On Tuesday 20 January 2009 08:55, Daniel Cheng wrote: > On Tue, Jan 20, 2009 at 4:16 PM, Ancoron Luciferis > <ancoron at chaoslayer.de> wrote: > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Hash: SHA1 > > > > Hi there, > > > > I knew that the french law goes further than any other country in europe > > nowadays regarding anti-piracy and stuff like that but I didn't knew > > that you can be held guilty for something you didn't do (neighbor hacked > > in WLAN). That's like being held guilty for the damage someone makes > > that stole your car. I can't really believe that, because that would > > negate the base assumption: everyone is innocent as long as his/her > > guilt has not been proven. > > This is not "held guilty" in the legal sense. They are just disconnect > you before bring to court. This is a proactive measurement to prevent > further "harm" -- just like what have been doing for, for example, > child abuse and violent to spouse. > > Yes, piracy issue is as serious as (if not more important then) trying > to kill your wife or child.
Obviously, since it costs more money to the economy! Also IIRC there *are* appeals and (quasi-?)judicial processes for child protection cases. This nonsense is a classic case of creeping corporatism - the megacorps speak louder than the individuals or the smaller companies. I'd be surprised if it was upheld by the ECHR, but we'll see ... In my country they tried to introduce such nonsense, the ISPs refused to indemnify the media companies for lawsuits arising from the media companies mistakes, so the government is going to make ISPs legally responsible for copyright infringements committed via p2p on their networks some time in the next few years. :< The other issue in France is that some people have claimed that the DADVSI does in fact make Freenet illegal, at least developing it. This has not been tested in court as far as I know, but let me know if you hear of any prosecutions under it, especially if they relate to filesharing software... as a professional Freenet developer I have decided that visiting France presents an unacceptable risk for the foreseeable future... My advice is to exercise your right as an EU citizen to live in any EU state where you can find employment. However... At the european level, IPRED2 would make it a serious criminal matter to attempt, aid and abet, incite, or commit, violation of copyrights or trademarks which are "intentional" and "on a commercial scale"; clarifying language according to wikipedia (which seems out of date) is "willful, commercial or intentional" and not for "personal and not for profits purposes". If we're lucky this means that inciting people to distribute the Fishman Affidavit won't be an imprisonable offence... but whether it's any protection for myself, a paid Freenet developer, is an open question. It passed first reading in Parliament on March 2007, and is listed as awaiting first reading in Council; in theory it could be adopted immediately by the Council, but it often drags out into second and third readings... Since this is an arbitrary, and probably illegal under ECHR, executive action, where no liability has been proven, I can in fact discuss your original question... > >>>>>>> On Monday 19 January 2009 15:28, 3BUIb3S50i 3BUIb3S50i wrote: > >>>>>>>> There is a break in the sanctions of french law Hadopi. Hadopi allow > >>>>>>>> censured users to use television, telephone and maybe anothers > >>>>>>>> payables services. So, victims will have a lot of censured ports, > >>>>>>>> but > >>>>>>>> not all. Some ports will continue to run. Can we found a method to > >>>>>>>> override this censorship (with freenet)? e.g. encapsulate traffic > >>>>>>>> into > >>>>>>>> VoIP. This is very difficult: ISP can limit traffic only from/to its > >>>>>>>> servers. What do you think? It's very important for french users. > >>>>>>>> French users risk to left freenet soon... like Batosai. For example, > >>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>> do not want to risk losing my Internet connection. The french > >>>>>>>> community is afraid by this law. Some users have requested TCP > >>>>>>>> support > >>>>>>>> for hide freenet traffic in https, http etc. ISP will spy their > >>>>>>>> users, > >>>>>>>> so Darknet will not be sufficient. If limits only apply to specific proscribed individuals, then they can be very harsh - severe monthly traffic limits, NATing lots of them together to prevent incoming connections, completely denying them access to computers and/or the Internet, etc. If your question is how do we avoid detection, the question is how much effort will the ISPs and media companies invest in finding people. It is possible to identify peer to peer traffic even if it is protected in steganography, by analysing the connection patterns between customers. If customers are ideal consumers, for example, they would only ever connect to central business-run sites! Traffic flow analysis is however somewhat expensive (we hope), so perhaps it will be avoided for a while ... a cheaper but more disruptive solution may be to simply prohibit all connections between customers; Skype would probably fallback to relaying over central servers, at a latency cost; SIP-based VoIP and non-centralised online gaming would be disrupted... In the medium term, approximately 1.0 era, Freenet will have support for "transport plugins", which will enable Freenet traffic over TCP, HTTP, VoIP-like packets etc etc. In the long term, Freenet *may* have support for high latency transports such as sneakernet (exchange of USB keys etc), fast transfers when physical rendezvous, and harder forms of steganography (which mimic timing as well as protocol). However, there is no consensus in the project in favour of this, and no clear idea of how to assign routing locations on a high latency network. Wireless may also help, but bear in mind that vast seas of omnidirectional antennas, especially if they are at rooftop level, do not scale well and while they may provide the large numbers of short links needed, they will not provide the small number of long links that Freenet also needs. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 827 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/tech/attachments/20090120/c2b4cec4/attachment.pgp>
