On Wed, Jul 27, 2022 at 02:27:12AM +0000, Kampanakis, Panos wrote: > Hi Ilari, > > > - DTLS-level fragmentation. There are buggy implementations that > > break if one tries this. > > DTLS servers have been fragmenting and sending cert chains that don’t > fit in the MTU for a long time. Is this buggy on the TLS client side?
These problems are specific to fragmenting Client Hello. Handling fragmented DTLS Client Hello is different from handling fragmented DTLS Certificate (and even more so in DTLS 1.3). I think DTLS specification just pretends both cases are the same. They are not. QUIC implementations could have similar issues with multiple initial packets, but operating QUIC with fast failure-independent fallback would make failures soft. There is the general principle that if some protocol feature is not used in the wild, it tends to break, even if required part of the protocol. Either by implementation being poorly tested and buggy, assuming the feature does not exist, or being missing entierely. Combine this with interop failures having outsize impact and old versions sticking around far longer than desriable. And I do not think fragmented Client Hellos in DTLS or multiple initials in QUIC are seen much. One trick with DTLS would be sending client hello with no key shares. Causes extra round-trip, but any server that selects PQC causing fragmentation would presumably be capable of handling that. -Ilari _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
