That is the plan. The access control would have to be done such that the
owner can not access it, otherwise they can write the data, gain access
and read the data. The solution is to shut off all other ways to access
the raw data on the platters (can't stop a spin stand).
Don
"Curtis Anderson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
No Phone Info Available
05/25/2006 03:08 PM
To
"'james hughes'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
cc
"'Gary Calder'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "'Gideon Avida'"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "'Landon Noll'"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "'Serge Plotkin'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
"'SISWG'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject
RE: Next P1619/1619.1 Meeting -> Discussion Doc D0.7
All,
I'll ask the dumb question: instead of having an encrypting drive
implement cryptographically secure access control mechanisms so that
it can support the "read long" SCSI command, can we just not support
the "read long"? If the only (known) problem is direct access to the
ciphertext, then "just say no".
Thanks,
Curtis
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
> Behalf Of james hughes
> Sent: Thursday, May 25, 2006 9:06 AM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: james hughes; Gary Calder; Gideon Avida; [EMAIL PROTECTED];
> Landon Noll; Serge Plotkin; SISWG
> Subject: Re: Next P1619/1619.1 Meeting -> Discussion Doc D0.7
>
> Very cool explanation! Wow. Very unexpected.Thanks!
>
>
>
> On May 25, 2006, at 6:58 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > To get export rights for the Seagate drives, the drive can not
> > allow a way
> > for the encrypted data to be read.
> >
> > If one was to do a normal sector write and then do a read-long
> > command,
> > they could use the drive as a cryptographic co-processor. With
> > tape the
> > encrypted data is also readable, and could be considered a
> > cryptographic
> > co-processor. One difference with tape is that the machines sell
> > in lower
> > quantities and to large customers, for disc drives there is a much
> > higher
> > quantity and it is easy for anyone to get one (go to your local
> > store).
> >
> > An encrypting tape machine is a $10K (I don't know the real numbers)
> > cryptographic co-processor. A disc drive could be a $75
> cryptographic
> > co-processor. That is why there are export controls on the disc
> > drive.
> >
> > Don
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > james hughes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > Sent by: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > No Phone Info Available
> > 05/24/2006 10:57 PM
> >
> > To
> > Gary Calder <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Gideon Avida
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> > Landon Noll <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > cc
> > james hughes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED], SISWG
> > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Serge Plotkin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > Subject
> > Re: Next P1619/1619.1 Meeting -> Discussion Doc D0.7
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > I basically agree what Gary suggests. Sun Microsystems has achieved
> > export approval for several products and I do not remember text that
> > requires "access control". The definitions of "Open Cryptographic
> > Interface" is indeed an interesting one. I doubt that a disk drive
> > with encryption but without access control would be considered an
> > "open cryptographic interface". It is my understanding that open
> > cryptographic interface applies to software APIs and chips,
> not where
> > someone has to open a device to harvest the crypto chip
> (where access
> > control can make that difficult).
> >
> > The response about China is correct, but irrelevant to the access
> > control issue. The way I read this, they will not let it in, period,
> > access control or not.
> >
> > Again. I think that the other storage encryption vendors
> should chime
> > in for both disk and tape. I assume that they are selling
> > internationally!
> >
> > jim
> >
> >
> >
> > On May 23, 2006, at 10:21 AM, Gary Calder wrote:
> >
> >> James (all),
> >>
> >> I have exactly the same concerns as you about the 2nd para in
> >> Laszlo's document, where it says that access control is required by
> >> authorities. Even just considering one country, the US, I don't
> >> think it is as simple as that, here are some references:
> >>
> >> The up to date US Export Administration Regulations (EAR) database
> >> can be found here: http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/ear_data.html
> >>
> >> Of the many documents listed, I think these are the most relevant:
> >> Part 736 - General Prohibitions http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/
> >> pdf/736.pdf dated 11-09-05
> >> Part 740 - License Exceptions
> http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/
> >> 740.pdf dated 04-28-06
> >> Part 742 - Control Policy -- CCL Based Controls http://
> >> www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/742.pdf dated 5-16-06
> >> (Part 774) Category 5 (Part 2) - Information Security http://
> >> www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/ccl5-pt2.pdf dated 11-18-05
> >>
> >> What follows is my interpretation of the above docs - I have not
> >> read through all of them word for word (life's too short) but I
> >> think I get the basic gist.
