-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > Quite simply, my argument is that most ISPs don't take even the most > basic cybersecurity precautions (spoofing protection) at the user end. > Therefore it is reasonable to assume that for them to install > significant traffic analysis on every user would be quite expensive.
This assumes that the traffic analysis required is significant. My colo provider disagrees. > My french isn't really good enough to get to grips with that paper; what > exactly DID they say about traffic flow analysis? It *looks* like they > said it wasn't feasible except on a very localised level with current > technology... right? Identifying whether the content transmitted is illicit is much harder than telling whether there is content being transmitted. I'll leave it to a geek fluent in french to clarify the paper, though there were several sections discussing a wide variety of commercially available tools for various aspects of traffic analysis. Monitoring for abnormal traffic doesn't need to be global - it is sufficient to work at a very localised level. =jr -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFDTV6TWYfZ3rPnHH0RAmiIAJ9v50pJ7v4VUTGRMm1KOCEUIzXnEgCcCFBH /N+iV1BnKYw0vxwtF+uh5YE= =ooFA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
