Dear Joe and Sean,

Following up with the request below with:

1. the observation that there has been no objection from the WG yet on
   this specific request
2. some inspiration from our next-door neighbors who have actually
   already done the formal analysis for EDHOC-PSK with KEM [6]. So it
   seems justified to get a confirmation via formal analysis for TLS
   protocol, too, especially given that we claim "high cryptographic
   assurance."

Thank you for your kind consideration!

Best regards,

-Usama

On 21.04.26 02:25, Muhammad Usama Sardar wrote:

Dear Joe and Sean,

As someone who has been doing the formal analysis of the following drafts for the WG:

 1. draft-fossati-tls-attestation
 2. draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update
 3. draft-ietf-tls-pake

and doing some preliminary working for some other drafts, I would like to formally request initiation of the FATT process for draft-ietf-tls-mlkem. The rationale is that I believe formal methods can provide additional value for security considerations of this draft. As an example, it can help justify design choices, such as the preference for hybrids.

I have shared further rationale and a summary of my work-in-progress in [5]. Notably:

    Approach: /symbolic/ security analysis so far (and planned
    /computational/ security analysis)

    Tool: /ProVerif/ so far (and planned /CryptoVerif/)

Please do not hesitate to ask if any further details would be helpful.

Thank you for your kind consideration!

Best regards,

-Usama

[1]https://github.com/tlswg/tls-fatt/pull/16/  <-ready to merge
[2]https://github.com/tlswg/tls-fatt/issues/19
[3]https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/RupKEHeJdAzxpNEZnRgerk4en1c/

[4] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-usama-tls-fatt-extension-05.html#section-3.2

[5] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-usama-tls-fatt-extension-05.html#section-3.3

[6] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lake/2XGOI9OCwylJUfSCasvvwM2FXmw/

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