My 5 cents. For the IoT environment this ciphersuite is not very useful.
If you want the best possible performance, lowest RAM utilization and use as little flash as possible then you go for a plain PSK ciphersuite (without DH/ECDHE). If you are already paying the price of the asymmetric crypto (in terms of flash usage/CPU speed/RAM utilization then just switch to a raw public key or a certificate based ciphersuite (since there is very little additional overhead). I suspect the usage is more for the we or so? Ciao Hannes On 04/25/2016 05:17 PM, Sean Turner wrote: > All, > > draft-mattsson-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead includes some cipher suites that are needed > for TLS1.3. We need to get these officially registered so the chairs would > like to hear whether there is WG support for adopting > draft-mattsson-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead. Please let us know whether you: > > - Support adoption and are willing to review/comment on the draft by > 201600429; the chairs still need people to review the draft to show there’s > support for it as we process it down the path. > > - Object to the adoption of this draft as a WG item, please respond to the > list indicating why by 201600429. > > Note 1: This draft will get published using the new rules we’ve been > concocting on the list so the IANA considerations section will get tweaked as > we settle on what words need to be included. > > Note 2: The other option is to put the registrations in the TLS1.3 spec, but > that would add four pages that I’m pretty sure no implementer is going to > read so there seems to be little point in included the registrations in the > TLS1.3 spec. And, these cipher suites do apply to TLS1.2. > > Cheers, > > J&S > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
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