Dear Deirdre, Joe, and Sean,

On 10.04.26 16:00, Sean Turner wrote:
1. Building on Usama's PR - clarify what happened to each I-D; see PR #16 [1].
I would like to thank you once again for all the effort on this. Now that this PR has just been merged, I've published an update draft-usama-tls-fatt-extension-05 removing all of the process-related stuff.
As far as why the recent crop - and I use the word "recent" liberally - of 
algorithm I-Ds that did not go through the FATT, they did not go through the FATT because 
we had some sense that that was not the FATT's job though we never really articulated 
that well. We would like to note that none of these recent algorithms I-D went through 
the FATT starting with draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex, and then 
draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design, draft-ietf-tls-tls13-pkcs1, draft-ietf-ecdhe-mlkem, 
draft-ietf-tls-mlkem, and draft-ietf-tls-mldsa. Maybe a good call on chairs' part maybe 
not, but that's what happened.
I believe except for one draft (see below), that was actually a very good call.
There were other suggestions at IETF 125, but I do not remember much support 
for them.

I don't recall anyone other than Ekr showing concerns either, and I believe I addressed his concerns. But I'll come back to this in the future.

===

Dear Joe and Sean,

As someone who has been doing the formal analysis of the following drafts for the WG:

1. draft-fossati-tls-attestation
2. draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update
3. draft-ietf-tls-pake

and doing some preliminary working for some other drafts, I would like to formally request initiation of the FATT process for draft-ietf-tls-mlkem. The rationale is that I believe formal methods can provide additional value for security considerations of this draft. As an example, it can help justify design choices, such as the preference for hybrids.

I have shared further rationale and a summary of my work-in-progress in [5]. Notably:

   Approach: /symbolic/ security analysis so far (and planned
   /computational/ security analysis)

   Tool: /ProVerif/ so far (and planned /CryptoVerif/)

Please do not hesitate to ask if any further details would be helpful.

Thank you for your kind consideration!

Best regards,

-Usama

[1]https://github.com/tlswg/tls-fatt/pull/16/  <-ready to merge
[2]https://github.com/tlswg/tls-fatt/issues/19
[3]https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/RupKEHeJdAzxpNEZnRgerk4en1c/

[4] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-usama-tls-fatt-extension-05.html#section-3.2

[5] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-usama-tls-fatt-extension-05.html#section-3.3

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