Well, it would certainly be useful in China at present, judging from the level of effort they have put in previously to block stuff (a bit, but not a massive amount). Whether in future they get pissed off enough that they put in the significant amount of effort required to detect, deter and block freenet/dark, we will see.
On Tue, Oct 11, 2005 at 02:46:09PM -0400, jrandom at i2p.net wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > >>>> However, before going on to build a more clear analysis of the costs > >>>> necessary to detect such communication, humor me - assuming that > >>>> cost to attack (2) is less than the cost of (1), do you agree that > >>>> further improvements upon (1) is immaterial to the practical anonymity > >>>> of those who require Freenet/dark? > >> > >>> Well of course, if it is easy to find all nodes, then there is little > >>> point in building in heavy anonymity once you're on the network. That > >>> was the whole motive behind the 0.7 darknet! > >> > >> Agreed. > >> > >> Just to clarify, "easy" there means both less expensive than attacking > >> the anonymity techniques of Freenet/dark (aka (1)) and within the > >> capabilities of an intent attacker. > > > I am not sure I would say it is "easy", but it is definitely possible > > - remember Freenet was never designed to prevent third-parties from > > discovering that you are running a Freenet node (very few anonymity > > protecting systems have this requirement). We have added this as a > > requirement in 0.7 hence the move to a darknet approach. > > I personally wouldn't say "easy" either - Toad's words, not mine. But > as you say, it is definitely possible. I know the original Freenet > wasn't designed to go dark, but the question at hand is whether > Freenet/dark will be useful for what it is being tasked with. > > If it is feasible for a state level adversary to mount an attack > which can identify a large majority (or all) Freenet/dark nodes in > their jurisdiction/control, the question becomes how expensive that > attack is. > > Simply put, Freenet/dark will not be useful in situations where such > an attack is economically viable and technically possible. > > Whether it is useful in situations where that attack is not > economically viable or not technically possible is a different > question (answered by analyzing the anonymity and security of (1), > rather than (2), as we are doing here). > > I'll try to get a more detailed analysis of the costs and viability > of such an attack later tonight, but it may have to wait until > tomorrow. > > =jr > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (GNU/Linux) > > iD8DBQFDTAaSWYfZ3rPnHH0RAh5xAJ0ccVejZxeS9MZQlfPcb+idAJBkSgCfdana > EGDlEPzjofDAb+mSBBB8c8E= > =etFe > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > _______________________________________________ > Tech mailing list > Tech at freenetproject.org > http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tech -- Matthew J Toseland - toad at amphibian.dyndns.org Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/tech/attachments/20051011/b9cd018a/attachment.pgp>
