Both Dan and Adam have now restated the distinction I was trying to
make. Hopefully they have been more successful.
One criterion that I think is important, though perhaps irrational, is
how calls to/from the PSTN are represented. Among all the possible ways
that the trustworthiness of the callerid may be represented, this case
had better be one that makes sense to most users. That probably means it
should not be "no trust at all", because that will be interpreted as
indicating that this new phone system makes calls less reliable. That is
why, as irrational is it may be, I'm thinking of three levels (bad, far,
good / red, yellow, green / ...) where an identity from the PSTN that
has been secured for the sip portion of the path, probably falls in the
middle.
Paul
Adam Roach wrote:
On 7/9/08 9:38 AM, David R Oran wrote:
[analysis removed]
I also agree that trying to mandate the way the state is presented to
the user is not something the IETF has the skill set to do a good job of.
Going onto this tangent however...
My personal preference is for something different from the lock icon
one sees in web browsers. Rather I like having a "go secure" button on
the phone that lights up green if the above conditions are met and
flashes or turns red if they are not. This allows either for the light
to come on in the few cases where everything works out at call
establishment time, or allows an attempt to secure the call via
re-invite, transfer, or whatever, during the call.
That works well for handling of this kind of information during the
call. But I think there are two very different sets of decisions people
want to be able to make:
1. Am I (reasonably) certain that the caller identity on my ringing,
unanswered phone is accurate?
2. Once I am in a call, how do I conduct myself?
I think your analysis is spot on for #2.
But #1 is a fairly different kind of decision based on a different kind
of information, and would probably be rendered differently.
/a
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