifetime of that human brain), and, coincidentally, a > particular rainstorm, for just a few seconds or minutes of the life of > that rainstorm. > > The key word is "coincidentally". There is no reason why it has to be *the same* computer from moment to moment. If your mind were uploaded to a computer and your physical brain died, you would experience continuity of consciousness (or if you prefer, the illusion of continuity of consciousness, which is just as good) despite the fact that there is a gross physical discontinuity between your brain and the computer. You would experience continuity of consciousness even if every moment were implemented on a completely different machine, in a completely different part of the universe, running in a completely jumbled up order. No external observer would ever be able to keep track of such a fragmented computation and as far as the rest of the universe is concerned there may as well be no computation. But if the computation involves conscious observers in a virtual reality, why should they be any less conscious due to being unable to observe and interact with the substrate of their implementation? In the final extrapolation of this idea it becomes clear that if any computation can be mapped onto any physical system, the physical system is superfluous and the computation resides in the mapping, an abstract mathematical object. This leads to the idea that all computations are actually implemented in a Platonic reality, and the universe we observe emerges from that Platonic reality, as per eg. Max Tegmark and in the article linked to by Matt Mahoney: http://www.mattmahoney.net/singularity.html -- Stathis Papaioannou ------------------------------------------- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