> >>
> >> Everything that is controlled is listed under an ECCN (Export
> >> Classification Control Number). ECCNs 5A002, 5D002, 5E002 and
> >> 5A992, 5D992 and 5E992 cover encryption items. Section 742.15 gives
> >> a broad outline of the licensing policy covering these ECCNs. For
> >> 5A/D/E002 an export license is required to all countries, except
> >> Canada. Further exceptions apply, given under 740.17.
> >> In particular, there is this exception:
> >>
> >> --------------------------------------------
> >> (2) Encryption commodities and software
> >> restricted to non-“government end-users.”
> >> This paragraph (b)(2) authorizes the export and
> >> reexport of items described in §740.17(b)(2)(iii)
> >> of the EAR that do not provide an “open
> >> cryptographic interface” and that are controlled
> >> by ECCNs 5A002.a.1, .a.2, .a.5, or .a.6, or 5D002
> >> to individuals, commercial firms, and other
> >> entities that are not “government end-users” and
> >> that are not located in a country listed in
> >> Supplement No. 3 to this part. In addition, the
> >> transaction must meet the provisions of either
> >> §740.17(b)(2)(i) or (ii) of the EAR.
> >> --------------------------------------------
> >>
> >> The relevant ECCN paras mentioned are:
> >>
> >> ----------------------------------------------
> >> a.1. Designed or modified to use
> >> “cryptography” employing digital techniques
> >> performing any cryptographic function other than
> >> authentication or digital signature having any of
> >> the following:
> >>
> >> a.1.a. A “symmetric algorithm”
> >> employing a key length in excess of 56-bits; or
> >> a.1.b. An “asymmetric algorithm” where
> >> the security of the algorithm is based on any of the
> >> following:
> >> a.1.b.1. Factorization of integers in
> >> excess of 512 bits (e.g., RSA);
> >> a.1.b.2. Computation of discrete
> >> logarithms in a multiplicative group of a finite
> >> field of size greater than 512 bits (e.g., Diffie-
> >> Hellman over Z/pZ); or
> >> a.1.b.3. Discrete logarithms in a
> >> group other than mentioned in 5A002.a.1.b.2 in
> >> excess of 112 bits (e.g., Diffie-Hellman over an
> >> elliptic curve);
> >> a.2. Designed or modified to perform
> >> cryptanalytic functions;
> >> ...
> >> a.5. Designed or modified to use
> >> cryptographic techniques to generate the
> >> spreading code for “spread spectrum” systems,
> >> including the hopping code for “frequency
> >> hopping” systems;
> >> a.6. Designed or modified to use
> >> cryptographic techniques to generate channelizing
> >> or scrambling codes for “time-modulated ultrawideband”
> >> systems;
> >> -----------------------------------------
> >>
> >> I think this is where the term 'required' has been misconstrued.
> >> Essentially this is saying if you have a product covered by these
> >> ECCNs, but aimed at end (non governmental) users not located in
> >> certain countries, where there is no 'open cryptographic
> >> interface', then export is authorized.
> >>
> >> But if you don't have a product that falls under the license
> >> exemptions, you can still apply for a license.742.15 (i)(ii) says
> >> that applications are treated on a case by case basis - I would
> >> take that to mean that even if (say) you had a product that had an
> >> 'open cryptographic interface' you might still get a license
> >> authorized, depending on the individual application.
> >>
> >> Now it may be that others on this list have some practical
> >> experience of actually applying for a license - I might be prepared
> >> to accept that in practice, any product with an 'open cryptographic
> >> interface' operating at the kinds of data rates that hard disks
> >> operate would stand a remote chance of getting a license.
> >>
> >> My only other experience is with the UK regulations. There is a
> >> control list which lists a combination of military items classified
> >> by the UK, plus a European Commission (EC) list of so-called 'dual-
> >> use' items. These are items which are civilian in nature but can
> >> have a dual military application.
> >> The list is available here: http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/
> >> file27539.pdf current copy dated 12th April 2006
> >>
> >> In this, category 5 covers "Telecommunications and Information
> >> Security".In this, you will find similar words as the US EAR regs.
