Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 17/02/2008, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
The first problem arises from Lanier's trick of claiming that there is a
computer, in the universe of all possible computers, that has a machine
architecture and a machine state that is isomorphic to BOTH the neural
state of a brain at a given moment, and also isomorphic to the state of
a particular rainstorm at a particular moment.
In the universe of all possible computers and programs, yes.
This is starting to be rather silly because the rainstorm and computer
then diverge in their behavior in the next tick of the clock. Lanier
then tries to persuade us, with some casually well chosen words, that he
can find a computer that will match up with the rainstorm AND the brain
for a few seconds, or a few minutes ... or ... how long? Well, if he
posits a large enough computer, maybe the whole lifetime of that brain....?
The problem with this is that what his argument really tells us is that
he can imagine a quasi-infinitely large, hypothetical computer that just
happens to be structured to look like (a) the functional equivalent of a
particular human brain for an indefinitely long period of time (at least
the normal lifetime of that human brain), and, coincidentally, a
particular rainstorm, for just a few seconds or minutes of the life of
that rainstorm.
The key word is "coincidentally".
There is no reason why it has to be *the same* computer from moment to
moment. If your mind were uploaded to a computer and your physical
brain died, you would experience continuity of consciousness (or if
you prefer, the illusion of continuity of consciousness, which is just
as good) despite the fact that there is a gross physical discontinuity
between your brain and the computer. You would experience continuity
of consciousness even if every moment were implemented on a completely
different machine, in a completely different part of the universe,
running in a completely jumbled up order.
Some of this I agree with, though it does not touch on the point that I
was making, which was that Lanier's argument was valueless.
The last statement you make, though, is not quite correct: with a
jumbled up sequence of "episodes" during which the various machines were
running the brain code, he whole would lose its coherence, because input
from the world would now be randomised.
If the computer was being fed input from a virtual reality simulation,
that would be fine. It would sense a sudden change from real world to
virtual world.
But again, none of this touches upon Lanier's attempt to draw a bogus
conclusion from his thought experiment.
No external observer would ever be able to keep track of such a
fragmented computation and as far as the rest of the universe is
concerned there may as well be no computation.
This makes little sense, surely. You mean that we would not be able to
interact with it? Of course not: the poor thing will have been
isolated from meanigful contact with the world because of the jumbled up
implementation that you posit. Again, though, I see no relevant
conclusion emerging from this.
I cannot make any sense of your statement that "as far as the rest of
the universe is concerned there may as well be no computation." So we
cannot communicate with it anymore.... that should not be surprising,
given your assumptions.
But if the computation
involves conscious observers in a virtual reality, why should they be
any less conscious due to being unable to observe and interact with
the substrate of their implementation?
No reason at all! They would be conscious. Isaac Newton could not
observe and interact with the substrate of his implementation, without
making a hole in his skull that would have killed his brain ... but that
did not have any bearing on his consciousness.
In the final extrapolation of this idea it becomes clear that if any
computation can be mapped onto any physical system, the physical
system is superfluous and the computation resides in the mapping, an
abstract mathematical object.
This is functionalism, no? I am not sure if you are disagreeing with
functionalism or supporting it. ;-)
Well, the computation is not the implemenatation, for sure, but is it
appropriate to call it an "abstract mathematical mapping"?
This leads to the idea that all
computations are actually implemented in a Platonic reality, and the
universe we observe emerges from that Platonic reality, as per eg. Max
Tegmark and in the article linked to by Matt Mahoney:
I don't see how this big jump follows. I have a different
interpretation that does not need Platonic realities, so it looks like
a non-sequiteur to me.
http://www.mattmahoney.net/singularity.html
I ind most of what Matt says in this article to be incoherent.
Assertions pulled out of thin air and citing of unjustifiable claims
made by others as if they were god-sent truth.
Richard Loosemore
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singularity
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