On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 11:49 AM, grarpamp <grarp...@gmail.com> wrote: >> ... >> the original argument is based on faulty assumptions. > > Rather, it presents untested hypotheses. As in the past with > these sorts of sites, the operator perhaps got vanned for reasons > other than any particular weakness of tor itself, or just vanished > for unknown reasons.
all of these; assuming discovery of hidden sites remains consistently authoritative of all resources (the presumption of fewer hidden services leading to flawed hypothesis, ...) to be clear: i disagree with the measurements, just as much as i disagree with the conclusions drawn from them. > Even without the cluster of services in question there's still around > 1150 onions to browse... nearly a full rebound from the former > events. and yet here too, a limited metric. > ... That's really the only way to > resolve some of these hypotheses... with facts. indeed. until then, i can only provide subjective experience as well. for what's it's worth, my experience is to the contrary. in network hostile environments Tor is increasingly the only effective technology i can use to remain in robust communication. best regards, -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk