Costin Manolache <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Eric Rescorla wrote: > > > Jim Jagielski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > > >> Eric Rescorla wrote: > >> > > >> > Glenn Olander <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > >> > > 5) The strength of the PRNG is largely irrelevant > >> > > > >> > > As a user, I wouldn't trust any solution which lacks a check for > >> > > duplicate session id's, regardless of the strength of the PRNG. > >> > This doesn't seem to me to be a plausible position in view > >> > of the fact that all of our security mechanisms absolutely > >> > depend on statistical uniqueness of randomly generated large > >> > numbers. > >> > > >> > >> These are 2 different points I think. If you randomly generate numbers > >> between 1 and 1,000,000 you will, after a point in time, have > >> duplicate numbers. > > Yes, but if you randomly generate numbers between 1 and 2^128, you'll > > have to generate roughly 2^64 random numbers to have a good chance of > > getting a duplicate. Sure, over time you'll get a duplicate, > > but in this context over time needs to be measured over a > > time scale far in excess of the time scale that is interesting. > > Adding the startup time doesn't hurt. > Or enough bits of the startup time to guarantee a duplicate won't > happen in our life. No, it doesn't hurt. I just don't think it adds much value. Why not use a simple counter, though?
-Ekr -- [Eric Rescorla [EMAIL PROTECTED]] http://www.rtfm.com/ -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> For additional commands, e-mail: <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>