> >> Even the use of the same numbers 5A002 and 5D002. Why is that? In
> >> fact, its because the US and Eu countries are all signatories of
> >> the Wassenaar agreement, mentioned in the 1998 survey you quoted.
> >> It covers the export of military and 'dual-use' items. This is
> >> where you can see where the common text of the US/UK/EU lists came
> >> about. Everything is documented here: http://www.wassenaar.org/
> >> controllists/index.html (Category 5 part 2).
> >>
> >> This list does not have the corresponding License Exceptions or
> >> mention of 'open cryptographic interfaces' so I have no idea if a
> >> similar exception applies to the UK (or EU). I would expect this to
> >> be country by country dependent.
> >>
> >> Of course, many of the *export* regulations are perhaps moot if, as
> >> with my company, manufacturing and export of the actual product is
> >> done in the Far East (Taiwan. Korea etc). In that case *import*
> >> regulations are relevant. AFAIK, these are much more relaxed. For
> >> example, this is the UK position (http://www.dti.gov.uk/
> >> europeandtrade/importing-into-uk/page9728.html):
> >>
> >>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> -
> >> -------------------------------------------
> >> The majority of goods can be imported into the United Kingdom
> >> without the need to apply for an import licence.
> >>
> >> Currently ILB issues import licences for certain goods mainly to
> >> implement:
> >> DTI’s trade policy measures
> >>
> >> * certain textiles from Belarus, China, Montenegro, North Korea and
> >> Uzbekistan
> >> * iron & steel
> >>
> >> For safety reasons
> >>
> >> *
> >> firearms and ammunition
> >> *
> >> nuclear materials
> >>
> >> As a result of international obligations
> >>
> >> *
> >> anti-personnel mines
> >> *
> >> rough diamonds and wood products from Liberia
> >>
> >> Other Government departments may have their own import
> >> restrictions. For example the Rural Payments Agency (RPA) issues
> >> import licences for agricultural, horticultural products and
> >> certain items of food and drink. Traders importing these products
> >> will need to contact them for advice not ILB (for link to RPA
> >> website see related links). It is the responsibility of the
> >> importers to ensure that he/she is aware of any restrictions on
> >> goods they wish to import.
> >>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> -
> >> ----------------------------------------------------
> >>
> >> So while the US and UK/EU and other Wasenaar signatories seem to be
> >> reasonably aligned in the export policy vis-a-vis encryption
> >> products, things are still obviously very country dependent for
> >> granting of export licenses and also imports.
> >>
> >> I hope at least this gives the insomniacs amongst you some useful
> >> bedtime reading.
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >> Gary Calder
> >> Oxford Semiconductor
> >> www.oxsemi.com
> >>
> >> james hughes wrote:
> >>> I would like some references to the claims in the introduction. My
> >>> reason for asking about such is that it is important that we
> >>> (IEEE) standardize what is right, not what is politically in vogue
> >>> at a moment in history. The I in IEEE is for International.
> >>> Additionally, I am interested in which market? Anyway, references
> >>> to the claims of this paragraph should be provided.
> >>>
> >>>> Access control not just can be provided, but it is required by
> >>>> the export control authorities,
> >>>
> >>> Reference?
> >>>
> >>>> and also by many local authorities,
> >>>
> >>> Reference?
> >>>
> >>>> where storage devices are sold. If the encrypted data is freely
> >>>> accessible, the encryption module can be used as a stand alone,
> >>>> high-speed encryption processor, which is prohibited in many
> >>>> markets.
> >>>
> >>> Reference of the regulation and any example of a storage
> >>> encryption device where the "encryption module can be used as a
> >>> stand alone, high-speed encryption processor" in such a way that
> >>> it violates a law?
> >>>
> >>> I have looked for information on the web about this kind of
> >>> information. There is a summary done in 1998, but I have found
> >>> nothing online more recent.
> >>> http://www.gilc.org/crypto/crypto-survey.html
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On May 19, 2006, at 6:16 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Here is an update of the non-removable secure storage discussion
> >>>> document. It does not contain new information, only editorial and
> >>>> formatting changes, in an attempt to make it easier to
> understand.
> >>>> -Laszlo
> >>>> <Nonremovable Discussions-D07.pdf>
> >>>
> >>>
>
