Ilari, I got your point.
But in view of the request this WG is discussing now, I see only two reasonable (IMHO) opinion: 1. Tell those requestors to go away because TLS 1.3 has been designed to always be forward-secure; or 2. Add a *detectable* non-PFS key exchange so those requestors would have something they can live with, and the rest of us could at least agree or disagree to a non-PFS session establishment on a per-session or a per-entity basis. I do not know what mechanism could do the latter, or off it even exists. But folding an RSA method in seems to do the job. I'd say it's fine if it borrows from 1.0, as it isn't going to be the most secure setting anyway. Regards, Uri Sent from my iPhone > On Jul 23, 2017, at 03:02, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusva...@welho.com> wrote: > >> On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 08:42:10PM +0000, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL >> wrote: >>> On 7/20/17, 16:32, "ilariliusva...@welho.com on behalf of Ilari Liusvaara" >>> <ilariliusva...@welho.com> wrote: >>> Maybe we are better off just retrofitting RSA-key-transport back >>> into TLS-1.3? >> >> This has in fact been requested. Kenny Paterson said about the request: >> ----------------------------------------------------------------------- >> My view concerning your request: no. >> Rationale: We're trying to build a more secure internet. >> >> My rationale to resurrect it: others are trying to push TLS-1.3 into >> an invisibly-insecure state. If we must satisfy them (and I’m not at >> all sure we should), then this is the most obvious way to at least >> avoid the “insecurity” being silently pushed upon you. At the very >> least you’d have an option to continue under surveillance or abort >> connection. > > This isn't just matter of what is considered "secure enough" to > include. There are fundamential technical constraints that prevent > adding static RSA back. > > Early on, there were all sorts of really fundamential decisions on how > TLS 1.3 works. The results of these decisions are baked deeply in the > protocol, and are extremely hard to change. These decisions were > already very apparent in draft-02, over 3 years ago, despite -02 being > unimplementable. > > One implication of those assumptions is that any asymmetric key > exchange in TLS 1.3 is at least potentially forward secure[1] (the > actual constraints on asymmetric key exchanges are even stronger > than that, but this weaker version suffices here). Static RSA is not > even potentially forward-secure, so it can not be added. > > If you try to add back RSA using the most straightforward method, > what you get is not an analog of static RSA from TLS 1.2. The result > would be closer to RSA_EXPORT from TLS 1.0. > > > On the other hand, there is no way to construct a key exchange that is > always forward-secure. Either endpoint can always act in a way that > destroys forward-security (even without leaking any per-connection > information), but can not be detected (DH share reuse is considered > detectable) by the other end. > > > [1] "potentially forward secure" means that there exists interoperating > client and server implementations, so that the key exchange is forward- > secure. > > > -Ilari >
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