On Sun, Jul 15, 2018 at 11:17:20AM +1000, Haw Loeung wrote: > On Fri, Jul 13, 2018 at 07:53:01PM +0100, Andrew Gallagher wrote: > > I am still willing to help with possible upgrades and/or > > replacements for the SKS network. At this point I have come to > > believe that a minimal network containing only key material, SBINDs > > and revocations (no id packets, no third party sigs) is the absolute > > maximum functionality we can hope to sustain in the long term. And > > for this to be bulletproof, all such material must be > > cryptographically verified (otherwise people could just create > > “random” key material containing arbitrary data). > > If it helps others, we have a patched SKS packaged to exclude the bad > key (one of them at least)[1]. A couple of others in my team did all > the work so I can't comment on the details. >
I should also add, you'll then need to drop the key from the DB with: $ sks drop 8C070D00D81E934B3C79247175E6B4BC Regards, Haw
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